Fighting administrative corruption in Afghanistan

Administrative corruption in Afghanistan is a major problem affecting all levels of government and society. It undermines the legitimacy of the state, hinders development progress, and contributes to instability. Analysing the corruption control frameworks of other countries shows that the successful suppression of administrative corruption depends on effective anti-corruption measures. Previous local studies have not addressed the issue of fighting administrative corruption in Afghanistan, let alone the challenges involved in this process. The lack of a comprehensive anti-corruption framework in Afghanistan is becoming a growing concern. Considering these obstacles, the central thesis is twofold. First, the rule of law is weakened due to the excessive power of officials in policymaking and implementation of anti-corruption initiatives, the lack of political will, and the absence of a culture of zero tolerance toward corruption in society. Second, Afghanistan has had anti-administrative corruption laws and mechanisms, but they have not been implemented effectively. It is argued that some of these laws and mechanisms are not improving the social and cultural realities in Afghanistan, reflecting failed law enforcement, especially over the past two decades. Henceforth, the adoption of the “Administrative Corruption Control Framework for Afghanistan” for combating administrative corruption and bringing transparency, accountability, and consistency among government officials in their public lives is needed. Directed by these propositions, this research examines the Afghan government’s approaches to combating administrative corruption. The research is theoretically grounded in the Fraud Triangle Theory and Fayol’s Management Theory, which are employed to evaluate the effectiveness of Afghanistan’s anti-corruption framework. The Fraud Triangle Theory is employed to examine how deficiencies in law enforcement, regulatory oversight, and accountability mechanisms create opportunities for administrative corruption. These deficiencies also facilitate the rationalisation of corrupt conduct, which ultimately undermines the rule of law. Fayol’s Management Theory is employed to evaluate the structural and administrative weaknesses present within public institutions. This includes a focus on the lack of effective legal control, discipline, and managerial accountability, which obstructs the proper implementation of anti-corruption laws. The integration of these theories offers a critical framework for analysing the relationship between legal norms and institutional practices. This examination highlights how theoretical insights can contribute to legal reform efforts and enhance the enforcement of anti-corruption laws in Afghanistan. This research employs a doctrinal library-based method. The primary data consists of legislative documents, including the Afghanistan Constitution, local anti-corruption laws, the Charter of the United Nations, and the multilateral anti-corruption protocols outlined in the United Nations Convention Against Corruption. The discussion focuses on the anti-corruption efforts in Afghanistan, with the findings of this research detailed in Chapter Six. Chapter Five examines the corruption control frameworks in New Zealand and Singapore. This research revealed that the efficacy of anti-corruption laws and strategies in Afghanistan has been undermined by several factors. The research aims to contribute to the body of knowledge and literature on combating administrative corruption initiatives in Afghanistan, thereby assisting anti-corruption authorities and policymakers directly involved in such an endeavour.