

Examining Key Stakeholder’s Neglect as an Obstacle to Effective Administrative Reform in the Nigerian Power Sector

Ashiru Olayemi Aliyu* ^{1 & 2}; Kuppusamy Singaravelloo¹; Norma Mansor¹

¹Department of Public Administration, Faculty of Business & Economics, Universiti Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia

²Department of Politics & Governance, Faculty of Management & Social Sciences, Kwara State University- Malete, Nigeria

*Correspondence Email: ashiru.aliyu@kwasu.edu.ng

ABSTRACT

ARTICLE HISTORY

Received:

26 January 2024

Accepted:

25 February 2024

Published:

25 April 2024

KEYWORDS

Administrative Reforms, Development, Efficiency, Electricity, Reform Outcomes

Scholars have long recognized a stable electricity supply as a critical infrastructure required to facilitate economic growth and development in all nations. But, despite concerted efforts made by the successive governments in Nigeria to rejig the power sector for optimal performance. No substantial progress has been achieved; the initiatives have over time produced unintended outcomes. Thus, this study examines issues ascribed to the unintended outcomes against the anticipated result. In this article, a survey research method, a cross-section study, and a purposive sampling technique were adopted. The study distributed a total of 463 closed-ended questionnaires where 401 were returned to establish the complex relationship between the dependent and independent variables. Data obtained was analysed using WarpPLS software, a variance-based Structural Equation Model. The study found that stakeholder support, which is required to drive a purposeful reform exercise, was conspicuously lacking. The research suggests a strong alignment, collaboration, and cooperation amongst the stakeholders as a necessity and a sine qua non to purposeful reform outcome.

e-ISSN 2600-7274

© 2024 Universiti Teknologi MARA Cawangan Pulau Pinang

This open access article is distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non-commercial 4.0 International (CC BY-NC 4.0) license.

<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/>



1. INTRODUCTION

In the public sector management parlance, the issue of administrative reform is a widely discussed phenomenon in both developed and developing countries. Historically, administrative reform emerged many centuries ago but attracted global attention in the 1940s and became prominent between the 1960s-1970s (Caiden,1979). This simply implies that administrative reform is not an emerging issue, but an old, and recurring issue. Undoubtedly, administrative reform is a vital ingredient of development cross-nationally, irrespective of the pattern, direction, and speed of change, because improved administrative capacity is central to the implementation of new ideas, plans, and policies (Caiden, 1969). Put simply, administrative reform entails the reorganization of institutions and structures considered ineffective or requiring innovation for better service.

Interestingly, academic discussions on the impact of administrative reform on economic growth and national development, most especially in developing economies, became more intense in the last century. This aptly attests to renewed interest in the continuation of the agitation for improving electricity access to enhance individual livelihood and accomplish nations the nation-states. Sarkodie and Adams (2020: 1) assert that "*without electricity, the pathways out of poverty are narrow and long*".

From the foregoing, it became apparent that the role of a public institution as a critical player in accomplishing this fundamental objective of this state cannot be underestimated. Undoubtedly, an efficient public sector facilitates a sound, balanced, and virile societal development (Nasrollah, 2004). This is especially true in the provision of public goods and services, namely: stable electricity, portable water supplies, and other infrastructural facilities. Notably, the availability of these commodities aptly indicates the bedrock of the state's obligation to the populace under the good governance principle. Yet, Nigeria and many developing countries (LDCs), are still struggling and grappling with the challenge of adequate provision of this essential service. Seidu, (2010: 1) acknowledged these challenges and admitted that "*without reform in the sector, good governance and efficient administration can be looked upon as wishful thinking*". Undoubtedly, an essential component of Nigerian governance is administrative reform, which aims to improve the effectiveness, transparency, and responsiveness of the public sector to the demands of the populace. The failure of administrative reform programmes across the nation has been hindered by several issues, despite the general recognition of their necessity. One major barrier has been the disregard of important stakeholders. A wide range of parties are involved in administrative reform, including local communities, businesses, government agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and individuals. The success of reform initiatives throughout African countries has been hampered by a persistent problem: ignoring the interests, viewpoints, and contributions of these important stakeholders. It is noteworthy that stakeholders are often neglected in Nigerian administrative reform initiatives. This in most cases result in may result in policies that do not align with the diverse needs and expectations of the population (Nkosi & Diallo, 2021). Stakeholder neglect can take many different forms, according to research, including little consultation and little involvement in decision-making.

1.1 Problem Statement

Despite the government's giant strides to reposition the sector for efficient delivery through successive reform initiatives. Conversely, the government has demonstrated more commitment to the sector over the years and huge financial investment in the sector (FGN, 2010). For example, between 1999-2015, a huge sum #2.7 trillion equivalent to USD 8.8

billion (at # 305 per USD), was allocated and disbursed but no commensurate result (Igali, 2015). Nonetheless, evidence from end-users suggests that no meaningful progress has been achieved. In a nutshell, the reform programme has since failed to produce anticipated outcomes. For example, the quarterly report for 2015 produced by NERC (2016) unveiled that a total of 47,127 electricity consumers lodged complaints against electricity companies over erratic power supply. Also, the NERC quarterly record showed that the number of complainants increased from 47,127 to 109,048 over interrupted likewise inadequate supply against power distribution companies in the third quarter of 2017 (NERC, 2018).

This undoubtedly pinpoints the fact that the majority of customers are dissatisfied with the service provided by the power companies. The evidence from these reports suggests that one out of every five electricity consumers is displeased with the quality of services provided by this utility company. To further buttress this argument, the former Vice President's assertion rightly alluded to deep concern over states of electricity supply in the post-reform as reported by Tony (2019) thus:

“Power sector has failed to deliver the desired result after years of privatisation. The sector remains stalled in delivering power to many Nigerian homes and businesses. We must act as a matter of national importance and we are committed to doing so, to work and re-engineer the sector for much more effective performance.”

Conversely, the President also shared greater frustrations on the negative impact of poor electricity delivery to the national economy as reported by Philip (2015) thus:

“No single cause can be identified to explain the Nigerian's poor economic performance over the years than the power situation. It is a national shame that an economy of 180 million generates only 4,000MW, and distributes even less. Continuous tinkering with the structures of power supply and distribution and close to \$20b expanded since 1999 have only brought darkness, frustration, misery, and resignation among Nigerians. We will not allow this to go on. Careful studies are underway during this transition to identify the quickest, safest, and most cost-effective way to bring light and relief to Nigerians”.

Moreover, this ugly situation forced a quarter of the population to rely on a generator, 32.3 percent resorted to a rechargeable lamp for lighting. In contrast, 21.7 percent rely on a kerosene lamp and battery touch lights (Okpi, 2018). Papaefstratiou (2019) offered useful insight into the problem when he asserted the absence of mutual trust amongst key stakeholders in the reform process. The stakeholders include political actors, bureaucrats, professionals, and interest groups (civil society organisation).

For instance, political actors, bureaucrats, professionals, and interest groups (civil society organisation) have significantly affected positive reform outcomes. Therefore, the fundamental thrust of this paper is: to ascertain whether political, bureaucratic, and professional support influences a successful reform. Additionally, to establish whether reform decision moderates the relationship between professional support and at the same time reconfirm Ouda's (2008) generic reform model.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Several studies have discussed reform in the public sector institutions aimed at achieving optimal performance. Many scholars have advocated for administrative reform to facilitate modernisation and change in society to effect social and economic transformation (Hussain, 1997, Farazmand, 1999; Brunsson, 2006). Admittedly, Caiden and Sundaram (2004) maintained that reform exercises a significant impact on building the capacity of public sector organisations. In this sense, Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011) agree that effective public institutions were strategic to reinvigorate and bolster the national economy. To corroborate this argument, Van Wart and Kapucu (2011) maintain that reform initiatives are often designed to facilitate institutional strengthening for improved performance.

From another perspective, many studies have justified support for privatisation as a deliberate effort to instill efficiency in service delivery (Adamantiades, Besant-Jones, & Hoskote, 1995; Bacon, 1999; Besant-Jones, 2006; Gratwick & Eberhard, 2008; Willians & Ghanadan, 2006). In light of this, Pollitt (2007; Shoshonis, 2011) identified privatisation as the most common pattern of electricity sector reform in both developed and developing countries. Additionally, notably amongst scholars whose research has shown vested attention to electricity reform in developing nations include (Jamsab *et al.*, 2004; Andersson, 2004; Pollitt, 2007 in Sioshansi, 2011).

However, Meyer *et al.* (2018) raised concern that privatisation in developing countries has proved itself to be a challenging exercise. This is because the exercise is most likely to generate an unexpected outcome and maintain that privatisation always accompanies controversies. In the same manner, Brirdsall and Nelli's (2003) study reveals divergent opinions on the effect of privatisation on poverty and the national economy. This might be the reason why many unveil strong skeptics and apprehension about the multiplier effect of the privatisation exercise against the fundamental objective of state principle.

Despite the divergent standpoint and ambiguities that have characterised the privatisation programme. There seems to be a consensus on what constitutes the rationale for or cardinal objective of privatisation, which entails enhancing competition and improving service quality (Pitelis & Clarke, 1993, Asmeron, 1994; Farazmand, 2000; Zhang *et al.*; 2002; Mota, 2004; Jamasb *et al.*; 2005). Notably, this ambitious objective cannot be accomplished in isolation, which is why many studies affirm close synergy and alignment among stakeholders in the electricity value chain. For instance, the Association of National Electricity Distribution (2019) maintains that the objective of power sector reform would not be realised without alignment, collaboration, and cooperation amongst stakeholders in the electricity delivery chain.

Admittedly, Muhammed's (2012) assertion corroborates the above argument that successful reform has failed to actualise far-reaching results. This is simply because facilitators of reform seem to work in isolation and secrecy, and this often deprives the process of expected participation and support from key stakeholders. Caiden (1979), while alluding to this argument, mentioned that most reforms fail not because strategies are incorrect, wrong, or implemented by unqualified reformers but merely due to inadequate support from key stakeholders. Consequently, when this happens, the reformers face stiff resistance and hostility from the public, who are often skeptical about change; of course, this negatively affects reform outcomes. Concisely, Meyer-Sahling, and Jan-Hinrik (2006) agree that the inability to establish synergy amongst key stakeholders in the reform process was largely

responsible for unintended reform outcomes. Much literature has underscored the significance of various stakeholders, including government agencies, private sector entities, and consumers, in driving administrative reform (Oladiran et al., 2017). Understanding and aligning the interests of these stakeholders are critical for successful reform initiatives.

In the same manner, Sangita (2002: 340) rightly observes that *"the success of reform depends upon the government's ability to present strategic reform based on the vision in consultation with the wider sections of the society as well as effective communication to the stakeholders and people about the need for reform and likely benefits from it"*. Similarly, Smith and Johnson (2020) state that a major barrier to administrative reform in the Nigerian Power Sector is the disregard for important stakeholders. According to Johnson et al. (2021), successful administrative change in the electricity industry depends on an understanding of the dynamics of stakeholder interactions. Stakeholder neglect undermines administrative reform efforts, as demonstrated by a recent study by Brown (2022) that highlights the necessity of comprehensive methods to address this issue. From the foregoing, it is evident that stakeholders' support is key to a desirable reform outcome, which cannot be underestimated.

2.1 Underpinning Theory

This article was anchored on Ouda's (2008) generic government sector model to explain the central point of this research has administrative reform in the power industry failed to produce the desired result? This framework explains the lateral relationship between political actors, bureaucrats, and professional supports in reform initiation and implementation. The adapted model was used based on the strength of the model, which underscores the fundamental requirement for successful reform. Put simply; this model was premised on the belief that for government sector reform to be successful, it must be supported by the key actors (political actors, bureaucrats, and professional groups), and when otherwise, the reform programmes are unlikely to be successful. To buttress Ouda's postulation, Zhang et al. (2008) suggest that the nature of the relationship that exists between stakeholders such as political class, bureaucrats, and other interest groups is a key determinant of reform success. The framework adopted in this research is presented in Figure 1.




Figure 1: Adopted Theoretical Framework of the Study

The description of the adopted generic government sector reform:

$$\text{SGR} = f(\text{PBS} + \text{PS} + \text{RD})$$

Where:

- SGR = Successful Government Reform
f = function
PBS = Political and Bureaucratic Support
PS = Professional Support
RD = Reform Decision

Notably, no attempt has been made to empirically study the reason why administrative reform failed. This article attempts to reconfirm this model using new data collected on each of the model variables. In the model, successful government reform (SGR) was used as the dependent variable, while Political, bureaucratic support (PBS), and professional support (PS) were used as the independent variable.

2.2 Proposition Developed

Although, many studies have been carried out on public sector reform (Farazmand, 2000; Beh, 2007; Seidu, 2010; Ukwandu & Ijere, 2020; Ishihara, 2021). However, there are few studies on the influence of stakeholders on administrative reform outcomes. Therefore, this study hypothesized that stakeholders support significantly influences the level of successful administrative reform. Specifically, the study postulates this:

Proposition 1: *Successful government sector reform (SGR) is associated with strong political, and bureaucratic support (PBS.)*

Proposition 2: *Strong professional support (PS) facilitates successful government reform (SGR)*

Proposition 3: *Reform decision (RD) moderates the relationship between professional support and successful government reform.*

3. METHODOLOGY

This section encompasses research methods including sampling techniques, the selected sample sources of data, methods/instruments of data collection, and method of data analysis.

3.1 Research and Sampling Techniques

This study adopted a cross-sectional research approach and purposive research technique. This research adopted a quantitative approach because quantitative data provides a vivid understanding of the issues under study. Quantifying the influence of political, bureaucratic, and professional support using a scale ensures a better understanding of what determines a successful administrative reform.

3.2 Sample

For the study to generate quantitative data from the population, a sample (respondents) was chosen from the following states: Lagos, Kwara, Niger, and Osun, having a total population of 1,589,000. Altogether, 463 respondents were chosen as the sample size (Based on Krejcie & Morgan 1970 sample size table).

Additionally, the breakdown of sample selection to the states shows that 156 respondents from Lagos State were included in the survey, 104 respondents from Niger State, 104 respondents from Osun State, and 99 respondents from Kwara, were included in the survey. In total, 463 respondents participated in the survey exercise. The selection was made based on an essential demographic attribute of the population: residency urban/rural, gender, educational attainment, and occupation. Table 1 shows the sample selection criteria for four states.

Table 1: Sample Selection Criteria for Four States

States	Number of LGs (sample)	Wards (sample)	Sampled Population
Lagos	20 (5)	110 (10)	156
Niger	25 (5)	105 (10)	104
Osun	30 (7)	120 (13)	104
Kwara	16 (4)	95 (9)	99
Total	91 (21)	430 (42)	463

Source: *Extracted from National Bureau of Statistics, Nigeria, Demographic Distribution of population (2016).*

Note: Figures in parenthesis represent the sample size for each item

Conversely, civil servants from the Ministry of Energy, Works, and the Governor's office served as respondents. Likewise, programme officers in Civil society organisations, electricity employees, and well academia. The selected respondents were presumed to have adequate knowledge of the issues under investigation.

3.3 Procedure

A closed-ended questionnaire instrument was utilised to elicit cogent information from participants chosen from the study population. The questionnaire was carefully designed, vetted, and ensured to capture issues under study before being administered to 463 respondents (stakeholders), giving rise to 401 valid responses. The study first establishes contact with the relevant organisation through Permanent secretaries and heads to solicit intending respondents through emails. Moreover, designed questionnaires were delivered to participating organisations for onward transmission to respondents and were given a week to fill out to avoid pressure. Subsequently, the questionnaires were retrieved and collated accordingly. Data gathered through this survey method were inserted and coded appropriately into SPSS software.

The SPSS software was also used to screen the data and detect or remove outliers that might significantly affect the resulting output from the SPSS. The Cronbach's alpha for the latent variables was found to be satisfactory as the values exceeded the threshold $> .70$. Moreover,

evidence from the Kolmogorov-Shapiro-Wilks Normality Test conducted shows $p\text{-value} = 0.000$, the $P < 0.05$, indicating a nonlinear data distribution. For the tool of analysis, a non-parametric, (WarpPLS 6.0 software)- variance-based structural equation model was adopted to analyse the data collected based on the result of the normality test. WarpPLS as a tool of analysis was considered well-suited because of its strength in prediction-oriented studies and theory development (Hair et al., 2017; Ali et al., 2018; Rasoolimanesh & Ali, 2018).

4. RESULT AND DISCUSSION

4.1 Reliability Statistics

Table 2 shows the result obtained from a pilot test conducted to ascertain the veracity of the survey design and research instrument (questionnaire). The participants were public servants, lecturers, retired electricity employees, and public officers who had adequate knowledge about the privatisation programme. A total of 30 respondents were chosen from the target study population. The pilot test was conducted between 26th and 30th January 2022. The study administered 30 sets of questionnaires developed on a 5-point Likert scale.

Table 2 Reliability Statistics

Latent variable	Number of items	Cronbach's Alpha
PBS	8	0.812
PS	7	0.798
RD	7	0.748
SGR	6	0.824

Source: Author's Computation, 2023.

Evidence from the result indicates that the alpha value of all the latent variables exceeded the threshold, which is greater than ≥ 0.7 . Therefore, the internal consistency for the latent variable met an acceptable level, implying that the reliability value is satisfactory.

4.2 Assessment of Research Models

In this paper, two evaluation models were employed: namely, the measurement model and the structural model. This evaluation was analysed using the PLS-SEM approach supported by WarpPLS 6.0 Algorithm method. All constructs are explained and considered as reflective indicators. Based on Kock's (2012) sample size specification for the choice of resampling method, the bootstrapping resampling method in WarpPLS was adopted because the research sample size is 463, which is higher than 100.

4.3 Measurement Model (Outer Model)

The outer model often referred to as the "measurement model", is usually evaluated to determine the reliability and validity of the indicators of the latent variables in the proposed model. Latan and Ghozali (2017) argued that the measurement of validity and reliability of the "outer model" through reflective constructs must encompass the following: (i) Multicollinearity (ii) internal consistency: Cronbach's alpha (CA) and composite reliability

(CR); and (iii) assessment of validity: convergent and discriminant. The result in Table 4 was derived from data analysed to verify the incidences of multicollinearity (if any) in the model.

Table 3: Multicollinearity

Full Collinearity	VIFs
PBS	1.369
PS	1.545
RD	1.226
SGR	1.107
RD*PS	1.82

Source: Survey Data Analysed using WarpPLS 6.0 Software, 2023.

In WarpPLS analysis, Kock (2018) recommended an acceptable threshold of ≥ 3.3 , specially when model variables are measured through one or more indicators. All values derived from the model variable estimation were lower than the recommended threshold. The results for each construct are thus acceptable and aptly suggest the absence of a multicollinearity problem. Similarly, the article further assessed the internal consistency of the construct used in the model through two measurements: (i) Cronbach alpha and (ii) composite reliability coefficients. The values obtained from each of the measurement items are presented in Table 4 and Table 5 below.

Table 4: Cronbach Alpha

Cronbach alpha (CA)	
PBS	0.746
PS	0.817
RD	0.723
SGR	0.722
RD*PS	0.915

Source: Survey Data Analysed using WarpPLS 6.0 Software, 2023.

Table 5: Composite Reliability (CR)

Composite Reliability (CR)	
PBS	0.704
PS	0.865
RD	0.751
SGR	0.812
RD*PS	0.922

According to Tavakol and Dennick (2011) Cronbach alpha coefficients $\alpha \geq 0.9$ = excellent; $0.9 > \alpha \geq 0.8$ = good; $0.8 > \alpha \geq 0.7$ is acceptable, while; $0.7 > \alpha \geq 0.6$ questionable; $0.6 > \alpha \geq 0.5$ poor and lastly $0.5 > \alpha$ is considered unacceptable. From Table 4, the values of Cronbach alpha coefficients obtained from each construct as presented in the table above are as follows: PBS 0.746, PS 0.817, 0.824, RD 0.723, SGR 0.722, RD*PS 0.915. Therefore, the CA for all the constructs is acceptable and found to be satisfactory. Undoubtedly, Cronbach alpha (CA) as an accurate measure of internal consistency has been vigorously challenged because of observable deficiencies and issues concerning computation and interpretation (Shevlin *et al.*, 2000; Raykov, 2001; Henson, 2001; Streiner, 2003; Hayashi & Kamata, 2005; Liu, & Zumbo, 2007). Moreover, this paper further conducted a composite reliability test to reinforce the CA; the coefficient obtained here is presented in Table 5.

The result in Table 5 indicates that the value of the coefficients for latent variables is: PBS 0.704; PS 0.865; CS0 0.515; RD 0.751; SR 0.812 while the result of the moderating variable also shows RD (RD*PS 0.922). Evidence from the table indicates that the results obtained were higher than the recommended threshold value of (0.6). This aptly implies that the internal consistency for the structural model is acceptable and satisfactory for all latent variables employed in the model.

In PLS-SEM, assessment of validity is crucial and is twofold: **Convergent** and **Discriminant** Validity. The common method for determining convergent validity is to check the estimated average variance extracted (AVE) against composite reliability (CR) for each loading of measurement items.

Table 6 Convergent Validity

<i>Measurement Items</i>	CR	AVE
<i>PBS</i>	0.704	0.430
<i>PS</i>	0.865	0.478
<i>RD</i>	0.751	0.44
<i>SGR</i>	0.812	0.424
<i>RD*PS</i>	0.922	0.425

Source: Survey Data Analysed using WarpPLS 6.0 Software, 2023.

Normally, the value for satisfactory convergent validity outcomes should be ≥ 0.5 . However, Fornell and Larcker (1981), as reported in Safiih and Azreen (2016), argued that when the value of AVE is less than 5, but the composite reliability is more than 0.6, then the convergent validity for that variable(s) is deemed satisfactory and acceptable. Based on the affirmation, the value of composite reliability (CR), as shown in column 2 of the table, is acceptable and satisfactory because the CR values for all variables are more than 0.6. Similarly, the table below shows the result of the discriminant validity test.

Table 7 Discriminant Validity

	<i>PBS</i>	<i>PS</i>	<i>RD</i>	<i>SGR</i>	<i>RD*PS</i>
<i>PBS</i>	0.575				
<i>PS</i>	0.395	0.692			
<i>RD</i>	0.399	0.282	0.58		
<i>SGR</i>	0.171	0.289	0.12	0.651	
<i>RD*PS</i>	0.044	0.035	0.1	0.02	0.474

Source: Survey Data Analysed using WarpPLS 6.0 Software, 2022

As indicated in Table 7, the **bolded** value for each construct in the model is greater than the value in the diagonal and off-diagonal in the rows and columns (as recommended by Muhammad Ali, 2013). Thus, evidence in the result analysed above, the assessment of the discriminant validity of the model is acceptable and satisfactory.

4.4 Evaluation of Structural Model

In PLS-SEM, a model fit and quality of indices are usually conducted to determine when a model is a better fit than the other using new data or testing hypotheses (Kock, 2017). The general result from model estimation is summarised in Table 8.

Table 8 Model Fit and Quality of Indices

Description	Threshold	Estimated Value	P-Value	Remark
APC	≤ 0.05	0.108	0.007	Significant
ARS	≤ 0.05	0.114	0.005	Significant
AARS	≤ 0.05	0.103	0.009	Significant
AVIV	≤ 5	1.442	-	Satisfactory
AFVIF	≤ 5	1.471	-	Satisfactory
GOLF	≥ 0.1	0.192	-	Small

Source: Data Analysed with WarpPLS 6.0 Software, 2023.

As shown in Table 8, the study model fit estimation indicates a good fit because the p -value of the main indicators of the robustness of the model: APC, ARS, and AARS, was found below the threshold. The values are aptly within the recommended range, which implies satisfaction (Kock, 2011). Specifically, the value for average path coefficient (APC), adjusted R-squared (ARS), and average adjusted R-squared (AARS) as presented above is < 0.05 , precisely the value for each are as follows: APC = 0.007, ARS = 0.005, and AARS = 0.009. Conversely, the result of multicollinearity estimation: AVIF, and AFVIF indicate 1.442 and 1.471, respectively. These values are acceptable because they are below the recommended moderate threshold of 3.3 (Kock, 2018). It, therefore, suggests the absence of multicollinearity problems across indicators and exogenous variables.

Moreover, the result of (GoF) "the goodness of fit" estimated shows 0.192, though small according to Wetzel et al. (2009) ranking but satisfied acceptable benchmark (Kock & Lynn, 2012; Kock, 2015a). For instance, Wetzel et al. (2009) categorized the thresholds for GoF thus: small if equal to or greater than 0.1, medium if equal to or greater than 0.25, and large if equal to or greater than 0.36.

Table 9 Structural Model Outcome

Measurement Items	Hypotheses	Beta
Political and Bureaucratic Support (PBS)	$H_1 a$: PBS to SGR	0.05
Professional Support (PS)	H : PS to SGR	0.22
(Moderation: Indirect)		
Reform Decision	H_{4a} : RD*PS to SGR	0.05

Source: Data Analysed with WarpPLS 6.0 Software, 2023.

The result analysed in Table 9 above, shows a positive relationship between PBS to SGR ($\beta=.005$; $p > .05$) but insignificant. Impliedly, the analysis failed to statistically confirm the relationship. However, some studies suggest otherwise (Ouda, 2008; Hesse, 2005; Beh, 2007; Schedler & Schmucki, 2009; Ahmed, 2009; Seidman, 2016). Therefore, this article rejects the hypothesis. In the same vein, path analysis of the relationship between PS to SGR ($\beta=.022$; p

< .05) suggests positive and significance. This aptly implies that the analysis has confirmed the relationships. Furthermore, analysis of moderating (indirect) effects of reform decision (RD) on successful government reform (SGR) through other variables, i.e., RD*PS to SGR ($\beta=.005$; $p > .05$), showing this relationship to be positive but insignificant

4.5 Discussion of Findings

The results analysed on the reliability and validity indicate high reliability and validity, it measures the strength, and the credibility of the research findings, instilling confidence in the accuracy of the results. Additionally, the overall model fit indices, including GoF, AVIF, and AFVIF, reinforce the reliability and robustness of the structural model. Moreso, structural equation estimation demonstrated a good fit, supported by satisfactory values of APC, ARS, and AARS. This affirms the robustness of the overall structural model. Analysis of the study propositions indicates that while the positive relationship between political and bureaucratic support (PBS) and successful government reform (SGR) was found to be insignificant, the positive and significant relationship between professional support (PS) and SGR validates the hypothesis. Moreover, estimating the moderating effects of reform decision (RD) on successful government reform (SGR) through professional support (PS) was positive but insignificant, suggesting potential areas for further investigation. The study contributes to the existing literature by employing PLS-SEM and providing nuanced insights into the relationships between key variables in public sector management. Specifically, the study's results provide valuable insights into the dynamics of public sector management, affirming the reliability and validity of the research methodology and offering avenues for future research exploration.

5. STUDY IMPLICATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

Reforms in Policy: To overcome stakeholder neglect in the Nigerian power sector, the findings point to the necessity of prompt governmental measures. Researchers could investigate the precise policy adjustments that are needed and evaluate how they might affect stakeholder participation. Also, the study emphasizes how crucial it is to provide important stakeholders with the tools they need to actively engage in administrative reforms. In another way, the potential avenues for further research include examining successful ways for strengthening the capacity of various stakeholder groups. The issues of techniques of communication are also crucial, therefore addressing stakeholder neglect requires effective communication. Consequent upon this, scholars could investigate communication tactics that can improve stakeholder collaboration and help administrative reform to be successful.

6. CONCLUSION AND CONTRIBUTIONS

Previous studies have reiterated the crucial role of stakeholders in a successful government reform exercise. Scholars such as Sangita (2002); and Meyer-Sahling and Jan-Hinrik (2006) have posited that the persistent failure of the reform programme was largely due to the inability to create strong synergy and effective consultation strategies among stakeholders. Data analysed and interpreted have proved that stakeholder involvement in the reform process is a prerequisite for result-oriented reform initiatives. For instance, the relationship between PBS to SGR ($\beta=.005$; $p > .05$), political, and bureaucratic support to facilitate successful government reform, was positive though not significant. But the literature as discussed above affirmed a significant relationship.

Furthermore, as shown in the path analysis, the relationship between professional support (PS) and successful government reforms (SGR) estimated using WarpPLS 6.0 indicates PS to SGR ($\beta=.022$; $p < .05$). This result affirmed the relationship as it has been statistically confirmed and proven.

Moreover, the article used a reform decision (RD) as a moderator, which estimated the indirect relationship between RD*PS to SGR ($\beta=.005$; $p > .05$) The result failed to confirm the indirect relationship between reform decision and SGR (RD*PS to SGR).

Evidence from the result presented affirms that reform decisions indirectly influence reform success. It became clear from the shreds of evidence analysed, that stakeholders significantly influence reform outcomes in the public sector. Consequently, the study affirmed that the contributions of key stakeholders are crucial to facilitate the success of government reform initiatives in the public sector. This implies that the involvement of key stakeholders is not only a pre-requisite, but it is a sine qua non to purposeful reform activities.

No doubt, a study of this nature is mostly assessed based on its contributions to expand the theoretical base and enrich the body of literature. from theoretical, empirical, and practical perspectives, Firstly, the study has contributed to the intellectual search for the appropriate theory/framework for result-oriented reform activity in the public sector. Secondly, the study has moved the search for an appropriate framework beyond Ouda's mere conceptualisation of the generic reform framework (variables), this study expands and empirically tests conceptualised variables (adapted variables). Lastly, the practical implication of this study entails the development of an adequate understanding of dynamics, complexities, and pre-conditions for a successful reform activity.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The authors appreciated the support received from all respondents. And particularly Dr Obasuyi who introduced me to WarpLS- a tool of analysis adopted in this study. Their contributions help me in the accomplishment of the research work.

AUTHORS' CONTRIBUTION

The research was carried out by all authors from the introduction to the conclusion. Specifically, the co-authors provided immense qualitative and quantitative support.

CONFLICT OF INTEREST

None

REFERENCES

- Admamantiades, A. G., Besant-Jone, J. E., & Hoskote, M. (1995). Power Sector Reform in Developing Countries and the Role of World Bank. *Administration & Society*, 47(6), 711-739.
- Ali, F., Rasoolimanesh, S. M., Sarstedt, M., Ringle, C. M., & Ryu, K. (2018). Undefined. *International Journal of Contemporary Hospitality Management*, 30(1), 514-538. doi:10.1108/ijchm-10-2016-0568
- Andersson, L. (2006). *Electricity Sector Reform in Namibia and Mozambique* (Unpublished master's thesis). Department of Business Administration and Social Science, Lulea University of Technology, Sweden.

- Asmeron, H. K. (1994). The Impact of Structural Adjustment Programme Policy in Administration Reform Strategic. In R.B. Jan and H. Bogart (eds) *Structural Adjustment Programme Policy and Bureaucracy in developing Societies* (pp. 368-395). New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications.
- Association of National Electricity Distribution. (2019, May 23). *The power sector wouldn't work properly without alignment*. Retrieved from <https://punchng.com/power-sector-wont-work-properly-without-alignment-discos/>
- Babatunde, O., Buraimoh, E., Tinuoye, O., Ayegbusi, C., Davidson, I., & Ighravwe, D. E. (2023). Electricity sector assessment in Nigeria: the post-liberation era. *Cogent Engineering*, 10(1), 2157536.
- Bacon, R. W. (1995). Privatisation and reform in the global electricity supply industry. *Annual Review of Energy and the Environment*, 20(1), 119-143. doi:10.1146/annurev.eg.20.110195.001003
- Beh L. (2007, August). *Administrative Reform: Issues of Ethics and Governance in Malaysia and China* [Conference session]. International China World Conference at the Institute of China Studies, University of Malaya, Malaysia
- Besant-Jones, J. E. (2006). *Reforming power markets in developing countries: what have we learned?* Washington, DC.: The World Bank.
- Birdsall, N., & Nellis, J. (2003). Winners and losers: Assessing the distributional impact of privatisation. *World Development*, 31(10), 1617-1633. doi:10.1016/s0305-750x(03)00141-4
- Brown, M. (2022). Strategies for overcoming stakeholder neglect in administrative reform: A case study of the Nigerian Power Sector. In *Proceedings of the International Conference on Public Policy*, 2, (101-120).
- Brunsson, N. (2006). undefined. *Scandinavian Journal of Management*, 22(3), 243-252. doi:10.1016/j.scaman.2006.10.007
- Caiden, G. E. (1969). Innovation in Public Administration, *Journal of Social Science*, 11(1),9-21. <https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000021537>.
- Caiden, G. E. (1979). Administrative reform: A view from the field. *Policy Studies Journal*, 8(3), 456-462. doi:10.1111/j.1541-0072.1979.tb01252.x
- Caiden, G. E., & Sundaram, P. (2004). The specificity of public service reform. *Public Administration and Development*, 24(5), 373-383. doi:10.1002/pad.329
- E. (2015, May 29). May 29 Inaugural Speeches. *The Punch* [Lagos]. Retrieved from www.dailypost.com
- Farazmand, A. (1999). Privatisation or reform? Public enterprise management in transition. *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, 65(4), 551-567. doi:10.1177/0020852399654003
- Farazmand, A. (2000). *Privatisation of Public Enterprises Reform*. Westport: Greenwood Press.
- FGN. (2010). *Roadmap for Power Sector Reforms: A Customer-driven Sector-wide Plan to Achieve Sustainable Power Supply*. The Presidency, Federal Republic of Nigeria.
- Fornell, C., & Larcker, D. F. (1981). Evaluating structural equation models with unobservable variables and measurement error. *Journal of Marketing Research*, 18(1), 39-50. doi:10.1177/002224378101800104
- Gratwick, K. N., & Eberhard, A. (2008). The demise of the Standard Model for power sector reform and the emergence of hybrid power markets. *Energy Policy*, 36(10), 3948-3960. doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2008.07.021
- Hair, J. F., Hult, G. T., Ringle, C., & Sarstedt, M. (2017). *A primer on Least Squares Structural Equation Modelling (PLS-SEM)* (2nd ed.). Los Angeles, C.A: Sage.

- Hayashi, K., & Kamata, A. (2005). A note on the estimator of the Alpha coefficient for standardised variables under normality. *Psychometrika*, 70(3), 579-586. doi:10.1007/s11336-001-0888-1
- Henson, R. K. (2001). Understanding internal consistency reliability estimates: A conceptual primer on coefficient Alpha. *Measurement and Evaluation in Counseling and Development*, 34(3), 177-189. doi:10.1080/07481756.2002.12069034
- Hesse, J. J. (2005, May). *The Korean Modernization Process-Looked at from Abroad*. Paper presented at Sixth Global Forum on Reinventing Government, Korea.
- Hussain, A. A. (1997). The Leadership Factor in Administrative Reforms in Malaysia, with a Specific Study on the Leadership of Dr Mahathir Mohamad, Prime Minister of Malaysia. *Pertanika Journal of Social Science and Humanities*, 5(2), 103-123.
- Igali, G. (2015, September 9). Power Probe: FG spent #2.74 Trillion on Power in 16 Years. *The Nigerian Observer Newspaper*, p. 1.
- Ishihara, T. (2021) *Public Management Review*, 1-10. doi:10.1080/14719037.2021.1893093
- Jamasb, T., R., D., M., T., Mota, R., & Newbery, D., & Pollitt, M. (2005). *Electricity Sector Reform in Developing Countries: a survey of empirical evidence on determinants and performance*. Washington DC: The World Bank.
- Johnson, K., Williams, L., & Davis, M. (2021). Stakeholder dynamics and administrative reform in the Nigerian Power Sector. *International Journal of Public Administration*, 25(4), 567-589.
- Kock, N. (2018). WarpPLS 6.0 User Manual, Script Warp Systems. Laredo, TX, USA. (Online URL) http://cits.tamui.edu/WarpPLS/UserManual_v_6_0.pdf
- Kock, N. (2011). A mathematical analysis of the evolution of human mate choice traits: Implications for evolutionary psychologists. *Journal of Evolutionary Psychology*, 9(3), 219-247. doi:10.1556/jep.9.2011.3.1
- Kock, N. (2015). A note on how to conduct a factor-based PLS-SEM analysis. *International Journal of e-Collaboration*, 11(3), 1-9. doi:10.4018/ijec.2015070101.
- Kock, N. (2015). How likely is Simpson's paradox in path models? *International Journal of e-Collaboration*, 11(1), 1-7. doi:10.4018/ijec.2015010101.
- Kock, N. (2017). *WarpPLS user manual: Version 6.0*. Script Warp Systems. (online URL) http://cits.tamui.edu/WarpPLS/UserManual_v_6_0.pdf
- Kock, N., & Gaskins, L. (2016). Simpson's paradox, moderation and the emergence of quadratic relationships in path models: An information systems illustration. *International Journal of Applied Nonlinear Science*, 2(3), 200. doi:10.1504/ijans.2016.077025
- Kock, N., & Lynn, G. (2012). Lateral collinearity and misleading results in variance-based SEM: An illustration and recommendations. *Journal of the Association for Information Systems*, 13(7), 546-580. doi:10.17705/1jais.00302
- Krejcie, R. V., & Morgan, D. W. (1970). Determining sample size for research activities. *Educational and Psychological Measurement*, 30(3), 607-610. doi:10.1177/001316447003000308
- Latan, H., & Noonan, R. (2017). *Partial least squares path modeling: Basic concepts, methodological issues, and applications*. Springer.
- Liu, Y., & Zumbo, B. D. (2007). The impact of outliers on Cronbach's coefficient Alpha estimate of reliability: Visual analog scales. *Educational and Psychological Measurement*, 67(4), 620-634. doi:10.1177/0013164406296976
- MacKinnon, D. P., Krull, J. L., & Lockwood, C. M. (2000). Equivalence of the mediation, confounding, and suppression effect. *Prevention Science*, 1(4), 173-181. Retrieved from <https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1026595011371>

- Meyer, R., Eberhard, A., & Gratwick, K. (2018). Uganda's power sector reform: There and back again? *Energy for Sustainable Development*, 43, 75-89. doi: 10.1016/j.esd.2017.11.001
- Meyer-Sahling, J. (2006). The rise of the partisan state? Parties, patronage, and the ministerial bureaucracy in Hungary. *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, 22(3), 274-297. doi:10.1080/13523270600855662
- Mota, R. L. (2004). *Comparing Brazil and USA Electricity Distribution Performance: What was the Impact of Privatisation?* Department of Applied Economics, University of Cambridge.
- Muhamadali, K. (2012). *Exploring new factors and the question of which 'in user acceptance studies of healthcare software* (Master's thesis, School of Computer Science, University of Nottingham, United Kingdom).
- Muhammed, A. (2012). Public Administration Reform: A Perspective on Theoretical Challenge. *Society and Change*, 6(3), 68-78.
- Nasrollah. (2004). *Roles of the Public Sector in the Economy, Proceeding of the Fifth United Nation General Assembly*. Retrieved from www.library.un.org/sites/library.un.org
- NERC. (2017, July 15). Quarterly Report on Electricity Supply in Nigeria. *Punch Newspaper*.
- NERC. (2018, August 28). Quarterly Report on Electricity Supply in Nigeria, *Punch Newspaper*.
- Nkosi, M., & Diallo, A. (2021). *Corruption and Administrative Reform: A Focus on African Countries*. Oxford University Press.
- Okpi, A. (2018). *Factsheet: The Challenges of Keeping Nigeria's Light on, Africa*. Retrieved from <https://africacheck.org/factsheets/factsheet-challenge-keeping-nigerias-lights/>
- Oladiran, T. O., et al. (2017). The role of stakeholders in driving administrative reform in the Nigerian power sector. *International Journal of Scientific & Engineering Research*, 8(8), 980-989.
- Olujobi, O. J., Okorie, U. E., Olarinde, E. S., & Aina-Pelemo, A. D. (2023). Legal responses to energy security and sustainability in Nigeria's power sector amidst fossil fuel disruptions and low carbon energy transition. *Heliyon*.
- Ouda, H. (2008). Towards a generic model for government sector reform: The New Zealand experience. *International Journal Financial Management*, 8(2), 91.
- Papaefstratiou, D. (2019). *The Nigerian power market experiment: a critical appraisal of the PHCN privatisation*, Retrieved from <https://www.dlapiper.com/en/uk/insights/publications/2019/03/the-nigerian-electricity-market-experiment/>.
- Philip, E. (2015, May 29). May 29 Inaugural Speeches. *Dailypost*. Retrieved from www.dailypost.com
- Pitelis, C., & Clarke. (1993). Introduction: The Political Economy of Privatization. In *Thomas Clarke and Christos Pitelis (eds) The Political Economy of Privatizations of privatisations*. London: Routledge.
- Pollitt, M. G. (2007). Liberalisation and Regulation in Electricity Systems: How can we get the balance right? In *Sioshansi, F. P. (2011) Competitive Electricity Markets: Design, Implementation, Performance*. Elsevier Science.
- Pollitt, C., & Bouckaert, G. (2011). *Public management reform: A comparative analysis of NPM, the Neo-Weberian State, and New Public Governance*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Rasoolimanesh, S. M., & Ali, F. (2018). Partial Least Square-Structural Equation Modeling in Hospital and Tourism. *Journal of Hospitality Tourism Technology*, 9(3), 238-248.
- Rawls, J. (2001). *Justice as fairness. Contemporary Political Theory: A Reader*. The Belknap

- Press of Harvard University Press. <https://doi.org/10.4135/9781446215272.n2>
- Raykov, T. (2001). The bias of coefficient α for fixed congeneric measures with correlated errors. *Applied psychological measurement*, 25(1), 69-76. Retrieved from <https://doi.org/10.1177/01466216010251005>
- Safiih, M., & Azreen, N. (2016). Confirmatory Factor Analysis Approach: A Case Study of Mathematics Students' Achievement in TIMSS. *Malaysian Journal of Mathematical Sciences*, 10(1), 41-51.
- Sangita, S. N. (2002). Administrative reforms for good governance. *The Indian Journal of Political Science*, 63(4), 325-350.
- Sarkodie, S. A., & Adams, S. (2020). Electricity access and income inequality in South Africa: Evidence from Bayesian and NARDL analyses. *Energy Strategy Reviews*, 29, 100480. doi: 10.1016/j.esr.2020.100480
- Schedler, K., & Schmucki, L. (2009). The political rationale of administrative reforms: Parliamentary support of output control in Switzerland. *Swiss Political Science Review*, 15(1), 1-30. doi:10.1002/j.1662-6370.2009.tb00121.x
- Seidman, A. (2016). *State and law in the development process: Problem-solving and institutional change in the third world*. Springer.
- Seidu, S. B. (2010). *Institutionalising reforms in the public sector: a comparative study of public sector reform agencies in Ghana and Nigeria* (Unpublished master's thesis). Erasmus University.
- Shevlin, M., Miles, J., Davies, M., & Walker, S. (2000). Coefficient Alpha: A useful indicator of reliability? *Personality and Individual Differences*, 28(2), 229-237. doi:10.1016/s0191-8869(99)00093-8.
- Sidel, J. T., & Paredes, O. T. (2000). Capital, coercion, and crime: bossism in the Philippines. *Choice Reviews Online*, 38(04), 38-2396-38-2396. <https://doi.org/10.5860/choice.38-2396>.
- Sioshansi, F. P. (2011). Competitive electricity markets: Questions remain about design, implementation, and performance. *The Electricity Journal*, 21(2), 74-87. doi: 10.1016/j.tej.2008.02.001
- Smith, J., & Johnson, K. (2020). Examining stakeholder neglect in the Nigerian Power Sector. *Journal of Administrative Reform*, 15(2), 123-145.
- Streiner, D. L. (2003). Being inconsistent about consistency: When coefficient Alpha does and doesn't matter. *Journal of Personality Assessment*, 80(3), 217-222. doi:10.1207/s15327752jpa8003_01
- Tavakol, M., & Dennick, R. (2011). Making sense of Cronbach's Alpha. *International Journal of Medical Education*, 2, 53-55. doi: 10.5116/ijme.4dfb.8dfd
- Ukwandu, D. C., & Ijere, E. S. (2020). Public sector reforms and national development: A situational analysis of post-independent Nigeria. *Africa's Public Service Delivery and Performance Review*, 8(1). doi:10.4102/apsdpr.v8i1.354
- Van Wart, M., & Kapucu, N. (2011). Crisis management competencies. *Public Management Review*, 13(4), 489-511. doi:10.1080/14719037.2010.525034
- Wetzels, Odekerken-Schröder, & Van Oppen. (2009). Using PLS path modeling for assessing hierarchical construct models: Guidelines and empirical illustration. *MIS Quarterly*, 33(1), 177. doi:10.2307/20650284
- Williams, J., & Ghanadan, R. (2006). Electricity reform in developing and transition countries: A reappraisal. *Energy*, 31(6-7), 815-844. doi: 10.1016/j.energy.2005.02.008
- Zhang, Y., Parker, D., & Kirkpatrick, C. (2007). Electricity sector reform in developing countries: An econometric assessment of the effects of privatisation, competition, and regulation. *Journal of Regulatory Economics*, 33(2), 159-178. doi:10.1007/s11149-007-9039-7.

AUTHOR BIOGRAPHIES

Dr. Aliyu Olayemi Ashiru is a lecturer of Public Administration (specialised in Public Management) at Kwara State University, Malete, Nigeria. He has published over 10 articles in peer-reviewed journals in Malaysia, USA, and Nigeria. The current research is in public Management (administrative reforms in the public sector).

Kuppusamy Singaravelloo is an associate professor at the Department of Public Administration, Universiti Malaya. He has published over 40 articles and books in areas of public management. Privatisation, Local Government.

Emeritus Professor Norma Mansor is currently the Director of the Social Wellbeing Research Centre (SWRC), Universiti Malaya, a position she has held since 2013. She was appointed the Secretary of the National Economic Advisory Council, Prime Minister's Department (2009 to 2011) after being the Dean of the Faculty of Economics and Administration from April 2004 to June 2009. She was also the Executive Director of the International Institute of Public Policy and Management (INPUMA) from September 2001 until March 2004. She has served as an advisor and a consultant to various organisations, including the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the World Bank, International Labor Organisation (ILO), Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the European Union (EU), the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and numerous Malaysian public agencies. As an academic, Professor Mansor has published over 37 articles, 11 books, and 38 book chapters.