

THE ONSET OF CIVIL WAR: COMBINING VARIOUS SCHOLARLY RESEARCH METHODS TO ARRIVE AT A SINGLE, UNIFIED EXPLANATION OF WHY CIVIL WARS OCCUR

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ABSTRACT

Historically, Southeast Asia has been among the most peaceful regions of the world. In the last sixty years, however, the populations of Southeast Asia have been torn apart by ravaging civil wars. What could be causing the high number of ethno-religious civil wars in Southeast Asia? Exactly what aspects of ethnicity and religion are associated with the start and continuation of war? What happens when religion and race crosses the path of a historically and traditionally peaceful Southeast Asian culture? To understand this, I use three different methods, two of which I have already employed in previous researches—quantitative (statistical) and traditional case studies. The third, using personal interviews with direct participants of conflict, is the focus of this study. Without personal interviews, the research becomes critically incomplete. What I propose to do is to build an inventory of transcripts of personal interviews of all former and current parties directly involved in these conflicts. This, combined with the results obtained from the other two methods, will highlight the causes of civil wars in Southeast Asia, bringing to the surface the dynamics behind these causes, therefore allowing policy-makers to consider the causes of civil war, which will contribute to tailoring policies accordingly. I believe all civil war actors will be more comfortable with scholars than with journalists. Very few exclusive press conferences have been conducted in the topic of civil war, making press reports haphazard, disjointed, misleading, and reported in bits and pieces. I am embarking on an organized, balanced, comprehensive, and a fair report that elicits information in totality. Partly completed phase of this study included recently completed interviews and discussions with President Aquino and Senator Estrada of the Philippines and former PM of Malaysia, Dr Mahathir. In addition, I interviewed and discussed with the highest officials of the rebel groups, PULO, MNLF, and MILF. While a number of studies have attempted to answer the race-religion-civil war nexus puzzle (none have used all three methods—quantitative, traditional case studies, and personal interviews), and none has specifically addressed Southeast Asian civil wars using all three methods.

Keywords: conflict, conflict actors, government, methods, rebels, Southeast Asia

INTRODUCTION

This paper was motivated by the seriousness of ethno-religious civil conflicts, like the ones currently occurring in Burma, Indonesia, and the Philippines, and previous conflicts like the ones in East Timor and Aceh in Indonesia and the communist insurgency in Malaysia.

Every year, thousands of lives, on average are lost in conflicts such as those mentioned. A great number of articles and books have been published pertaining to the topic, yet there appears to be little consensus on what causes such conflicts.

The reducing trend of international conflict replaced by the increasing numbers of civil conflicts shifted attention to this area of conflict study. There were 36 armed conflicts in 2009. All were civil conflicts and none were interstate (Harbom and Wallensteen 2010). Equally disturbing news is that, between 1989 and 2009, there were 128 armed conflicts; all but 8 were internal (Harbom and Wallensteen 2009).

The paper begins with a dissection of the literature review of civil conflict in general followed by a review of literature on important aspects of the ethno-religious portion of civil conflicts. The second section of the paper describes the research design. The third section of the paper presents the results from both the quantitative study and the field work (personal interviews). A discussion of the quantitative section follows. The dissection of the comparison between the quantitative and the qualitative work and recommendations for future research are reserved for discussion during the conference.

LITERATURE REVIEW OF CIVIL CONFLICT

Various definitions are used to describe civil conflict, as defined by Correlates of War (COW), Fearon and Laitin (2003), Doyle and Sambanis (2000), Henderson and Sambanis (2000), the State Failure Project, and the UCDP/PRIO definition. There are no substantial variations between these definitions. But the fact that there are some differences causes scholars to arrive at different results when these various definitions are used to test the causes or intensities of civil conflicts.

Civil conflict literature boasts three major explanations as to why such conflicts happen. In conducting research on the determinants of the onset of civil war, we need to discover if the conflict in question is a result of which of the explanations. In doing so, we are in a better position to address prevention and ending the conflict.

Greed

The greed idea was popularized by Collier and Hoeffler (2002). Collier and Hoeffler believe that greed, the desire for private gain, increases the likelihood of civil war. This idea treats rebellion as a business enterprise, where rebel leaders seek gains from the war. Greed basically follows a rational choice calculation of choosing the choice that maximizes benefit to cost. This is not to say that Collier and Hoeffler discount the grievance model completely. Grievance may be a factor motivating conflict because of repressive regimes and ethnic fractionalization however, grievance does not possess a motivation high enough that greed has to easily cause violence. Therefore, they believe that grievance-based conflicts are harder to realize than greed-based conflicts.

Grievance

The grievance idea came about as a result of ideas from different scholars who argued that grievance instead of personal greed is the cause of civil war.

Grievance may arise out of dissatisfaction over allocation of resources, or over repressive regime/political rights, territorial struggles, the injection of members of an alien

ethnic group into one's territory, or even through mere envy over the success of rival groups. Henderson and Singer (2000) found that civil wars that occurred for the years 1946-1992 followed mainly a political grievance trend than an economic or cultural trend. They found semi-democracies are very violent-prone. Countries that are somewhere in the middle of the democracy-autocracy scale are clearly haven for civil wars. Another support for the grievance idea found that both political and economic factors were related to civil war prevalence, and, politics is more important than economics in countries that are ethnically polarized or which have ethnic dominance. Economic factors reduce civil war in about any kind of country immaterial of ethnic fractionalization. Ethnically diverse countries face a higher risk of civil war occurrence but this may be mitigated by political means especially by promoting democracy (Elbadawi and Sambanis 2002). The literature also cites inequality as a possible source of grievance. Among the three measures of inequalities—economic, social, and health-related inequalities in a society—only social inequality (for example, unequal educational or civil service employment policies) leads to a higher likelihood of civil conflict. Unequal healthcare provision (for example, child mortality rates among the different groups) and grievances such as unequal access to beneficial economic goods and conditions do not lead to conflict (Ostby 2004, 6, 13, 15). Grievance may be the result of being victimized, loss of or dispute over territory, rights, discrimination, and curtailment of cultural or religious practice. Grievance is not just a want, desire, or demand but is substantiated by belief that injustice has happened (Williams 1994, 58-59). Williams (1994) goes further to mention that most of the literature cite four causes of ethnic conflict—strong ethnic identities/boundaries, grievances, opportunities, and mobilization. Gurr (1993) using the MAR data found close connection between the grievance idea and the instrumental (mobilization of groups by elites) in causing conflict. Identity, discrimination, and territorial concerns of groups are used as tools by elites to mobilize them to act.

Another proponent of the grievance idea is Reynal-Querol (2002). In her study natural resource exports did not contribute to conflict but grievance variables did. Since her study only tested ethnic conflicts, we may deduce that her conclusion may only be applicable to ethnic conflicts and may not be generalized to all civil conflicts. Horowitz investigated what probabilities exist for different groups in different regions of a state to end up in secessionist claims, and concluded that, at least for the poorer ethnic groups in poor peripherals, grievance far exceeds greed in explaining the desire to secede. Some support for the greed idea emerged in his study—the educated elites in the periphery will support secession because of selfish reasons, yet greed did not explain why the poor (who are the majority of the periphery) chose to secede. Instead grievances were the main reason why they chose that path. Even though the majority of the periphery residents have more to lose than gain from independence based on the rational-choice calculation, they still opt for secession (Horowitz 1981, 174 - 77). Even though the grievance idea is mainly supported by only one of the four categories in Horowitz's study (the "backward groups in backward regions" category), we can assume it to represent the study because this group represented the most number of secessionist movements. Horowitz found that in the category, the backward groups in backward regions (the most frequent and precocious secessionists)—economic loss or gain plays the smallest role, ethnic anxiety the largest, lending to the primordial basis of war (Horowitz 1981, 193).

Horowitz (1985) blames ethnicity as the main cause of conflict. In the description above, Horowitz (1981) has indicated that ethnic anxiety and not economic is a better explanation for conflict. Could this ethnic spirit or zeal be due to skin color differences instead?

A democratic form of government can reduce the likelihood of onset of civil war because of the availability of channels for grievances to be heard. This is due to the institutional make up of democracies (Gurr 2000). Ellingsen (2000, 228-249) blames civil

conflict on multi-ethnicity, semi-democracies, and a weak economy. The multi-ethnicity factor seemed to be more pronounced in smaller conflicts and those in the post-cold war era.

As mentioned in the beginning of this section, scholars need to assess the war is based on which one—greed or grievance. Tackling greed conflicts by solving grievances or tackling grievance conflicts by addressing opportunities will make it impossible to bring about peace (Collier and Sambanis 2002, 11).

Opportunity

A more recent explanation for why conflicts happen was introduced by Fearon and Laitin (2003). According to Fearon and Laitin, a better equipped and stronger government can control the onset of conflict (the state capacity variable). But, instead of lootable resources and male schooling rates being the channel for opportunity, as projected by Collier and Hoeffler, Fearon and Laitin found that states with unstable and improper management, and weak armed and domestic (police) forces contribute to it. It was found that the lower the per capita income, the higher the chances of civil war (they proxied per capita income for a country's administrative, army, and police capabilities). Grievances had nothing much to do with civil war onset (Fearon and Laitin 2003, 76). In a test of the above state capacity idea on outcome of conflict, it was found that while the size of the armed forces of a country does not necessarily affect outcome, a strong and effective government clearly hinders rebel victory, even if it may not guarantee government victory (DeRouen and Sobek 2004, 311).

On causes of ethno-religious violence, several theoretical perspectives exist. While some scholars argue that natural hatred cause ethnic conflict, others are divided between the structure of government and selfishness:

The Primordial View

The primordial view argues that long-term ethnic antagonisms spark violence (Van den Berghe 1981). Vanhanen (1999) focused on the explanatory power of the primordial idea. He tested his ethnic nepotism concept on causes of civil conflicts to see if the idea of people showing favoritism to their kind or kin can explain conflict. Using Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection to understand this, Vanhanen ties conflict to scrambling over scarce resources by different ethnic groups. The survival of the group guarantees the survival of the individual belonging to the group. As this is the case, the individual will favor his kin over others because that will indirectly guarantee his survival (Vanhanen 1999, 56-57).

"Members of the same group support their group members over non-members because they are more related to their group members than to the remainder of the population" (Vanhanen 1999, 57).

The Instrumental View

The instrumental view regards ethnic affiliations and other types of identities as having equal chances of causing conflict. According to this view, ethnicity becomes important when elites use it to mobilize ethnic groups for self gain or group gain (Banton 1983). Horowitz also mentions that elites may be instrumental in sparking conflict. Elites mobilize ethnic groups for personal gains. Conflict can also result from elites creating new ethnic identities or reinforcing existing ethnic identities in order to pursue their goals (Horowitz 1985). Taken together, Horowitz describes tradition, modernization, economics, and culture as possible causes of conflict. He, however, attributes conflict to the combination of group passion, group symbol, and ethnic-group anxiety and apprehension. Ethnic conflict therefore, arises out of the common evaluative significance accorded by the groups to

acknowledged group differences and then played out in public rituals of affirmation and contradiction. It is the struggle for relative group worth. Carment (1993, 138) also believes that elites may use ethnicity for selfish reasons. Elites may create, or maintain ethnic groupings if they believe that such ethnic mobilization can provide them with their desired goals. Jackson also puts the blame on elites for the cause of ethnic conflict further reinforcing the instrumental idea, but with an indirect relationship. In a way, he argues that elites are somewhat forced into such situations. They are sometimes left with no choice but to play one ethnic group to another due to circumstances. These circumstances arise out of being a leader of a weak state. The weak state that the leader is ruling faces considerable challenges both from inside and outside the country. International pressures on him or her, domestic failing economy, unstable institutions and civil service, and the like compels the leader into a dictator. Because most weak states are ethnically heterogeneous, the fear of civil strife also forces the leader to be more authoritarian. In trying to survive the leader plays one group with another, follows the “divide and rule” strategy, and rewards cronies and allies while keeping rivals checked. The strategies the leader adopts sometimes backfire and cause ethnic conflict (Jackson 2001, 65 – 81). A similar view is shared by Fearon and Laitin. In weak states where conditions usually keep changing, leaders tend to be tough on the people. Fear and opportunities cause this (Fearon and Laitin 2003, 76).

Clash of Civilizations

Huntington’s (1993) “clash of civilization” theory argues that violence effective at the end of the cold war will not arise out of ideological or economic struggle. Conflict, both interstate and internal will occur along civilizational lines. Civilizations, according to Huntington are cultural entities. He defines a civilization as “the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity people have short of that which distinguishes humans from other species” (24). Differences in civilizations are either by history, language, culture, tradition, or most importantly, religion. There are seven, and possibly eight civilizations, namely Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American, and possibly the African civilization. Post-cold war fights will be between two or more of any of the above combinations of civilizations (Huntington 1993, 22-49). Gurr found some truth in Huntington’s theory. Although Gurr’s conclusion is that ethnic conflicts originate in the line of group power and group status grievances, divisions along civilizational lines will structure and reinforce these grievances in increasing the severity of ethnic conflicts (Gurr 1994, 364). Horowitz (1985) gives a lengthy description of the different possibilities for what causes violence. He mentions that “memories of old animosities ingrained among the different ethnic groups” is one cause of violence. Snow (1996) writes, “Tribally based warfare erupts where ethnic and other hatreds had long been officially suppressed but never extinguished in the hearts and minds of populations” (116).

Modernization

Modernization can also be a source of violence. Modernization creates economic and social changes in a society which demands that groups cope with changes. Because coping requires groups to compete for resources, which are scarce, this competition may cause violence.

Taras and Ganguly (2008) give various reasons why modernization can lead to ethnic conflict. Modernization can cause erosion of traditional values. The new urban middle and lower-middle classes respond to this by increased ethnic nationalism. There is an indirect effect of modernization on conflict. Modernization gives rise to a greater social movement arising out of improved communications and transportation. Greater freedom allows members of ethnic groups to get together easily. This provides an efficient way to forward ethnic nationalism that has been forming as a result of dissatisfaction with the ill

effects of modernization. Increased social mobility not only brings members of the same group together, it can also bring members of different groups together. While the coming together of people of the same group allows greater chance of mobilizing against the majority ruling government, the mingling of different groups can have undesired effects like dislike, animosity, and envy.

Taras and Ganguly (2008, 14) cite Huntington (1996) on the tension between “revolution of the rising expectations” and the “revolution of the rising frustration” caused by modernization, which can lead to ethnic conflict.

Modernization creates division of labor which gives rise to different levels of jobs at the workplace. The coveted positions go to members of the majority group while minorities are left with menial jobs. This is another source of conflict (Taras and Ganguly 2008, 16).

The comprehensive view of ethno-religious conflict in the preceding section provided a detailed description of what may be causing ethno-religious conflict in particular. But could all the factors above be in some way related to the perception of “us” versus “them” based on skin color or tone?

A group’s basis of “us” versus “them” mentioned above is best described by the Minorities at Risk Project (MAR). MAR project states that the basis is usually common history or myths of shared experience that often includes victimization by others. Whether it is a myth or not, the group believes it is different, and this difference is what sets it apart from other groups and this difference is why it has been treated differently (Marshall and Gurr 2005 “peace and conflict 2005” MAR publication). Thambiah (1989) defines ethnicity as a self-conscious and vocalized identity that substantializes and naturalizes one or more attributes like skin color, language, religion, and territorial occupation. These attributes are then attached to collectivities as their innate possession and their mytho-historical legacy. It is interesting to note the mention of myth by MAR because Horowitz also mentions the myth of ethnicity, where collective ancestry and its innate traits, is a myth (Horowitz 1985).

RESEARCH DESIGN/METHODOLOGY

Goals and Methods of the Field Personal Interviews

As mentioned earlier, to understand Southeast Asian civil conflicts, I use two different methods: quantitative (statistical analysis) and qualitative personal interview. This second method complements the first. No studies have used three methods—quantitative, case studies, and personal interviews (Collier and Sambanis 2005, Fox 2000). The interviews provide direct contact with parties involved in the conflicts, and the goal is to produce an organized, balanced, comprehensive, and fair research that elicits information in its totality.

There are three major objectives for the qualitative study: (a) obtain firsthand information on why these conflicts happened from the people who make the decisions to go to war; (b) obtain firsthand information on why these conflicts are still unresolved, from the decision-makers themselves; and (c) use the information to design better approaches to understanding civil conflicts, not as ends, but as a means to a larger, long-term study of Southeast Asian civil conflicts.

To achieve these objectives, interviews are carried out with each country's political leader focused on what the leader thinks caused previous and/or current civil conflicts within the country, and why they are still unresolved. Discussions with current or previous political leaders are instrumental in this study as these are individuals who have or have had decision-making power in setting policies in their governments. In addition, the political leaders will be asked to comment on and predict future civil conflicts within their countries and the justifications for them. On September 11, 2001, Islamic terrorists attacked and destroyed both of the New York World Trade Center buildings, resulting in thousands of casualties. Has the September 11th incident been a motivation for other groups to stage similar attacks since 2001? Is it a warning of events to come? The interviews will draw political leaders' opinions on how the September 11th incident affected internal security of their respective countries, and how money expended to counter Islamic militancy by states also increased. Did Southeast Asian countries follow the same trend as the world at large?

Second, the opinions of the countries' elected political leaders will be compared to the opinions of leaders of the main opposition political parties in the federal legislatures. Third, both sets of opinions will then be compared to the opinions of the rebel groups. The opposition party leaders in legislatures are not in any way connected to the struggles of the rebel groups. The focus of the interviews is to obtain information and elicit opinions. Once this valuable primary information has been collected, it is analyzed and compared with causes of civil conflict with previous research (the quantitative method). This provides a list of common causes of Southeast Asian conflicts. Such a list allows a better understanding of the causes of the conflicts and why they are still unresolved. The information will either support the theories already developed by scholars in the field or dispute them. For instance, on Islamic conflicts, Juergensmeyer (2001) and Vanhanen (1999) find Islam to be conflict-prone while Halliday (1996) disagrees. Esposito (1999) expressed that although the only Islamic revolution having taken over a government was the 1979 Iranian revolution and none like that have occurred since, Islamic revitalization and resurgence have continued without lessening and have only become more radical.

In the field, first, I interviewed the political leaders in person: the president or the prime minister (and in the case of Malaysia, also Tun Dr. Mahathir, former Prime Minister of Malaysia) of the respective countries. A carefully worded questionnaire was prepared, and the questions are directly connected to the role of the usual correlates of war in Southeast Asian civil conflicts.

Next, and the more difficult part of the study, I interviewed the leaders of the respective rebel groups in four countries. The rebel groups that are included are GAM (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka) of Indonesia, MILF (Moro Islamic Liberation Front) and MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front) of the Philippines, and PULO of Thailand.. Although this has pose a problem because of security and secrecy issues, I made all reasonable attempts to contact the spokespersons for the leaders of the groups. In the absence of the leader of the group, I attempted to interview the next highest ranking leader as I did at times.

Because the majority of civil conflicts in Southeast Asia are ethno-religious in nature, it is only natural that our emphasis is on this type of conflict. Some quantitative studies have given rise to contradicting arguments on the causes of ethno-religious conflicts. For example, oil-exporting Islamic countries or Islamic countries with high percentages of young

males have a higher likelihood of experiencing civil conflicts than those that are not oil exporters or those with a low percentage of young males (Fearon and Laitin 2003). Using the State Failure dataset for the years 1950 – 1996, Fox (2001, 2003, and 2004) found Christian groups to be the most conflict-prone, followed by Islamic groups. He also found conflict among Christians to be the most frequent, followed by conflict among Muslims, followed by conflicts between Christian and Islamic groups. While de Soysa (2002) found Islam to be highly conflictful, this is not confined to Islam alone, as Halliday (1996) found. According to de Soysa, Catholicism is also highly conflictful, and both Islamic and Catholic countries are highly conflictful.

The recently completed interviews in summer 2009, 2010, and 2011 included discussions with the following individuals. In the USA, I met with Dr Steve Rood, the only American mediator in the current MILF-Government of Philippines formal peace talks. In the Philippines, I met with Noynoy Aquino, President of the Philippines, Nur Misuari, Chief of Moro armed rebel group MNLF, Jimmy Labawan, Deputy Chief of MNLF (Nur Misuari's deputy), Senator Estrada (currently Senate President Pro-Tempore), Mohagher Iqbal, Chief Mediator for Islamic armed rebel group MILF, Michael Mastura, Chief Attorney for Islamic armed rebel group MILF, Jun Mantawil, Head of the Secretariat, Islamic armed rebel group MILF, Dolores Corro, Director of MINCODE, an NGO dealing with civil wars, conflict-resolution, and community-building, Gus Miclat, Director and Ruby Lora, Deputy Director of IID, largest think tank in Philippines dealing with civil wars, conflict-resolution, and community-building, Alain Pascua, KAAKBAY Party leader, Senator Juan Miguel Zubiri, former Senate Majority leader, Senator Vicente Sotto III, current Senate Majority Leader, and Danilo Caspe, Program Director, Mindanao Peoples Caucus. In Indonesia, I met with then Aceh rebel leaders (now leaders of Aceh autonomous province), including Tengku Hasan di Tiro (just before he passed away), Mr Malik Mahmud, now GAM's leader, after the death of Tengku di Tiro, and current Aceh Governor, Irwandi Yusuf. In Malaysia, I met with Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad, former Prime Minister of Malaysia, P. Uthayakumar, Secretary-General of HINDRAF, the outlawed minority Indian movement and Waytha Moorthy, the group's Chairman, Prof Dr Ramasamy Palanisamy, Deputy Chief Minister of the state of Penang, Malaysia, M. Kayveas, President, the PPP party, Malaysia. All attempts to meet with opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim in the last three years proved futile. Attempts are being made to meet with Chin Peng, former Malaysian communist insurgency leader. In Thailand I met with Col. Kasturi Mahkota, leader of the armed group, PULO, Dr Mukhtar, one of the top leaders and head of research for PULO, Dr Srisompob, Director of the Thai Patani think tank, Deep South Watch.

Some of the actors or parties of war mentioned above have been in their organizations for a long time. For instance, Mahkota Kasturi was an active member of PULO when the group began its armed struggle and therefore has first hand knowledge of the beginnings of the civil conflict. Mahathir Mohamad was an active politician when the Malaysian civil conflict began in the late 1950s and when other Southeast Asian civil conflicts occurred or were going on, hence has first hand knowledge of it. At the height of these conflict, he held many high level positions in then ruling government, including cabinet positions.

What I propose to do is to build an inventory of transcripts of personal interviews of all former and current parties directly involved in these conflicts. This, combined with the

results obtained from the other two methods, will highlight the causes of civil conflicts in Southeast Asia, bringing to the surface the dynamics behind these causes, therefore allowing policy-makers to consider the causes of civil conflict and their intensity, which will contribute to tailoring policies accordingly. For example, the quantitative method revealed that, as the percentage of Muslims in a country exceeds 74 percent, the likelihood of conflict increases significantly. When the ethno-religious fractionalization of a country increases, the likelihood of conflict also increases but follows an inverted U-shaped relationship. It also showed that countries imposing cultural, ethnic, or religious restrictions on its citizens have a significantly higher likelihood of any form of conflict. Personal interviews can confirm or dispute these findings. There are various factors (for example, “glory in conflict” and “rebel/government leader satisfaction”) that are impossible to convert into numbers in quantitative research. Personal interviews will be able to reveal much more about these variables. Even variables that are easily quantifiable in quantitative research, such as, “degree of restrictions,” are reinforced by talking to interviewees who accurately interpret them. The personal interviews will hopefully shed some light on the much misunderstood Islamic conflict for scholars, students, and policy makers.

In the first two years of my field research, Thailand was facing an uncertain political situation. The protests in Bangkok and frequent change of leadership force me to adopt a “wait and see” strategy to meet current or former Thai leaders. I am planning to meet Thai current or former leaders and the Indonesian leadership in 2013. Like in the Philippines, I will conduct interviews with the Thai prime minister or former prime minister and the Indonesian president or former president. Whenever necessary, assistance will be sought from local scholars and individuals connected to all parties.

The Quantitative Portion of the Research

Definitions

The paper follows the definition of armed conflicts as defined by UCDP/PRIO (Gleditsch and Urdal 2002). An armed conflict is

- A contested incompatibility that concerns government or territory or both, where the use of armed force between two parties results in at least 25 battle-related deaths.
- Of these two parties, at least one has to be the government of a state. Interstate armed conflict occurs between two or more states. Intrastate (internal) armed conflict occurs between the government of a state and internal opposition groups (Harbom and Wallensteen 2010).

Fearon and Laitin (2003) differ from UCPD/PRIO in their definition of what constitutes armed conflicts. Fearon and Laitin (2003) defined intrastate armed conflicts as conflicts killing at least 1000 people over its course, with an annual average of at least 100. In using the lower threshold, that is, when armed conflict is defined the way UCPD/PRIO does, we are able to capture outbreaks of a lower threshold using the set of independent variables from the Fearon and Laitin (2003) dataset. Using *onset* instead of “incidence” or “prevalence” as the dependent variable avoids the analysis being influenced by duration dependence.

The unit of analysis is the country-year, coded “1” for all country-years with outbreaks that has a minimum of 25 casualties and “0” otherwise.

Observations

There are 7390 country-years. However, because of missing values many of the estimations may not total to this number. Between 1946 and 2004, there were 225 onsets overall. All conflicts arising out of military factions and coups, and all conflicts involving fighting for independence from colonial masters were dropped from this study.

It is a cross-sectional time series (panel) data containing 156 states. The first year for each state starts at either 1945 or from the year of independence. The last year for each state is 2004.

There are various reasons why panel datasets are much more advantageous than other forms of datasets. First, panel data combine both cross-section and time (space and time) making it a more comprehensive data. It provides us with more observations and measurements than would a purely cross-section or a purely time series dataset. Second, the panel data structure can measure variables that vary across space as well as variables that vary across time. Third, we can control for unobserved heterogeneity (Lee 2006). Williams (1994) mentioned that to discover links to causations, one needs to use repeated observations over time.

Modifications to the Fearon and Laitin Dataset

In addition to using the UCPD/PRIO definition of civil conflict, this study made some critical modifications to the Fearon and Laitin (2003) dataset. The study expanded the dataset ending in 1999 to ending in 2004. Various sources were consulted to perform the extensions. As far as possible data were collected from the same sources used by Fearon and Laitin (2003). The updated dataset increased the number of observations from 6610 to 7390. Because no new countries were added to the Fearon and Laitin (2003) dataset, and none of the countries in the Fearon and Laitin (2003) dataset were deleted, the expanded dataset contains the same number of states with the same regional breakdown as Fearon and Laitin's: 156 countries.

Description of Variables and Sources—Dependent Variables

Outbreak of Conflict. Outbreak of conflict is denoted by *onset*, which is the base dependent variable, covering all types of conflicts. Obtained from UCPD/PRIO, the variable is coded "1" for a new conflict or two years since last observation, otherwise coded "0." The idea of the tests is to discover countries with majority population of which skin color or tone has higher likelihoods of experiencing internal armed conflicts.

Further regression tests are carried out with the ethno-religious conflict type replacing the base model above. The dependent variable for these regressions is the outbreak of ethno-religious conflicts.

Description of Variables and Sources—Independent Variables

Did state experience previous conflicts: The *priorwar* variable is coded "1" if the state experienced a civil conflict in the previous year, and "0" otherwise.

Existence of a State Religion. *Officialreligion* represents the presence of an official state religion mandated by the government of a country. This is a dummy variable coded "1" if a country has an official state religion and "0" otherwise. If the country has more than one official religion, it is coded as "0." This variable is based on Nordas (2004). Nordas (2004) used two different datasets to arrive at whether a state mandated a state religion or not. She used the Religion and State (RAS) database and the Religious Freedom Reports by the U.S. Department of State to devise her state religion variable.

The Presence of Ethno-Religious Restrictions. Nordas (2004) compiled a list of possible ethno-religious restrictions that may exist in a country. Examples of such restrictions are restrictions on religious conversions, restrictions on culture and religion pertaining to marriage, divorce, and related matters, restrictions on places of worship and meetings, restrictions on religious education and proselytizing, restrictions on customs and traditions, dressing, dietary, and similar religious or customary restrictions. Using the RAS, Religious Freedom Reports, and CIA World Factbook datasets, she formed a scale of "0" to "5" where "0" represents no restrictions while "5" represents the most serious restrictions. Here the variable has been modified to a simple dummy variable, *restrictionsdummy* where "1" represents the presence of restrictions and "0" otherwise.

Ethnic/Religious Diversity Variables. *Ethfrac* is the ethnic fractionalization within a country. This variable is provided by Fearon and Laitin (2003). Fearon and Laitin (2003) obtained their ethnic fractionalization variable from the Atlas Narodov Mira 1964, which gives the probability that two randomly drawn individuals in a country are from different ethno-linguistic groups.

The *relfrac* variable is religious fractionalization within a country. *Relfrac* is also taken from Fearon and Laitin (2003). The authors constructed it using the CIA Factbook and other related sources.

State Population. *Laglogpop* measures the total population of the country in 1000s. It is logged and lagged one year. The variable was obtained from Fearon and Laitin (2003). To code this variable, Fearon and Laitin (2003) used the Penn World Tables 5.6 for the years 1950 to 1992, World Development Indicators (WDI, published by the World Bank) for the years 1993 to 1999 and 1945 to 1949, and COW for missing data before 1950.

Democracy. Two different measures of democracy were used, one is a continuous variable while the other, a binary variable. *Polity2* is the revised Polity IV measure (lagged), which is a 21-point scale, ranging from -10 to +10. Consistent with Polity coding recommendation, values for transition periods (-88) were interpolated, foreign occupation years (-66) coded as missing, and interruptions (-77) coded "0."

Lagdemornot is a dummy marking whether a country-year is democratic or not democratic (lagged one year). It is coded "1" if the country-year is more than 5 on the revised Polity4 scale (*Polity2*), "0" otherwise. The dummy variable was created by referring to the Polity IV measure. Hence only country-years that exceeded the "5" mark on the Polity IV scale were considered democratic, and therefore, coded "1."

Per Capita Income. *Laggdpen* is GDP per capita of the country in thousands (lagged one year). This variable is based on Fearon and Laitin (2003). Fearon and Laitin (2003) used the Penn World Tables 5.6 for the years 1950 to 1992, World Development Indicators (WDI, published by the World Bank) for the years 1993 to 1999 and 1945 to 1949, and COW for missing data before 1950.

Oil Exporters. *Lagoil* is also provided by Fearon and Laitin (2003). If the oil exports of a country exceed 33% of total exports, it is coded "1," otherwise "0" (lagged one year). In trying to adhere to the same source as Fearon and Laitin (2003), this paper strictly used World Development Indicators (WDI) for the estimates of these variables for the years 2000 to 2004 using the new WDI dataset (The World Bank Group). For missing values, they extended the dummy variable forward up to the year where the next data are available. Therefore, if the last year country-year before the "missing" year was "1," then all the following years were coded "1" until the value of the next country-year was available. The rationale behind doing this is that once states become oil producers, they remain oil producers (Fearon and Laitin 2003). The new WDI version was used to find which country-years surpassed the mark where oil exports of the country exceeded 33% of total exports.

For these country-years, they were coded as “1” and “0” otherwise, following the Fearon and Laitin’s method, extending the dummies for missing variables.

Estimation

The model was analyzed employing the logistic regression estimation method of analysis. All dependent variables are binary, taking the form, either a “0” or a “1.” Because my dependent variables are all dichotomous, many of the assumptions of the linear regression model would be violated (Aldrich and Nelson 1984). Anytime a binary response variable is used, OLS is violated (UCLA ATS SCG, 2008). Because of this, I employed the logistic regression method to avoid this problem.

$$Y = \beta_1X_1 + \beta_2X_2 + \dots + \beta_kX_k + e$$

is the general, standard multiple regression equation. However, since we are using time series data, all equations may be expressed, in accordance with time series designs, as

$$Y_{it} = \alpha + \beta_1X_{1it} + \beta_2X_{2it} + \dots + \beta_kX_{kit} + e_{it}$$

where Y_{it} represents the dependent variable which is equal to 1 if an event of civil conflict is observed in year t , and 0 for absence of conflict. The X s represent the independent variables, i represents the individuals, t is time, e represents the error term, and α , the constant term, or intercept of the equation. X_{2it} for example, represents the i th observation on explanatory variable X_2 at time t . The β s are the slopes or coefficients of the explanatory variables. This represents the amount that Y changes (increases or decreases) for each change of one unit in X (Fox and Levin 2006). For example, the slope or coefficient of the *gdp per capita* (*gdpen*) variable explains the change in onset of conflict associated with one unit change in the per capita income of the state.

The statistical package STATA, version 9 and 10, were used to test the equations.

RESULTS

Quantitative Results

Table 1 shows the analysis of the variables without the inclusion of the skin color variables. The results revealed a pattern similar to many other findings in the literature except for one—the prior war variable.

The results in Table 1 shows that countries imposing ethno-religious or cultural barriers on citizens will have a bigger likelihood of conflict. Ethnic fractionalization increases the likelihood of conflict. However when the variable’s square term is included in the equation, an inverted U-shaped relationship emerges. As expected, an inverted U-shaped relationship also emerged with the democracy variable, further reinforcing Hegre et al (2001). Consistently, in all results, larger population size and being an oil exporting country contribute to increased expectation of conflict. It is interesting to note that the only factor that reduces the likelihood of armed internal conflict is GDP per capita. The higher a country’s per capita income, the lower the likelihood of a conflict outbreak. This is probably the most robust finding in the civil war literature—population size and GDP per capita have consistently been cited to affect civil war (Ward, Greenhill, and Bakke 2010).

Table 1 Logit Models of the Determinants of Civil Conflict, 1946-2004	
	Onset (General/Worldwide)
Prior War	.014 (.178)
Has Official Religion	.118 (.184)
Restrictions	.464* (.198)
Ethnic Frac.	4.668*** (1.307)
Lag Log of Popul.	.353*** (.058)
Lag GDP Per Cap.	-.155*** (.043)
Lag Oil	.572* (.205)
Polity2	.030* (.012)
Polity2 Squared	-.006* (.003)
Ethnic Frac. Squared	-3.584** (1.378)
Constant	-7.682*** (.634)
N	6452

QUALITATIVE RESULTS

Actor	Source of Conflict	Rank
Malik Mahmud, GAM, Indonesia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> History/colonial/ invasion/conquering of locals Refusal of Acehnese/Muslims to be ruled by others Rights infringed/stripped 	A combination but <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Loss of political power from invasion/conquering of locals 2. Injustice/unequal treatment
Senator Jinggoy Estrada, the Philippines	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Government not alleviating poverty Groups demanding secession. Groups should drop secession demand, then negotiation, for e.g. reduce poverty Lack of tough rules (control) 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Poverty (Economic) 2. Secession (Primordial) 3. Ideological 4. GDP/capita: to some extend
President Noynoy Aquino, the Philippines	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Corruption Insincerity of all parties Lack of tough rules (controls) 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Economic barriers 2. Instrumentalism but not necessarily Islamic 3. All others are causes but arise out of economic barriers 4. Ethno-religious factors: No
Prof. Nur Misuari, MNLF, the Philippines	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> History/colonial/ invasion/conquering of locals Refusal of Moros/Muslims to be ruled by others 	A combination of factors but <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Any by-product of colonialism are important factors 2. Discrimination and Poverty (even this is a by-product of colonialism)
Dr Steve Rood (American mediator in the GPh-MILF mediation)	-	Land conflict, therefore mostly <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Economic, and 1. Primordial
Senator Miguel Zubiri, former		<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Class clash: Poverty is root cause

majority leader, the Philippines	-	(Economic) 2. Difference in incomes (Economic) 3. Religious clash: restrictions on minorities and barriers; next is poverty and religious intolerance
Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, former Prime Minister of Malaysia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The demand for equal rights • Challenging majority special rights • Unwilling to convert to majority culture, language, ways • Liberal democracy: free speech etc 	1. Race/Racial issues 1. Economic: as important as race but economic usually amplified by race and when so, it becomes explosive 2. Next is barriers but this depends on % minority population 3. Primordialism depends on economic 4. Ideology before, now no more but. Was indirectly dependent on economic
Colonel Kasturi Mahkota, PULO, Thailand	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • History/colonial/ invasion/conquering of locals • Refusal of Malays/Muslims to be ruled by others 	1. Thailand does not treat Malays as one of them 1. Discrimination/ injustice/unequal treatment/unequal standards 1. Barriers/restrictions

COMPARING THE RESULTS OBTAINED FROM THE QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH AND PERSONAL INTERVIEWS

The following will be discussed during the conference presentation:

What are the similarities and differences?

Discussions

Recommendations and Further research

CONCLUSION

Some scholars have suggested combining quantitative studies with qualitative. King, Keohane and Verba (1994) suggested that we should use qualitative research when numerical measurement becomes either undesirable or impossible. Fox (2000) and Collier and Sambanis (2005) recommend using a combination of qualitative and quantitative

research. King, Keohane and Verba (1995) argued that the best studies combine both qualitative and quantitative work. They added that good research design is rarely done by isolation from prior research and by harvesting overlooked data or information, researchers can obtain relevant info. Increasing relevant data can include intensive interviews. McKeown (1999) argued that case studies are applied to learn something new about something known to a degree, not for learning something completely new. Gerring (2004) argued that case studies are a way to do an in-depth single unit study to generalize similar larger class (like a sample of a population). He believes that the more cases included in a research, the better the study will be.

This paper's investigation into the correlates of civil war reveals some interesting results. While the GDP per capita, population size, and ethno-religious fractionalization variables confirm the findings of previous studies, the field interviews confirm the barrier/restrictions variable. Most of the interviewees agreed with the quantitative result for that variable. Generally, both rebels and government leaders agreed on the fact that restrictions or barriers to minority progress can cause war. A finding that was not uncovered by the quantitative work was the impact of history on conflict. The rebel leaders argued that history of being a sovereign territory paved the way for them to believe that they should be independent from the core.

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