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A STUDY ON UNDERSTANDING OF MALAYSIAN DEMOCRACY BASED ON
DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS NAMELY GENDER, JOB SECTORS AND RACE

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DECEMBER 2011

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CLEARANCE FOR SUBMISSION OF THE RESEARCH PROPOSAL BY THE SUPERVISOR

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I have reviewed the final and complete research proposal and approve the submission of this report for evaluation.

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Acknowledgement

First and foremost, we would like to express our gratitude to Allah s.w.t. for the blessed that have been gave to us in accomplishing this research paper.

We would also like to express our acknowledgement to Dr. Kuldip Singh, lecturer of ADS501 (Research Method and Data Analysis) for his guidance and advises in completing the research proposal and contributes to the accomplishment of this research paper.

We are also thankful to Miss Zalina binti Mohd Desa as our research supervisor in this research. With her assistance and patience in giving us all her expertise and experience regarding this subject, we are able to complete this research accordingly.

Besides that, we would also like to thank all the respondents that have involve in this survey. With their cooperation and willingness, we can gain lots of meaningful information that are useful to our research.

And not to be forgotten, we would like to express our gratitude to everyone that have contributed directly or indirectly in completing this research. With their sweat and tears, this research can be completed on time.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

Election is an important aspect in a country which practices the system of democracy, like Malaysia (Rashidah Abd Ghani, 2008). Since gaining independence five decades ago, world leaders have sung praises of Malaysia's ability to sustain democracy through fair elections. Such praise, coupled with congratulatory messages which Malaysia normally receives after every general election, reflects the confidence of the world leaders in its election system. Therefore, this trust has shown that other nations acknowledge the practice of democracy in Malaysia that has been symbolized by fair and just election process.

However, the election process is not the only indicator of democracy in Malaysia. There is also certain rights that have been provided in the Federal Constitution as the supreme law in the country that reflected democracy are being practiced in the country. For instance, the freedom of speech, the freedom of media, and the freedom of association are the other indicators of democracy in Malaysia. These provisions will ensure that there will be no violation of human rights in the country as to ensure the government good governance.

Even though there are already stated provisions of certain rights as a Malaysian citizens, there is also issue arises regarding to the extent on how far does these rights can be practice in Malaysia without constraint? One of the criticisms is the use of ISA or the Internal Security Act that often limit these rights with the reason to protect the harmony and stability in the country. There are a lot of issues that have been related with the act such as the detention of Dato' Seri Anwar Ibrahim, Hindraf rally, and other issues that they argued as a normal practice of people in democratic country. Based on

these issues raise another question; are the people really know and understand that they are exercising their rights in a democratic country? Or they just merely follow others who act as the trigger to the chaos that they have been created. Therefore, there is a need to find whether the people actions such as their turnover during the election or creating issues such as rally and demonstration are really based on their understanding of the democracy concept in the country or they just merely act based on other influence such as politician speech or issues pertaining their interests.

1.2 Problem statement

Much has been written about the significance of the March 8, 2008 general election. Some point to the fact that we may be seeing the birth of a true competitive political system where the opposition may win at the federal level eventually (Blis Bernama, 2008). The political "tsunami" in Malaysia's General election in the year 2008 has created a lot of speculation reflecting the democracy practice in Malaysia. The lost of National Front in four states namely Kedah, Penang, Selangor, and Perak (now are under the ruling of National Front after the revocation of state assembly by the Sultan of Perak) resulted in simple majority won by the government. This situation was far from the situation during the 2004 general election where the National Front has won a two third majority and has a control over all the states except Kelantan which is the brick wall for the opposition party, PAS.

Why did a 'change' or 'upward lift' in the voting pattern occur? How far can the election results of 2008 regarded as a continuation? Or does it actually describe a determination of wanted change? With the capacity to continue to withstand at federal level and enable BN to still continue to set up the federal government, it can be seen as continuity in change. Although BN party's majority faced a decline, it produced a shock as many voters voted for the opposition as a sign of protest or to show how voter power has large meaning in each registered voter's self. In fact, among the voters or candidates, they did not expect a 'political tsunami' like this could happen (Sivamurugan, 2010).

There is also a suggestion that this situation occurs as the Malaysian citizens are now more aware to their rights in the democratic country but, how far is this true? Therefore, by looking at three demographic factors our respondents, this could help us in gathering further information on the understanding of Malaysian democracy. Hence,

this research proposal is aim to find the level of understanding of Malaysian democracy based on the demographic factors namely gender, job sectors, and race.

1.3 Research objectives

This research will serves three objectives which are:

- 1.3.1 To assess between gender and their understanding of democracy concept in Malaysia.
- 1.3.2 To assess the levels of understanding of democracy concept in Malaysia among people in public and private sector; and
- 1.3.3 To determine whether race have an influence to the levels of understanding of democracy in Malaysia.

1.4 Scope of the study

The study will cover public sector employees and private sector employees with different levels of education and races in Sarawak. Among the Ministries, departments and private organizations that may involve in this study is Human Resource Department of Sarawak, Ministry of Social Development and Urbanization in Sarawak, and Zecon Berhad.

1.5 Significance of the study

1.5.1 There is no specific research regarding the people understanding of democracy concept in Malaysia that has been conducted before. Therefore, it is hope that this study will be very useful in serving the interest of the government and public to have in-depth view of this matter for a better mutual understanding between the government and the public.

1.5.2 The study will also help to gain meaningful information regarding the people's understanding of Malaysian democracy that being practiced in the country.

1.5.3 The findings of this research can be use as a reference to explain whether the public understanding of Malaysian democracy is the cause of issues pertaining democracy in the country such as demonstration by some interest groups and the voters turnover in the past general election.

1.5.4 Besides that, this research will also serve the interest of political analyst as their study to find the political maturity of the people in the country based on their levels of understanding of Malaysian democracy.

1.5.5 This study will provide a basis for further study that will be conducted in the future to assess other related issues related to the people understanding of democracy in Malaysia.

1.6 Definition of terms/concepts

The terms used in this study are defined for ease of understanding.

1.6.1 Democracy

“Democracy” has its origins from the Greek. It combines the words “*demos*” that means whole citizen living within a particular city-state and “*kratos*” meaning power or rule. However, both terms have more than one meaning (Arblaster, 1996). The term “democracy” can be seen in two basic forms which are direct democracy and representative democracy. In modern day government including

Malaysia, democracy is taking the concept of representative system of government (Arblaster, 1996). Therefore, democracy is where the people have their rights in influencing decision making in the state. Under a democratic country, the public will have their rights to vote in election, have the freedom of speech and expression, freedom of media and press, and freedom of associations.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW & CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Literature review

2.1.1 Introduction

This chapter provides a review of the literature on the definition of democracy, the concept of democracy in Malaysia, Malaysia 12th general election analysis and its reflection to the understanding of Malaysian democracy, issues pertaining democracy practice in Malaysia, influence of demographic factors on perceptions, and the importance of understanding democracy by the people.

2.1.2 What is Democracy?

Literally, the word “democracy” has its origins from the Greek. It combines the words “*demos*” that means whole citizen living within a particular city-state and “*kratos*” meaning power or rule. However, both terms have more than one meaning (Arblaster, 1996). Scholar such as Aristotle accepts the definition of democracy as being ruled by the people or the many, including the poor. However, this practice was not necessarily the case in Ancient Greece, where the only participants were adult males who were eligible to serve in decision making and the defense forces. Therefore, a democratic state can be described as one where government is legitimized by the agreement of those subject to its rule, agreement being determined through the election process (Arblaster, 1996). Elections are therefore the essence of democracy practices in a state, referring to the procedural basis of the concept that applies in today’s modern world and government.

The term “democracy” can be seen in two basic forms which are direct democracy and representative democracy. However, both can be constitutional democracies. Direct democracy was practiced in ancient Athens. This form of government gave the right to participate in making political decisions to all who were called “citizens” with the exception of women and slaves acting under procedures of majority rule. In the concept of direct democracy there is a continuous participation of the citizens in the direct exercise of power. In large states this is not possible because the decision making process is more complex and it is impossible to gain mutual consensus regarding the public matters, except when the population votes in a referendum. In modern day government, democracy is taking the concept of representative system of government (Arblaster, 1996).

Different from direct democracy, representative democracy on the other hand is characterized by the election of representatives, trust by the people who elect them to be their representative in the government. This process tends to restrict the freedom of governments, as they are accountable to the electorate, the people who elect for their representatives. To maintain the stability of political institutions, parliament and political parties were developed to solve recurring political problems. Successful democratic institutions adapt to changing circumstances and help prevent any individual from gaining control of government. For instance, in Malaysia, political parties act as a means of representing different community interests in parliament. Parties act as a mediator between the citizens and their elected government, and no other institution can do their job.

In the modern world the most common form of non-autocratic government is the constitutional democracy as what have been practiced in most of the countries including Malaysia. Constitution act as a supreme law in the state which will represent the people in a democratic country. Constitution can be described as a written document that legitimates limits and empowers the government, which, if democratic, is based on

periodic and competitive election of representatives by virtually all the adult population. An example of liberal constitutional democracy exists in Malaysia.

According to John J. Patrick (1996) a liberal democracy as government of, by, and for the people, which government is both empowered and limited by the supreme law of the people's constitution for the ultimate purpose of protecting equally the autonomy and rights of everyone in the polity. Constitutionalism means limited government and the rule of law to prevent the arbitrary, abusive use of power, to protect human rights, to support democratic procedures in elections and public policy making, and to achieve a community's shared purposes (Patrick, 1996). A constitutional document provides fixed limitations on the exercise of power by assigning certain specific powers to different structures of government. Malaysia's constitution defines the powers of the Federal government.

Besides that, democratic forms of government provide the fairest method of governance to most people. The coupling of democracy with constitution ensures protection of the rights of the individual, while the accountability of politicians to the electorate through the election process ensures that the government pays some attention to the voice of the people. Different from Malaysia, in Europe, the term democracy signifies a particular type of society and not merely a particular form of government or the means by which we choose a government.

Democracy is also a social arrangement in which the rights and obligations of individuals are significantly understood and respected. For instance, in Malaysia, this arrangement was reflected by the social contract between the major races in Malaya before the country gained its independence on 31 August 1957. A democratic society is one in which the majority of the population plays an active rather than a passive role. In addition, a modern democracy replaced the old traditions of deference and

subordination by a sense of equity among the people, with the essence that every person has an equal right to be respected and listened to. The term democracy is frequently associated with a moral imperative and equated with political liberalism, thus making it synonymous with substantive civic rights, such as freedom from arbitrary arrest, freedom of religion, speech and association.

2.1.3 Democracy Concept Practice in Malaysia

Malaysia is one of the countries who apply the principles of constitutional democracy in its administration by the government (Heufer, 2002). There are two executives which is the Head of State, calls Yang Di Pertuan Agong, a titular executive who holds the position for a five year terms and there is the Head of Government, a Prime Minister who have been elected by the winning party in the election that are held once in four to five year time lapse.

2.1.3.1 Practice of Elections in Malaysia

The concept of democracy in Malaysia can be seen in the practice of General Election and the group of people who have been appointed as the people's representative in decision making process in the country (Lim Hong Hai, 2002). These people often called as the assemblymen and they can be in the Senate or the House of Representative and they will discuss on any topics or issue that is related with the nation's interest and came out with a solutions that can be in form of laws and regulations.

An important aspect of the democratic system is elections. Elections in the practice of democracy constitute a social contract between the people and the candidate or party that succeeds to form a government. When the majority of the people choose a party from among the contesting parties in an election, the winning party then forms the government which means the voters have certain expectations that the

candidate will carry out. The party that wins the election and forms the government should fulfil the party's promises and manifesto proclaimed during the election campaign. Similar practice occurs at the state level, elected representatives of the people will sit in the State Legislative Assembly of each state. At the federal or national level, elected Members of Parliament sit in the House of Representatives.

In Malaysia, there are two types of general election. First, the general election for the whole country, held once in every five years. The next is the by-elections, also considered a general election because the concept of the election itself constitutes the choosing of a representative by the public citizens for the Parliament and the State Legislative Assembly. There are clear differences between the two types of election. The first type is only held after Parliament or the State Legislative Assembly is dissolved. The by-elections do not involve the dissolution of any of the assembly nor do they follow a fixed schedule and occur due to the representative was deprived from his position or by any other means enacted by the law such as death or disability to perform his duty as a representative.

The general election in Malaysia is usually held every 5 years. Before the election, Yang di-Pertuan Agong must first dissolve the Parliament on the advice or at the request of the Prime Minister. This occurs at the federal level. On the other hand, at the State level, a general election is held after the State Legislative Assembly is dissolved by the Sultan or Yang Dipertua Negeri at the request of the Menteri Besar or Chief Minister. As soon as Parliament is dissolved, the elections must be held within 60 days in West Malaysia and within 90 days in Sabah and Sarawak (Abdul Rashid Matoen and Tunku Mohar Mokhtar, 2006). The time specified is reasonable for the Election Commission, to prepare the election arrangements and the contesting parties to get ready, hold campaigns and construct definite strategies following the regulations or laws that have been fixed from time to time.

After the Yang di-Pertuan Agung dissolves Parliament, the Election Commission then will issue an order to the Managing Officer to organize the process of election. The

responsibility of the Managing Officer is to issue a statement, through the Government Gazette or newspaper, on the date of nomination of candidate for the said election, the place and the time of election for every electoral constituency. The Election Commission also determines the date and place of balloting.

Article 113 of the Federal Constitution provides that the body that is responsible for managing and administering the elections is the Election Commission. The responsibility of the Commission can be divided into three main areas which are draw up the borders of the electoral constituencies, prepare and check the voters' lists for the elections, and manage the election process for the Parliamentary and State Legislative Assembly constituencies. It is to be understood that the first responsibility is important because it is related to the increase in population and the development of settlements or the growth of small towns in a constituency.

The members of the Election Commission are appointed by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong after consultation with the Council of Rulers. The membership of the Commission is provided under *Article 114 of the Federal Constitution*. Its membership consists of a chairperson, a deputy and 3 other members. Members of the Commission shall hold office until they reach the age of 65 but they may resign any time by writing to the Yang di-Pertuan Agong. The Yang di-Pertuan Agong is empowered to remove any member who is an undischarged bankrupt, or engages in any paid office or employment outside the duties of his office or is a member of either House of Parliament or of the Legislative Assembly of a state. The Federal Constitution also provides for the appointment of one member to represent Sabah and Sarawak. This member is to be appointed in rotation from the two states.

2.1.3.2 State Legislative Assembly and Parliamentary Members

The main agenda for election to be held in a democratic country such as Malaysia is to choose the representative for the people in the process of decision

making in the country. In a public general election the voters will choose two candidates who are deemed qualified to represent them in the Houses, that is, the State Legislative Council and the House of Representatives. The candidate, who contests in a State Legislative Council district, is known as the candidate for the State Legislative Assembly seat while for the House of Representatives, as the candidate for Parliamentary or House of Representatives seat. Those who win the elections will be designated State Legislative Assembly members or People's Representatives depending on the level of the electoral district won. A member of the State Legislative Assemblies cannot at the same time represent more than one electoral constituency. A people's representative too, cannot be a member for both the Parliamentary Assemblies or represent more than one electoral district. The total membership of the State Legislative Assembly varies from state to state and this has to do with the issue of alignment of divisions or electoral constituencies determined and identified by the Election Commission authorities. The same goes for the membership of the House of Representatives.

2.1.3.3 The Senate

Different from state's assemblyman and Member of Parliament, the criteria to become a member in the Senate was not through official and general election. Article 45 of the Federal Constitution provides that the members of the Senate also known as senators are selected and appointed. Two members for each State shall be elected in accordance with the Seventh Schedule of the Federal Constitution comprise of 26 members, two members for the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur, one member each for the Federal Territory of Labuan and the Federal Territory of Putrajaya shall be appointed by the Yang di Pertuan Agong, and the remaining of 40 members also shall be appointed by the Yang di Pertuan Agong. Senators, who are appointed, consist of those who have rendered excellent service in the commerce, business, industry, agriculture, art or social welfare. Senators can also be appointed from those who represent minority groups or people who can represent the interests of the native tribes. The appointment of a Senator from this group is considered important in the legislative context.

The vast experiences in their respective fields can help the legislative body to refine related aspects and this definitely helps the executive body in the country's administrative matters, based on the rules in the form of acts passed by the House of Representatives. This wide experience is reinforced with the condition that a person can be appointed as a Senator from the age of 30 and above.

The duration in office of a Senator is different from that of a representative of the people. The length of time in office of a member of the House of Representatives is limited by dissolution of Parliament but not a Senator. A Senator can hold his post for 3 years, even during the period Parliament is dissolved. However the post cannot be held for more than two terms that is, not exceeding 6 years whether continuously or intermittently.

2.1.4 Malaysia 12th General Election Analysis and its reflection to the understanding of Malaysian Democracy

12th Malaysian general election was held on 8 March 2008 although the actual maturity was May 2009 (Utusan Malaysia, 2008). This was due to the dissolution of the Parliament declared on 13 February 2008 by the former Prime Minister, Datuk Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi. 72.2% from 10.9 million registered voters had fulfilled their responsibility to choose their new government (Utusan Malaysia, 2008).

The election contested included 222 Parliament seats and 505 state government seats as the Sarawak state government had held its State Legislative Assembly election in 2007. The election results clearly sided with BN's large coalition party which obtained 52% popular votes compared to the opposition pact of 37%. This was very different from the popular votes in election year 2004 where BN obtained 64%. If previously 91% Parliament seats were dominated by BN, BN's performance showed a far decline in their performance. In fact, if the elections year 2004 saw Datuk Seri Abdullah's government being given a huge mandate and successfully administered 12 from 13 states, the elections this time was the hardest hit to BN with the loss of 5 states

including Kelantan state which has been under PAS party since 1990 and majority of seats in the Federal Territory also being won by the opposition. With the success of setting up the federal government with simple majority, the performance of elections 2008 was regarded as the worst performance with only being able to defend 140 seats compared to the opposition's success to control 82 seats, the biggest number won by their pact since the year 1957.

It is not surprising when Penang's fall to DAP but the question is raised to what happen to BN when they have lose in Selangor, Kedah and Perak. The issue is, why was there a large transition of votes? BN's popular vote in the Peninsular was 49% while the opposition obtained 51%. Although BN won 140 seats, 54 seats came from Sabah and Sarawak. Without their win in Sabah and Sarawak, BN would have failed to defend their easy majority in Parliament. The opposition like DAP and PAS have crept into BN's stronghold in the Johor state and won seats while in Negeri Sembilan, the difference with the opposition's win was only 4 seats (Utusan Malaysia, 2008). Urban areas such as Kuantan and Indera Mahkota in Pahang state fell into the opposition's control. In Penang, only Datuk Seri Abdullah and Tan Sri Nor Mohamad Ya'cop won in the Parliament level whilst several areas in the other states were won by the opposition.

Therefore, there is a big question mark on how far the election results of 2008 regarded as a continuation? Or does it actually describe a determination of wanted change? Or is it the sign of democracy maturity among the people in the country? With the capacity to continue to withstand at federal level and enable BN to still continue to set up the federal government, it can be seen as continuity in change. Although BN party's majority faced a decline, it produced a shock as many voters voted for the opposition as a sign of protest or to show how voter power has large meaning in each registered voter's self. In fact, among the voters or candidates, they did not expect a "political tsunami" like this could happen.

The opposition's win was often associated with the weakness of the opponent and not because of their strength. Their cooperation is also characterized as temporal, always waiting for the moment as to whether to separate or if there will be a party that continues to vanish or die. The opposition's performance has not been have been proven except in certain conditions including the year 2008 as if a new paradigm had been born in the context of the nation's politics. Rejection by Malay, Chinese and Indian voters in all previous elections, the change in the percentage of Malay voters was not as obvious as what was seen in the 2008 elections although many master degree holders and political analysts often made comparisons with the general election of years 1969 and 1999.

Malay rejection was so obvious because popular votes obtained by UMNO were 35.5% while popular vote combination of PAS and PKR was 34.8% (P. Sivamurugan, 2010). As the biggest voter ethnic group, the pattern of Malay voters was very significant in whether to continue leadership tradition under BN or shift to other party. Although the vote transition to the opposition party was not as big as voters from other ethnic clusters, it was important to show solidarity as a strategy to be with other ethnic groups. This percentage decline does not mean that Malay voters support the opposition but it is more of symbolizing a sign of protest on other side issues which do not have a solution because the majority is still component party BN. At the same time, PAS cannot claim that the ideology of their party politics was accepted by voters and this enabled the party to get support from Malay voters because the party ideology had no underlying in their campaign this time. Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim reputedly emerged in perfect time and manipulated the mood of the people nicely.

Although the non-Malay voting pattern moved to DAP and PKR, UMNO lost a lot of its voter support in big city areas populated by society who possessed various basic facilities and ability to seek side information sources through technology development. 75% from today's population demography is targeted to achieve township status in the

year 2020. If this happens, is BN already prepared to face the trend of preference towards the opposition party among this cluster of voters? If the election pattern of 2008 remains, thus it is no longer a change in continuity but a new political change in Malaysia. If in the 2004 elections, a majority of Chinese voters still preferred BN where they have won 56.4% or 31 of the 40 seats contested. However, in the 2008 elections, that percentage declined by 18.3% to 38.1%. It could have been influenced by sentiments on current issues which brought them to choosing the opposition party to send signals to government leadership.

Clearly, the party with ethnic opposition Chinese attracted big support from the Chinese community's rejection of MCA and Gerakan. The severe losses caused the party President, Datuk Seri Ong Ka Ting, refused his reappointment in the Cabinet as a sign of his responsibility on MCA's declining performance (Utusan Malaysia, 2008). On the other hand, another Chinese majority party under BN, Gerakan lost all seats in Penang (Utusan Malaysia, 2008). This can be seen in DAP's campaign that one MCA or Gerakan vote is one vote for UMNO and playing with the sentiment of resentment towards UMNO succeeded in approaching Chinese voters, causing MCA and Gerakan's achievement to be tossed aside. The 'Keris' issue from the UMNO General Assembly earlier on still continued to be remembered by the Chinese community and this issue was used and manipulated by DAP to seek sympathy and inflame the feeling of hatred among them as the opposition raised situations where Gerakan and MCA were considered too often give in to UMNO (Sivamurugan, 2010).

During the 2008 election, the Indian community voting pattern was the biggest contribution towards BN's rejection with its close fall of 64.1% from 72.4% in 2004 to just 8.3% in 2008 (Sivamurugan, 2010). Although the Indian community population is considered small, the polling trend in fact has its influence to the election result. This phenomenon, although not surprising, played a sufficiently large effect on the Indian community overall because they also had no big say in Pakatan Rakyat (Utusan Malaysia, 2008). One of the triggers might come from the emergence of Hindu Rights Action Force (Hindraf), that managed to affect the lower class society steered by the

professional class on issues regarding the Indian community, such as the demolishing of a temple and religious conversion, plus the detention of the five leaders of Hindraf under ISA Act became the Indian community's reason to switch over to the opposition.

The signals from all three communities are clear that it is the issues of culture, belief, religion and deserted life style without any solution which is connected with the absence effective leadership, causing them to organize a mass protest which thus became the basis for the "political tsunami".

The Indian community with the issue of the temple demolition and Hindraf claim, while the Chinese community's frustration with current culture issues and economic situation because as they could see no authority in handling the economic issues of the nation let alone the economic cultures was considered a synonym with society, and among the Malay community, they realized that a one-way compromise value had emerged until UMNO and Abdullah were held accountable for sacrificing religion and race for the interest of other ethnic group in this country (Sivamurugan, 2010). Although there is the perception that the voting pattern among the Malay, Chinese and Indian communities have brought a new phase on polling styles and has stepped over the boundaries of ethnicity and elections system of two parties, there are still no solid evidence that suggested that the political maturity and the societies' understanding of democracy is reflected in the 12th general election.

2.1.5 Issues pertaining democracy practice in Malaysia

2.1.5.1 Freedom of speech and expression

Freedom of expression in Malaysia is limited by restrictive legislation, and by the concentration of media ownership in the hands of the ruling parties or those closely

allied with them. All media are government-controlled, directly through ownership, or indirectly through individuals with political connections. Only officially sanctioned viewpoints are aired, and little space is given to marginalized groups and communities. Opposition parties have no access to the broadcast media and limited access to print media while licensing is handled restrictively.

Defamation law is another tool used by powerful, well-connected individuals to undermine freedom of expression (Siebert, 1965). Defamation suits are excessively punitive and can run into hundreds of millions of Ringgit. The Sedition Act has a very broad definition of "sedition," and places many limitations on freedom of expression, particularly regarding "sensitive" political issues. It has been invoked against critics of the government, including members of parliament who, under the act, can have their parliamentary immunity suspended.

The right to freedom of information is non-existent in Malaysia. Legislation allows almost any civil servant to classify any piece of information, without justification. The decision to classify information cannot be challenged in court. Expectations that Prime Minister Abdullah was ready to explore positive initiatives through his pledge to fight burdensome bureaucracy have not materialized. Rather, Malaysia's biggest English language newspaper, The Star, reported on August 2, 2006 that the prime minister had issued a warning against critics of the government, that those who spread untruths and slander on the Internet will face the law. If information in blogs, web sites and online portals were deemed incorrect, bordered on slander, caused a disturbance or compelled the public to lose faith in the nation's economic policies, their authors would be detained for investigation.

Even though Malaysia's constitution guarantees every citizen the right of free speech and expression, they also sets significant limitations on that freedom, as

Parliament may by law effect “such restrictions on free speech as it deems necessary or expedient in the interest of the security of the Federation ...” (Malaysian Constitution, Article 10), Parliament has enacted numerous laws enabling broad state control over the media. Notable print and broadcast media regulations include the Printing Presses and Publications Act, which requires all print publishers to seek annual renewal of a publication license granted at the state’s discretion, and the Sedition Act, which criminalizes the expression or publication of words that tend to incite hatred or contempt against any government.

For instance, the Communications and Multimedia Act of 1998 (CMA) and the Communications and Multimedia Commission Act of 1998 (CMCA) together directly govern Malaysia’s telecommunications, broadcasting, and Internet sectors, including related facilities, services, and content. The CMCA establishes the Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission, which is empowered to regulate the information technology and communications industries. The commission takes the position that Internet content must be regulated and controlled for reasons of access, privacy and security and protection of individual rights. The CMA empowers the commission with broad authority to regulate online speech, providing that in the Malaysian Communication Multimedia Act 1998, Section 211(1) stated that “no content applications service provider, or other person using a content applications service, shall provide content which is indecent, obscene, false, menacing, or offensive in character with intent to annoy, abuse, threaten or harass any person.”

2.1.5.2 Freedom of assembly and association

The constitutional right “to assemble peacefully and without arms” has in practice been restricted by subsequent legislation. The discretionary powers given to police officers in issuing and cancelling permits have led to repeated allegations of selective application of the law and political bias.

While some observers have noted improvements in the Royal Malaysian Police's respect for freedom of assembly over recent years, administration and police periodically continue to adopt high-handed methods in cracking down on peaceful gatherings, as seen on May 28, 2006, when the police violently stopped a protest against fuel and electricity price hikes at the Petronas Twin Towers in Kuala Lumpur (Malaysia Civil and Political Rights Report, 2008). 21 members and supporters of opposition parties have also been subjected to repression and sometimes arrested for unlawful assembly.

2.1.6 Influence of demographic factors on understanding of democracy

In this research, we will try to identify the different level of understanding based on three demographic factors namely gender, job sector, and races. Why these three factors do is chosen? It is because we believe that these three factors have significant influence on the level of understanding of democracy in Malaysia.

For instance, it is logically to think that people who serve in the public sector have a higher understanding on democracy concept because it is their concern as the prime mover of public administration and management in the state. Similar to gender, most of us may perceived that male understand more about democracy compare to female as politics are one of their topic of interest. Besides that, in our multiracial society, the level of understanding of democracy might be different across races where we assume that Malays and Bumiputras are more aware and understand of democracy compare to Chinese and Indian.

2.1.6.1 Gender and politics

The growing phenomena of classifying gender as a social aspect came from the fact that both men and women were recognized as a socio-economic complex where the dominance is not due to the biological or physical nature but due to socio-economic norms, thereafter a lot of norms were changed which previously prioritized one sex over the other. Thus the notion of gender means more of a responsibility, roles and different characteristics given to individuals (Emara, 2011). Therefore, it is the norms of the gender influenced by socio-economic that may create a difference understanding of politics and democracy. In Malaysia, the norm that have resulted in male dominate society based on economic power and therefore also in politics.

According to Xiajuan (2003), women are not as equal as men in real power structure. Obviously women are in a hobble, which contrasts sharply with their comparatively independent participation awareness. Even though women posses strong ability in political participation, they would not concentrate on work like men because they feel like going against the traditional role expectation. Therefore, this situation may also contribute to different level of understanding of democracy based on gender perspective. In addition, the view of "Men are superior to women" goes deeps into women's characters as well as men's values (Xiajuan, 2003).

(H1: Male has higher levels of understanding on democracy that female)

2.1.6.2 Job Sector influence on level of understanding of democracy

It is often assume that employee who serve the public sector has higher levels of understanding on democracy concept as they are more exposed to governemnt machineries and administration that employee who work with private organizations. To

identify this, it is important for us to view on the similarities and differences that these two sectors have that might be a possible cause for this assumption.

The most salient distinguishing characteristic of public/political-sector bodies is that they are normative at their core (Lapalombara). For instance, the public sector core values is to provide and deliver services to the people. They are not as profit-oriented as the private sector which consider it as their main core values. Besides that, the public sector also have a high degree of influence by political actors compare to private sector. This is because their purpose is to execute the strategies, plans, policies, and programs according to the will of the government.

The basic elements of the argument that public and private management are fundamentally unlike in all important respects are: (1) that the public interest differs from private interests, (2) that public officials, because they exercise the sovereign power of the state, are necessarily accountable to democratic values rather than to any particular group or material interest, and (3) that the constitution requires equal treatment of persons and rules out the kind of selectivity that is essential to sustaining profitability. Moreover, the extent of the differences between the two sectors has been well documented empirically (Laurence E. Lynn & Sydney Stein, 2001). Hence, it can be assume that the nature of public sector itself has led to their higher level of understanding of democracy compare to the private sector.

(H2: Public Sector employees understand more on democracy concept compare to private sector employees)

2.6.1.3 Races identification and understanding of democracy concept

When viewing democracy concept practice in our country, we cannot avoid to associate it with party system based on races. Malaysia is a multi-racial, multi-religious

and multi-cultural country. Many races have been living on its soil for the past 500 years. It was during the British colonization when a huge number of workers and immigrants, mostly from mainland China and the Indian subcontinent were brought into the country and located in various commercial areas and plantation estates respectively. At the same time, the Malays, who were natives, remained in the rural areas. This social set-up led to polarization and segregation between the three main ethnic groups (Musa, 2008).

This segmentation has also influence the political climates in the country. Therefore, the political party set up in our country before independent and continue until today are based on races and ethnics available in the country. The main party in Malaysia, UMNO (United Malays Nationalist Organisation), emerged after the British tried to introduce a Malayan Union in the late 1940s (Fionna, 2008). UMNO created an agreement with MCA and MIC and together they formed the National Front that have been in power for over five decade since our country gaining it independence in 1957.

The situation of race-based party system has continue to shape the perception of politics and democracy based on races. One of the central pillars of the 1957 Malayan Constitution was the inter-communal compromises enshrined in the document. These compromises, which sought to safeguard the rights and interests of all communities, can be traced to the joint memorandum submitted to the Reid Constitutional Commission by the Alliance Parties. The memorandum was a creation of negotiations between the Alliance parties in 1956. The Alliance parties were a coalition between UMNO (representing the Malays), MCA (representing the Chinese) and MIC (representing the Indians). The Alliance appointed two committees to draft its memorandum. The first, which included all the top executives of the three parties, dealt with the vexed communal issues such as citizenship, language and the Malay special position. The second, comprising two senior leaders from each of the three parties,

worked on the structure and function of government, the Federal- State division of powers and resources, the judiciary, etc. (Musa, 2008).

UMNO is seen to be a dominant party in National Front coalition as it serve the majority of the state population, which is the Malays ((Fionna, 2008). In Sabah and Sarawak, most of the party are also based on race and dominate by Malays and Bumiputras. MCA, GERAKAN, MIC, and other small parties are the representatives of Chinese and Indian in the country. Hence, based on this situation, since Malays and Bumiputras are the native of the soil, the understanding of democracy might be higher compare to Chinese and Indians.

(H3: Malays and Bumiputras have a higher understanding of democracy compare to Chinese and Indians)

2.1.7 Why it is important to understand democracy?

If we are to embrace the Greek concept of government “by the people”, then knowledge about how our system of government works and how citizens can bring about change is the key to sustainable democratic development. In Malaysia, while modern democracies continue to deliver tangible benefits to citizens, many citizens remain suspicious of political power and authority. Therefore, it can be said that in a healthy democracy, citizens question the motives of their politicians, and scrutinize the activities of governments. In a democracy the prevalent belief is that no government is perfect, no ruling doctrine or ideology unquestionably valid (Singleton, 2000).


Understanding for democracy is gaining knowledge about an inclusive society. This society recognizes all members, regardless of race, religion, gender, status, socio-

economic status and skin color. An inclusive community recognizes diversity among its members and makes people feel that they are part of the community.

Calabrese and Barton (1994) argue that one of the primary lessons of a democracy is that we can agree to disagree. We can debate all sides of an issue until common ground is found. People need to be taught to consider issues and debate alternatives in order to appreciate and practice the concepts of democracy. Besides that, people should also be taught to question the reliability and validity of decisions and to offer constructive criticism and alternatives, not simply argue for arguments' sake. To do so, people first must need to understand that there are differing viewpoints, solutions or perspectives in addition to their own. The skill of listening to others and accepting and respecting their points of view are valuable lessons taught to the society that values democracy. In the end, the processes and discussions are just as important as the result, as people have the opportunity to discuss and debate issues. A decision or viewpoint has not been made without explanation or clarification of concepts. It is not the aim of a democracy to convert people to one view but rather to seek common ground, to seek better understanding, to seek to discover how we can improve our society all altogether (Bahmueller, 1998).

Democracy will gives to ordinary citizens the greatest opportunity of influencing public decisions. The knowledge and understandings of democracy should be taught and our citizens empowered and motivated to act. Civility must be maintained and the arguments thought out. Debate must be anticipated and encouraged. Therefore, people too, must understand how to act democratically so as to promote democracy as a process. Hence, if there is to be government of the people, by the people and for the people, then there must be education of the people in the principles, practices and commitments of democracy (Patrick, 1999)

2.2 Conceptual Framework



2.2.1 Independent variables

2.2.1.1 Gender

Gender may have some influence to the research topic. Hence, it is considered as a factor that the researcher chosen to study in this proposal.

2.2.1.2 Job sector

Sector where person work may influence their understandings of democracy practices in Malaysia. Therefore, the researcher has included job sectors namely those who work in public and private organization as one of the factors in the conceptual framework.

2.2.1.3 Races

This refers to the race or ethnics available in the country where it is divided into four major groups which is Malays, Bumiputras, Chinese and Indians. As a country with multiracial background, it is important to consider this factor as one of the influential factors that may affect the levels of understanding of Malaysian democracy.

2.2.2 Dependent variables

2.2.2.1 Right to vote

Elections in the practice of democracy constitute a social contract between the people and the candidate or party. In Malaysia, every citizens who was over the age of 21 years old and fulfilling certain criteria according to Article 119 of the Federal Constitution has the right to vote in the election process in the country.

2.2.2.2 Freedom of speech and expression

Article 10 of the Federal Constitution mentioned about the rights of Malaysian citizens including their freedom of speech. However, the article also mentions on the restriction of freedom of speech that may harm the Federation security. Sedition Act 1948 also one of the laws that impose certain restriction on freedom of speech and expression in Malaysia.

2.2.2.3 Freedom of media and press

The printing presses and publication act 1984 requires the keeper of a printing press to obtain a license from the minister and making a deposit the amount of which is fixed by him. The minister's power to refuse to renew the license is not subject to judicial review. This power has been used to control the press.

2.2.2.4 Freedom of assembly and association

Article 10 also conferred right and freedom of assembly and association with certain exceptions. Apart from that, freedom of association and assembly has been regulated by the Police Act 1967, and gatherings of more than 5 persons in public places require a permit, which must be applied for 14 days in advance.

2.2.3 Hypotheses

Objective 1

H1: Male has higher levels of understanding on democracy than female.

Objective 2

H2: Public Sector employees understand more on democracy concept compared to private sector employees.

Objective 3

H3: Malays and Bumiputras have a higher understanding of democracy compared to Chinese and Indians.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHOD

3.1 Research design

For the purpose of this study, the research design will be cross-sector survey. The research demands for information from both public sector and private sector employees which may cover various departments, divisions and sections within the organizations. In the study, the researcher will use self-administered questionnaire as a medium for survey.

3.2 Unit of analysis

As this study will address the understanding of Malaysian democracy based on the gender, job sectors and races, the unit of analysis will be the public agencies and private organizations in Sarawak with multiracial background of employees.

3.3 Sample size

The sample size for this study is 200 which will be divided equally among the sectors and genders with proportion to the races of the respondents.

3.4 Sampling technique

Two public departments and two private organizations will be selected for this research. The sampling that we have chosen is convenience sampling to ensure that the data collected are not being manipulated and only to the extent of the factors that we wanted to emphasize in this study.

3.5 Measurement/Instrumentation

	Objectives	Concept/constructs	Measurement
1	Levels of understanding of democracy concept in Malaysia among people in public and private sector	Those who work in public and private sectors	Differences of understanding of Malaysian democracy between public and private sectors.
2	Relation between gender and their understanding of democracy concept in Malaysia.	Gender is define into male and female	Level of understanding of Malaysian democracy between gender
3	Determine whether race have an influence to the levels of understanding of democracy in Malaysia.	Refers to races or ethnics available in the country where it is divided into four major groups which is Malays, Bumiputras, Chinese and Indians.	Differences and mean of levels of understanding between major races groups in Malaysia.

3.6 Data collection

The data for this study will be collected through questionnaire. This method was chosen because it is convenient to gather and collect all the data necessary for the purpose of this study. It also could be collected within a limited time.

3.7 Data analysis

Objectives	Variable/s	Measurement	Scale	Statistics
Determine the level of understanding of democracy between job sectors	Refers to those who works in public and private sectors	Differences of understanding of Malaysian democracy between public and private sectors.	Nominal	Mean and frequencies
Determine the influence of gender on levels of understanding of Malaysian democracy	Refers to sex of subject	male or female	Nominal	Mean and frequencies
Determine the influence of races to levels of understandings of Malaysian democracy	Ethnic and races in Malaysia. Divided into four major groups which are Malays, Bumiputras, Chinese, and Indians	Differences and mean of levels of understanding between major races groups in Malaysia.	Nominal	Mean and frequencies

CHAPTER 4

FINDINGS

4.1 Introduction

In this chapter we will discuss about the findings that has been obtained from our study of levels of understanding of Malaysian democracy based on demographic factors namely gender, job sectors, and race. This study was done from April 2011 until November 2011. We analyzed the data using Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) Version 16.0.

4.2 Respondents' profile

This section will determine the background information of our respondents. Below were the results calculated using descriptive statistic which is frequency and percentage.

Table 4.0 Gender of respondents

Gender				
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
male	70	46.4	46.4	46.4
female	81	53.6	53.6	100.0
Total	151	100.0	100.0	

Table 4.0 above shows the gender of our respondents. From 151 respondents for our study, 46.4% or 70 of them were males while the remaining was females comprising of 81 respondents in total.

Table 4.1 Respondents' job sectors

Job					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	public sector	104	68.9	68.9	68.9
	private sector	47	31.1	31.1	100.0
	Total	151	100.0	100.0	

Table 4.1 shows most of our respondents came from public sector employees. It comprises of 68.9% of the total respondents. The remaining of our respondents came from private sector employees which comprise of 31.1% or 47 respondents out of total respondents in our study.

Table 4.2 Race of respondents

Race					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Malay	71	47.0	47.0	47.0
	Bumiputra	60	39.7	39.7	86.8
	Chinese	19	12.6	12.6	99.3
	Indian	1	.7	.7	100.0
	Total	151	100.0	100.0	

Table 4.2 shows the races of our respondents. From the total of our respondents involved in this study, most of them are Malays and Bumiputras that amounted to a total of 131 respondents. Chinese respondents comprise of 12.6% which is 19 of the total respondents and there are only one Indian respondent in our study. The lack of Indian respondent is due to their small number in the population in Sarawak. Therefore, in this study, since we use SPSS as a mean to analyze the findings, Indian race is being included in any boxplots produced but other output will be omitted.

4.3 Findings of Objectives

In this section, a set of simple test is distributed to respondents to measure their levels of understanding regarding democracy concept practice in Malaysia. The test comprise of 13 questions divided under four subtopic related to democracy in Malaysia namely election process, freedom of speech and expression, freedom of media, and freedom of assembly and association. However, the total test score will only be totaled to 11 where Q2 and Q13 is meant to assess their main criterion in voting and awareness of restriction for freedom of assembly respectively, that have no right or wrong answers. Both of these questions will help to enhance our study regarding their levels of understanding of Malaysian democracy and will be discussed in the recommendation and conclusion section.

4.3.1 Genders understanding of democracy

This section is concerning the first hypothesis about the differences in gender understanding of democracy concept practice in Malaysia. The hypothesis is:

H1: Male has higher levels of understanding on democracy that female

Table 4.3 Genders understanding of democracy

Gender	Number of respondents	Mean score
Male	70	6.10
Female	81	5.65

Chart 4.0 Male total score





Chart 4.1 Female total score



From the above chart, we can see that most of our male respondents have a score of 6 over 11 from the test conducted. On the other hand, our female respondents mostly have a score of 5 over 11 from the test. From this result, we can assume that male respondents have a higher understanding levels of democracy concept in Malaysia compare to their counterparts. The test has been supported with the mean test where on the average; male has a score of 6.10 while female has a total score of 5.65.

Therefore, in this finding, we have accepted H1 which stated that males have higher levels of understanding of democracy concept in Malaysia compare to females.

4.3.2 Job sectors and levels of understanding of democracy

This section will analyze the levels of understanding of democracy concept in Malaysia based on the respondents' job sectors either in a public sector or private organizations. The hypothesis concerning this section is:

H2: Public Sector employees understand more on democracy concept compare to private sector employees

Table 4.4 Understanding of Malaysian democracy based on job sectors

Job sectors	Number of respondents	Mean score
Public	104	5.73
Private	47	6.15

Chart 4.2 Public Sector total score





Chart 4.3 Private sector total score



From the above table and charts, we have found that respondents who work in private sector have higher levels of understanding of democracy concepts practice in Malaysia compare to respondents who work in public sector. From the test conducted, respondents from private sector have an average score of 6.15 while respondents from public sector only manage to get an average score of 5.73 of the test.

Therefore, we rejected H2 that mentioned public sector employees understand more on democracy concept compare to private sector employees.

4.3.3 Races understanding of democracy concept in Malaysia

This section will analyze the levels of understanding of democracy concept in Malaysia based on races. Therefore, we have included Malays, Chinese and Indians in our study meanwhile the natives are put into one category which is Bumiputra. However, as the study being conducted, we are unable to collect sufficient response from the Indian community and only manage to get only one respondent for our study. Therefore, in analyzing the data using SPSS 16, the data for Indian will be omitted.

This section is concerning the third hypothesis of our study which is:

H3: Malays and Bumiputras have a higher understanding of democracy compare to Chinese and Indians

Table 4.5 Average score based on races

Race	Number of respondents	Mean score
Malays	71	5.89
Bumiputra	60	5.95
Chinese	19	5.37

* Data for Indian has been omitted

Chart 4.4 Malays test score




Table 4.5 Bumiputras test score





Table 4.6 Chinese test score



The table and charts above show the average test score for three races which are Malays, Bumiputras, and Chinese with respect to their levels of understanding of Malaysian democracy. From the table 4.3.3.1, the average score for Malays is 5.89 while Bumiputras and Chinese have an average score of 5.95 and 5.37 respectively. From this result, it can be assumed that Malays and Bumiputras are more understand regarding the democracy concept practice in Malaysia compare to the Chinese. However, the margins between these races score are not that far from each other.

Hence, we have accepted H3 that stated Malays and Bumiputras have a higher understanding of democracy compare to Chinese and Indians.

CHAPTER 5

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

5.1 Introduction

This chapter concludes the present of our case study of the levels of understanding of Malaysian democracy based on demographic factors namely gender, job sectors, and races. Therefore, this chapter discusses the implication, limitations and provide recommendations found from our questionnaires. This is important to the research objectives in order to enable the respondents to give their own opinion about their understanding towards democracy concept practice in Malaysia.

5.2 Implications of the study

There are several implications that can be drawn from the current study results in Chapter 4. In perspective of government, we hope that they will be able to get a clear perception on how the citizens define the concept of democracy practice in the country. In order to avoid any misunderstanding about our democracy concept, this is crucial where government and people should have the same wavelength of understanding democracy. The misconception of democracy has led to various problems in Malaysia that involves citizens such as illegal demonstration due to grievances in certain issues.

The public; on the other hand, should also aware and understand the concept of democracy practice in Malaysia. We want the public to have a higher understanding of the democracy concept in Malaysia to ensure that they will know all their rights and able to use it, but not abuse it. As a country that practice constitutional democracy, Malaysia is different from other countries that practice total democracy such as the United States

and France. Therefore, a higher awareness about Malaysia's concept of democracy will improve their levels of understanding regardless of their gender, job sectors, or races.

Finally, the implication of the study will guide the people regardless of their gender, job sectors, or races to assess their levels of understanding regarding democracy concept in Malaysia. This will help to give them a better understanding of our country's practice of democracy. By having higher levels of understanding of democracy, it will also improve their political maturity and we can have a politically matured society in the near future.

5.3 Suggestions and recommendations

Section B (Questions 2 and 13) and Section C of our questionnaire that were given to the respondents was asked on their overall understanding on how democracy concept is practice in the country and ways to improve the levels of understanding of democracy among the people.

5.3.1 Suggestions by respondents

5.3.1.1 Abolish certain restrictions to freedom of speech, media, and rights to assembly

In moving toward a developed nation by the year 2020, political stability is one of the main pillars to achieve the vision. Therefore, to create a stable political condition in Malaysia, the citizens must have a high political maturity; which include a higher level of understanding of democracy practice in the country. In order to achieve it, some extent of the current restrictions such as freedom of media and speech must be revised, amends, or abolish where it deems to be necessary.

Therefore, it is suggested that the government will review this restrictions to ensure that the people will have more says in the decision made by the

government. This will also serve as a check and balance between the government and the people. However, recently, a day before the first celebration of Malaysia Day, the Prime Minister has announced that the Internal Security Act 1960 (ISA) will be abolished, while Printing Presses and Publication Act 1984 and Section 27 of the Police Act 1967 will be reviewed. Thus, it has proven that in order to achieve the status of politically matured society, these restrictions is not relevant anymore as the people themselves should have a better understanding of their rights protected under the law and use appropriately.

5.3.1.2 More transparent mainstream media

Some of the respondents argue that the mainstream media are not transparent in disseminating information to the public. This causes them to have a misperception regarding certain issues being brought up. Some of them also seeks alternative media such as blogs and internet to find information and as a result, they may be served with manipulated facts wrote by these bloggers. Hence, this will affect their levels of understanding of democracy concept practice in Malaysia and the society will be prone to negative information such as seditious statement made by irresponsible party.

Therefore, a transparent mainstream media is important as a major source of information for the public apart from the new media. By having a proper and rightful dissemination of information, this will help the public to gain more understanding of democracy in Malaysia.

5.3.2 Suggestions by researchers

5.3.2.1 Education on democracy concept from the early age

Although many nations promote the value of teaching for democracy, this crucial part of the student's lifelong education is rarely given sustained attention in the

formal curriculum or the school community. Democracy should be viewed as key learning outcomes in the formal and informal curriculum from the earliest years of schooling. If there is to be government of the people, by the people and for the people, then there must be education of the people in the principles, practices and commitments of democracy (Patrick, 1996).

Therefore, our view of early age education is important to instill the understanding of democracy. The earlier the people expose to the real concept of democracy concept practice in Malaysia, the higher their understanding will be. Even though politics is seems to be an inappropriate subject to be taught in school, the elements of democracy can be included in other subject such as history.

5.3.2.2 Academicians roles in improving people understanding of democracy in Malaysia

In order to improve the levels of understanding of democracy concept practice in Malaysia, roles play by academicians is seems to be important. It cannot be denied that these academicians are the expert of their fields and their opinion and thought are based on facts and years of experiences. Therefore, academicians related to political study should involve in the efforts to educate the people regarding democracy concept practice in Malaysia. As the experts, they will be able to give a clear view to the citizens without prejudice and bias to certain parties.

5.4 Limitations of the Study

There are several limitations which may hinder and slow down the research project as follows:

5.4.1 Lack of secondary data

It is hard to find journals, annual reports and magazines that are useful for the research. We gain limited information in online newspapers to gain relevant data and feedback from the respondents regarding their understanding of democracy concept in Malaysia.

5.4.2 The response of the general public to the questionnaire

Some of the respondents are in rush and they do not want to give full cooperation to fill in the questionnaire. Therefore, the collected data that we gain may not be accurate and thus cause difficulties in data collection and problem in analyzing the data. Apart from that, the respondents did not read the instructions carefully as there are respondents that answering some sections in the questionnaires incorrectly.

5.4.3 Lack of relevant information

Less cooperation from the respondents will make the data not relevant. The irrelevant data will cause the information limits the scope and validity of the study. For instance, some of the respondents may not honestly answer the questionnaire in a correct manner that causes data distortion.

5.4.4 Uncooperative and lack of respondents for the study

Some of the respondents simply refuse to answer and return the questionnaires. Therefore, from 200 questionnaires distributed, only 151 were returned to the researchers. This will cause difficulties in performing data analysis in Chapter 4. For instance, most of the Chinese respondents did not return the questionnaires to the researchers with only 19 of them returned it. Besides that, difficulties in finding Indian respondents by the researchers are another issue that causes the data to be omitted when analyzes using SPSS 16.

5.5 Conclusion

Based on the conducted research, we have managed to get information in regard to the levels of understanding of Malaysian democracy based on demographic factors namely gender, job sectors, and races.


In view of gender, male claimed to have a higher understanding of democracy compare to female. This has supported the hypothesis stated where male should have higher understanding of democracy than female. This may be cause by their topic of interests which is politics that affect their understanding. However, the difference between the average score is not that far.

However, in job sectors, the hypothesis that stated public servants have a higher understanding of democracy is incorrect. In our study, it is proven that private sector workers have higher understanding regarding the subject. This may be cause by their exposure to government policies, laws, and other information such as from mass media and alternative media. Even though the private sector respondents seem to understand more regarding democracy concept in Malaysia, the average score is just slightly differentiated between both sectors.

In view of races, it is proven that Malays and Bumiputras have higher levels of understanding of democracy concept in Malaysia compare to Chinese and Indians. However, the average score has shown that the Chinese also understand democracy

where the margin between their score with Malays and Bumiputras is not far. However, it is regretted that we cannot have the information for Indian as the data has been omitted due to lack of respondents.

As a conclusion, knowledge about how our system of government works and how citizens can bring about change is the key to sustainable democratic development. Hence, from our study, there are not much difference between the understanding of democracy concept in Malaysia when we compare it to gender, job sectors, and races. Therefore, this shows that our citizens regardless of their gender, job sectors, and races do not differ much in their understanding of democracy. However, based on the score result, several measures should be taken to ensure that people have a higher understanding of democracy concept practice in our country and embraced the concept of government "by the people".



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APPENDICES

Sample questionnaire

Section A: demographic information

Please tick (√) in the appropriate box.

Gender	Male ()	Female ()		
Job sector	Public Sector ()	Private Sector ()		
Race	Malays ()	Bumiputras ()	Chinese ()	Indian ()

Section B: Please circle the appropriate answer.

Right to vote in Malaysia:

1. What is the eligible age for Malaysian to vote?
 - a. 18
 - b. 19
 - c. 20
 - d. 21
2. What is your main criterion to vote in the election?
 - a. Candidate
 - b. Party
 - c. Current government
 - d. Manifesto
3. What is the main role of Suruhanjaya Pilihanraya Malaysia?
 - a. Ensure fair election
 - b. Administering election process in Malaysia
 - c. Registering voters
 - d. Unsure
4. How often is the election held in the country?
 - a. once in three year
 - b. once in four year
 - c. once in five year
 - d. unsure

Freedom of speech and expression in Malaysia:

5. What is freedom of speech means to you?
 - a. I am free to voice my opinion on any matters
 - b. I am free to voice my opinion based on what I think is right and appropriate
 - c. I am free to voice my opinion as long as it is not falls under sensitive issues protected by the Federal Constitution
 - d. Unsure
6. What is the function of Sedition Act 1948 (Akta Hasutan 1948)?
 - a. To limit my freedom of speech

- b. To maintain public order and stability in the state from unnecessary statement that deem to create chaos in the country
 - c. To control open debate of sensitive issues in the country
 - d. Unsure
7. Why do you think is the main reason for the government to restrict certain matters regarding the freedom of speech in Malaysia?
- a. To maintain stability and harmony in the country
 - b. To suppress the people from raising the issue that may cause uneasiness in the country
 - c. As a tool for controlling the citizens from voicing their opinion
 - d. Unsure

Freedom of media and press in Malaysia:

8. What is the controlling act of media and press in Malaysia?
- a. Printing Presses and Publications Act 1984
 - b. Press Act 1984
 - c. Media and Press Act 1984
 - d. Unsure
9. What is the main criterion to possess printing press in Malaysia?
- a. Obtain a license from Minister of Information
 - b. Obtain a license from Minister of Home Affairs
 - c. Obtain a license from State government
 - d. Unsure
10. Why do you think there should be a permit for media and press in Malaysia?
- a. To control the media freedom
 - b. Tool for government to monitor issues that will be published in the press
 - c. To avoid the sensitive issues that may hinder the harmony in the country
 - d. Unsure

Freedom of assembly and association in Malaysia:

11. What is the number of people to gather in public places that must obtain a permit?
- a. More than 3
 - b. More than 5
 - c. More than 10
 - d. Unsure
12. Who will be responsible to issue the permit?
- a. Royal Malaysian Police
 - b. Local government
 - c. Minister of Home Affairs
 - d. Unsure
13. Are you aware of this restriction in Malaysia?
- a. Yes, I am aware of this restriction
 - b. Yes, I am aware and understand this restriction
 - c. No, I am not aware of this restriction
 - d. No, I didn't even know about this restriction

Section C:

14. Based on your understanding, how can you explain the democracy concept practice in Malaysia in term of right to vote, freedom of speech, freedom of press; and freedom of association and assembly?

15. What is your suggestion to improve the understanding of Malaysian democracy among its people?

How People View Democracy:
Findings from Public Opinion Surveys in Four Regions

By Larry Diamond

Presentation to the Stanford Seminar on Democratization.

January 11, 2001

Background: The Growth of Comparative Survey Research on Public Opinion in New Democracies

Over the past decade, one of the most important developments in the comparative study of democratization has been the growth of a major line of research on public opinion in democracies. In one sense, this marks a resurgence of an earlier tradition of political culture research that began with the famous Almond and Verba book, *The Civic Culture*. Building on this and many more recent studies of how individuals evaluate, relate to, and participate in their political systems, the new wave of public opinion research has a number of practical and theoretical purposes. One practical purpose is to generate a barometer of how mass publics evaluate the performance of their democratic systems, and to what extent they support democracy as a form of government. These periodic measures of public opinion generate important raw empirical data for political scientists trying to assess the quality and stability of democracy in different countries (especially those that have recently experienced transitions or confront serious challenges to stability). They also can provide important information for national and international policymakers about the public's response to policy initiatives and institutional reforms, as well as directions and priorities for future reform.

At the same time, public opinion survey data is an invaluable source of information for assessing and extending theories of democratic consolidation. One crucial dimension of consolidation involves norms and beliefs about the legitimacy of democracy, both in principle and as it is embodied in a particular regime.¹ While partial inferences about regime legitimacy can be

¹ For conceptual depictions of democratic consolidation in this way, see Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe*

drawn from mass-level behavior, and from expressions of public sentiment in the mass media and elsewhere, there is no way that legitimacy can be adequately assessed and comprehended without nationally representative, public opinion survey data. The additional value of such surveys is that they enable us to analyze the correlates and determinants of support for democracy, how legitimacy is shaped by socioeconomic status, by party and ideological orientations, by evaluations of economic and political performance, and a variety of other factors. In short, public opinion surveys are opening up an unprecedented analytic window onto the study of the dynamics of democratic regimes, especially what fosters democratic consolidation as opposed to stagnation, instability, or even breakdown.

“Barometer” is increasingly the term that is used to describe these periodic (even annual) surveys. For the countries of post-communist Europe, there is a “New Democracies Barometer” that has been administered by Richard Rose and his colleagues region-wide (in ten countries) five times since 1991. There is also a “New Russia Barometer” and “A New Baltic Barometer” and a “New Korea Barometer” that employ many of the same questions measuring perceptions of and responses to both political and economic change.² For some time, a “Eurobarometer” has periodically measured political attitudes, values, and behaviors in the established democracies of western (including southern) Europe. Many of those questions were incorporated into a “Latinobarometro,” which in early 2000 completed its fifth survey since 1995, now covering 17 countries in Latin America, from Mexico to the Southern cone. This project is coordinated by Marta Lagos in Santiago, Chile. The model of a regional barometer of attitudes toward political and economic change and performance in new democracies was then

(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), and Larry Diamond, *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999).

taken to Africa by Michael Bratton. He has worked with a team of African researchers that includes Robert Mattes, based in South Africa at Idasa (which has a substantial Public Opinion Service that has been surveying attitudes and values in South Africa since the transition to democracy there). The resulting “Afrobarometer” has been administered or is being prepared for administration in roughly a dozen African countries, and if funding is available, the number of countries will be increased in the next few years.

Ironically, despite its relative wealth and social science expertise, Asia has been the region of the developing world that has seen the least progress toward the development of a regional barometer of public opinion in new democracies. This, however, is changing. In July of 2000, social scientists from eight Asian countries gathered in Taiwan with leaders of the other regional barometers (Rose, Bratton, and Lagos) to begin designing the first systematically comparative regional survey of attitudes and values toward democracy in Asia. This first “East Asian Barometer” of attitudes and values toward democracy and the performance of democratic regimes aims to administer a common core survey in the second half of this year in six East Asian democracies—Taiwan, Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia. Much of the core survey will also be administered in Hong Kong and mainland China. Ultimately, it is hoped that a “South Asian Barometer” can be joined to this project.³ The East Asian barometer is administered from Taiwan by a team led by professors Hu Fu and Yun-han Chu, with support from Taiwan’s ministry of education.

² For details and to order specific reports, see <http://www.cspp.strath.ac.uk//>

³ For more information on this survey, see the news item, “Surveying Value Change in East Asia,” in the *Journal of Democracy* 11, no. 4 (October 2000), p. 189, and visit <http://eacsurvey.law.ntu.edu.tw>. The comparative survey will cover ten areas of public opinion: the meaning of democracy, democratic legitimacy, regime evaluation and democratic satisfaction, economic evaluations, trust in institutions, efficacy and system responsiveness, attitudes toward tradition, democratic vs. authoritarian values, social capital, political participation, electoral mobilization, and partisanship and psychological involvement politics.

This recent (post-1990) wave of comparative research on public opinion in (mainly) new or developing democracies is unprecedented in several respects. First, there has never been such a comprehensive effort to measure how people view democracy and regime performance in so many emerging political systems. Second, the regional surveys have repeated at fairly frequent intervals (typically every second or third year or so, but sometimes annually) many of the same precise questions, which generates an exceptional time series of data. Third, within each region, the barometers have standardized the questionnaire wording and taken considerable pains to ensure a common meaning through “back translation” and preliminary testing of questions in the field. This enables rigorous comparison of public attitudes and values across different countries with a region, and even pooling of the data across countries for broader regional assessments. In almost every country, the surveys are also based on nationally representative random samples of at least 1000 respondents, which permits inferences within a relatively small margin of error about the overall state of public opinion, and which provides enough cases to analyze a variety of sub-groups.

To date, the problem has been the disarticulation among the different regional (and in some cases, isolated country) surveys. Different regional surveys have used very different types of questions, or similar questions but different response formats, to measure common underlying concepts, such as legitimacy (or support for democracy), satisfaction with the performance of democracy, efficacy, institutional trust, and social capital. Public opinion about politics and regimes (and no doubt, other matters) is highly sensitive to the way a question is worded, and even to the type of response structure that is offered. (For example, levels of trust in different institutions will appear lower, possibly by a considerable margin, when respondents are offered a mid-point on an odd-numbered scale, signifying neither trust nor distrust, than when they have

an even-numbered scale that forces them to express either trust or distrust).⁴ To overcome this handicap toward globally comparative research on new democracies, the coordinators of the different regional barometers are increasingly employing questions from the other regional surveys and seeking ways to standardize questionnaire wording and format on a number of themes. Thus, while this endeavor will not have the central coordination and standardization of the World Values Survey, which now administers a common survey in more than 50 countries around the world, it will soon have a comparable reach in number of countries (some 50 or more overall). And it will generate numerous opportunities for meaningful and rigorous comparative analysis across regions.

The remainder of this essay will examine the levels and trends in public opinion about democracy in three regions—postcommunist Europe, Latin America, and Africa—plus two countries, Korea and Taiwan, where recent surveys represent the beginning of a fourth regional barometer. This discussion is based on a cluster of four articles (one on each of these regional groupings) published in the January 2001 *Journal of Democracy* under the title, “How People View Democracy,”⁵ as well as supplementary data and analysis from the different regional and country survey projects.⁶

⁴ For evidence and analysis of the impact of differences in questionnaire wording and design, see Larry Diamond, *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), chapter 5, and Yun-han Chu, Larry Diamond, and Doh Chull Shin, “Growth and Equivocation in Support for Democracy: Korea and Taiwan in Comparative Perspective,” paper presented to the 2000 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., August 31-September 3. A revised version of this paper will appear in the series, “Studies in Public Policy, distributed by the Center for the Study of Public Policy of the University of Strathclyde.

⁵ The specific articles are Richard Rose, “A Diverging Europe,” Michael Bratton and Robert Mattes, “African’s Surprising Universalism,” Yun-han Chu, Larry Diamond, and Doh Chull Shin, “Halting Progress in Korea and Taiwan,” and Marta Lagos, “Between Stability and Crisis in Latin America,” *Journal of Democracy* 12, no. 1 (2001), pp. 93-45.

⁶ I am grateful to Richard Rose and Marta Lagos for providing me with additional data, as well as a number of the papers from their survey projects, and to Michael Bratton and Robert Mattes for providing me with additional papers from the Afrobarometer project. I would also like to thank my co-authors Yun-han Chu and Doh Chull Shin. Some

LEGITIMACY AND SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY

In terms of its implications for democratic stability and consolidation, the core dimension of public opinion concerns legitimacy, or support for democracy. Ideally, this should be measured both as a general principle and in specific reference to the system in place and to alternative systems that people could imagine. To what extent do the publics in these countries appear committed to democracy as the best form of government for their society?

The Postcommunist States

Unfortunately, the data from postcommunist Europe are not comparable with those from the other regions, as different questions are employed. Nevertheless, we can make two crucially important comparisons: over time, within each country and the region as a whole, and between postcommunist countries, especially Eastern Europe vs. the former Soviet countries. We can begin by examining the extent to which the publics in these countries give a positive rating to the working of two different systems: “the former communist regime” and the “current system of governing with free elections and many parties.” Because these two questions pertain to “how our system of government works,” they straddle the boundary between support for democracy and satisfaction with the way democracy works. Thus, they are not purely a measure of regime support. Nevertheless, they do illuminate the overall public view of democracy and provide one indication of system support.

Two points merit emphasis in reviewing the data in Tables 1 and 2, on approval of the current system and the former communist one. First, as is the case on so many different measures

of the data in this paper is drawn from our collaborative work, particularly our paper “Growth and Equivocation in Support for Democracy.”

consistently over time, the publics in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) are much more supportive of democracy than are the former Soviet publics, in this case Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus. Whereas strong majorities, typically over 60 percent, in each of the seven CEE countries have approved of the way the current multiparty system works, the overall percentage in the post-Soviet heartland has never been much more than a third. And the most recent figure has increased mainly because of the rise in Belarus, which is now a very authoritarian state, making it difficult to interpret just what it is that the Belarussian public is approving. At the same time, retrospective approval of the previous communist system is much higher in the post-Soviet states than in the CEE ones—by an average of 30 percentage points in the most recent survey. And the difference would be even greater if Hungary were set aside, given that its much softer “goulash” communism does not evoke the same repressive, authoritarian memories that the other systems do. Overall, more than two-thirds of these post-Soviet publics look back favorably (perhaps wistfully) on the old Communist regimes.⁷

The other point that stands out from these two tables is the recent downward trend in the CEE states in approval of the democratic system’s performance. In most of these states, there was a perceptible dip between 1995 and 1998 in approval of the current regime. This is likely due to protracted economic difficulties in many countries, such as Romania (where approval of the current economic system in 1998 was only 23 percent, compared to 40 percent in Hungary and Slovenia and 61 percent in Poland). When people were asked to compare the “overall economic situation of your household” currently (in 1998) with that before the fall of communism, an average of 56% in the seven CEE states (about the same as Russia) but 79% in Belarus and 90%

⁷ In particular, “In Ukraine the longer the country has been independent the greater the number who would welcome a return to Communist rule.” SPP # 308.

in Ukraine thought the past was better.⁸ The other factor that may be depressing approval is the widespread perception of corruption in the region. “Across postcommunist Europe, Barometer surveys find an average of 72 percent believe that their new regime is more corrupt than its predecessor;” only six percent perceive a reduction in corruption, and in every postcommunist country surveyed, a majority of the public believes the national government is corrupt.⁹ As we will see, these proportions bear a striking resemblance to the views of Latin American publics and epitomize the general growth of cynicism about politics and politicians in all contemporary democracies.

Two others questions are particularly useful for evaluating public support for democracy in these countries. One examines legitimacy in the essential comparative context: to what extent would people support an alternative, undemocratic regime? Four alternative non-democratic regime types have been presented to the postcommunist publics in the New Democracies Barometers over the years: a return to Communist rule, rule by the army, closing down parliament in favor of “strong leader who can decide things quickly,” and a return to monarchy.¹⁰ Rejection of all of these authoritarian alternatives can be read as rather robust support for democracy as a form of government. Such robust support is lacking in Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine, where, in 1998, an average of only 36 percent of the public opposed all authoritarian alternatives (Table 3).¹¹ Once again, the difference with the European postcommunist states is striking. In the latter, two-thirds

⁸ *Studies in Public Policy* no. 306, p. 47.

⁹ “A Diverging Europe,” p. 101.

¹⁰ This omnibus question asks whether people agree that “most important decisions about the economy should be made by experts and not the government and parliament,” but majorities can—and consistently do—agree with this proposition without this necessarily indicating lack of support for democracy. In fact, probably majorities in most Western democracies would agree with this statement. I therefore delete this last item.

¹¹ In two more recent Russian surveys, the proportion rejecting all authoritarian alternatives rose to 45% in January 2000 but then slipped back to 37% in April 2000, shortly after Putin was elected. Data are from “New Russia Barometers” VIII and IX, provided by Richard Rose and Neil Munro. Of all the postcommunist states, only in Ukraine and Belarus does a majority endorse strong-man rule as an alternative to democracy. SPP #308.

of the public oppose all authoritarian alternatives (as many as three-quarters do so in the Czech Republic and Slovenia). There is not a single postcommunist European state, including Croatia and Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), where the return of Communist rule is opposed by less than seventy percent of the public. By contrast, only half do so in Ukraine and 59 percent in Russia.¹²

Another indication of regime support is rejection of the idea of suspending parliament and abolishing political parties. This proposition has been steadily rejected by every postcommunist public save for Ukraine's (Table 4). However, support for democracy by this measure is once again much stronger in CEE, where across the five surveys it has consistently averaged over three-quarters of the public.

As Richard Rose shows, the crucial divide among the postcommunist states is not purely between Europe as opposed to the former Soviet Union. Rather it is between those states with levels of civil and political freedom (as assessed annually by Freedom House) roughly comparable to the European Union and those that lag well behind. Among the ten countries rated "free" by Freedom House, an average of 63% reject all authoritarian alternatives. Among the six others, only 43% do so (see Table 1 of Richard Rose's article).¹³ A similarly large gap exists between the two sets of countries in approval of the current system (as measured by the question in Table 1). Among the "free" countries, an average of 55% approve, while among the less democratic countries, only about one-third approve. This is indicative of a more general problem. "The great obstacle to the completion of democracy in postcommunist Europe is the

¹² *SPP* no. 306, p. 53.

¹³ "A Diverging Europe," Table 1, p. 99. Data is lacking for Estonia, and the percentage is quite low (40) in Lithuania even though it is "free." The percentage is quite high (76) in Croatia even though at the time of the survey it was only partly free.

absence of the rule of law.”¹⁴ This absence is particularly glaring in the less-than-free states, which are also the ones with the highest external perceptions of corruption, as measured by Transparency International.

Thus, as Rose demonstrates, there are really two sharply diverging sets of postcommunist states emerging. One set is in and of Europe, and looks to integration into a broader definition of what is Europe, through an expansion of the EU (and also NATO). This set, which very much includes the three Baltic states, is more free and generally less corrupt. The other set contains the states that are slipping backwards, away from democracy and the rule of law. These are the more repressive and corrupt of the postcommunist states, where democracy is increasingly shallow and beleaguered, or gone altogether (in Belarus). It is important to underscore that the problem is not simply a divergence between *electoral* democracy and the other dimensions of *liberal* democracy (such as freedom and the rule of law). The growing weakness of liberty and accountability, and increasing centralization of power in countries such as Russia and Ukraine is exacting a heavy toll on the electoral dimension of democracy as well, raising doubts as to just how competitive and fair elections are. With the recent defeat of the quasi-dictator Slobadan Milosevic in the 2000 presidential election, Serbia shows signs of moving away from this group of democratic laggards, toward Europe, as Croatia began doing two or three years before. But the other post-Soviet electoral regimes, from Georgia and Azerbaijan to Kyrgyzstan, remain stuck to one degree or another in this ambiguous status between democracy and authoritarianism. There is, of course, a third group of post-Soviet states, primarily in Central Asia, that no longer even seriously attempt to appear democratic.

¹⁴ “A Diverging Europe,” p. 94.

Latin America

Within Latin America as well, there is significant variation in support for democracy. The key measure used here—whether “democracy is preferable to any other kind of government” or sometimes “an authoritarian government can be preferable”—was borrowed from the Eurobarometer. It has now been used in numerous surveys around the world, not only in Western Europe but also in Korea, Taiwan and sub-Saharan Africa. Several features of the time series data for Latin America are noteworthy.¹⁵ First, only two small countries have levels of support for democracy comparable to Spain, Portugal, and Greece, and indicative of firm democratic consolidation. These are Costa Rica and Uruguay, where support for democracy exceeds 80 percent and the willingness to entertain the authoritarian option is at 10 percent or less. The only other country that consistently shows 70 percent-plus support for democracy is Argentina. By this measure, some other countries have made progress or appear reasonably supportive, but others have regressed. Particularly striking are the very low level of support for democracy in Brazil; the rather high levels of consideration for authoritarian rule in Mexico, Paraguay, Brazil, Colombia, and Venezuela; and the deterioration in support for democracy in Colombia (Table 5).

The above data are best analyzed in conjunction with responses to the question whether there can be democracy without a national congress.¹⁶ Uruguay, Argentina, and Costa Rica (now joined by El Salvador) have the most democratic responses to this question, but Chile and a few other countries also have quite democratic orientations, with two-thirds or so of the public saying there

¹⁵ For the country data on this measure for the years 1996, 1998, and 2000, see Table 1 of Marta Lagos, “Between Stability and Crisis in Latin America,” *Journal of Democracy* 12, no. 1 (2001): 139.

can be no democracy without a national congress. The low appreciation of the importance of a Congress in Venezuela, and the precipitous decline since 1997 (from 51 to 29 percent) helps to illuminate the crisis of democracy in that country, where President (former Colonel) Hugo Chavez has appeared increasingly bent on constructing a personalistic, Peronist type of pseudodemocracy. The low recognition of the need for a congress in Ecuador (29%) and Colombia (39%) also reflects the crisis of democracy in the Andean region. As Lagos notes, the increase in the percentage of Colombians (from 38 to 45%) who think there can be democracy without a congress, “and the parallel rise in the number of Colombians who believe that there can be democracy without parties (from 38 to 46 percent), provide further evidence of growing disillusionment with established democratic institutions.”¹⁷ Interestingly, in the one Andean country that has really had a quasi-dictator for most of the past decade, Peru, nearly two-thirds of the public have repeatedly embraced the importance for democracy of a national congress (Table 5). Overall in Latin America, the belief that “without a National Congress there can be no democracy” has declined six points in the last three years (from 63 to 57 percent), without a corresponding drop (62 to 57 percent) in the belief that democracy requires political parties.

The malaise of democracy in the Andean region and in some other parts of Latin America is driven by dissatisfaction with the way democracy is working, and underlying that, concern about corruption, poor economic performance, and a general lack of responsiveness on the part of politicians. One response that has remained virtually unchanged over the past four years in Latin America is the assessment of the trend with respect to corruption. When asked whether it has

¹⁶ Responses were yes or no. There was a similar question about whether there can be a democracy without political parties, but the national responses to these two questions were virtually identical. The two questions were asked only in the 1997 and 2000 surveys.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 140. The percentage believing democracy can work without parties rose even more sharply in Ecuador, from 47 to 59% between 1997 and 2000.

increased a little or a lot, remained the same, or decreased a little or a lot in the last 12 months, an astonishing 75% of Latin Americans said in 2000 that corruption has increased *a lot*. Another 10% said corruption has increased a little and less than five percent perceived any decline.¹⁸ Even in countries with strong support for democracy, such as Costa Rica, Uruguay, and Argentina, most people think corruption has increased a lot. Interestingly, the country with the least extreme perception was Venezuela the percentage believing that corruption has increased a lot declined from 94% in 1998 to 54% in 2000, with the coming to power of the populist Hugo Chavez. As Richard Rose noted for the postcommunist states, much of this perception may be the ironic consequence of greater freedom to report political wrongdoing, and of press sensationalism.

As for economic performance, several countries remained mired in economic crisis, and even where the economy is growing overall (as in Brazil) severe problems of inequality leave huge swaths of the population excluded from its benefits. The disgust with democratic politicians in Ecuador, where indigenous organizations and sections of the military joined to seize power briefly in January 2000, can be attributed at least in part to severe economic crisis. In 1999, severe budgetary cuts to finance international debt service caused social spending to fall by half in real terms; the minimum salary fell by a quarter while unemployment doubled in a country that already had the third worst distribution of income in the region.¹⁹

The political malaise in Latin America is vividly conveyed by the trends in satisfaction with the way democracy is working in each country. Between 1995 and 2000, satisfaction has declined

¹⁸ Data provided by Marta Lagos from the Latinobarometro. The percentages saying corruption has "increased a lot" were 75% in 1996, 79% in 1997 and again in 1998, and 75% in 2000.

¹⁹ Jose Antonio Lucero, "Ecuador: Democracy in Hard Times," forthcoming in the *Journal of Democracy*, April 2001.

from 62 to 18% in Brazil, from 71 to 35% in Chile; from 75 to 24% in Peru; and from 81 to 55% in Venezuela (where it sunk as low as 35% in 1998). Overall, satisfaction with democracy in the region has risen from its nadir of 27% in 1996, but at an average of 37% it still remains quite low. Only in three countries were majorities of the Latin American public satisfied with the working of democracy in 2000, and the extremely low levels of satisfaction in Brazil (18%), Ecuador (23%) and Paraguay (12%) are indicative of a crisis of democratic confidence.

East Asia and Africa

The Latin American data needs to be appreciated in a comparative context. On the one hand, support for democracy is, on average, higher in Latin America than in Korea and Taiwan, where the most recent data display a nearly identical average of around 54% (Table 5). Particularly striking is the substantial proportion of Koreans (almost one-third in 1998 and 1999) who say that sometimes an authoritarian regime may be preferable. On the other hand (as previously noted), the levels of support for democracy in most Latin American countries are well below those recorded for Spain, Portugal and Greece. By around 1990, support for democracy in Western Europe varied between 75 and 92% on this standardized question of whether democracy is always the best form of government.²⁰ Moreover, while democratic support appears lower in Korea and Taiwan, satisfaction is higher, particularly in Taiwan where three in five say they are satisfied (Table 7).

The data from Korea and Taiwan paint an ambiguous picture. Neither democracy is in danger of collapse. Indeed, each system is considerably more secure than the democracies of the Andean

region, for example. But as we see in Table 5, support for democracy in Korea has declined significantly in the wake of the financial crisis and a string of high-profile corruption scandals. On some other measures as well that are unique to these two countries, such as the 10-point scale of democratic suitability, support for democracy has declined perceptibly in the last three years in Korea, and is outpaced by the level of support for democracy in Taiwan. Koreans are torn. They reject authoritarian alternatives about as often as the more democratic postcommunist publics, yet when forced to weigh democracy against economic security, their commitment wavers much more. And about seven in ten Koreans seem willing to tolerate illegal actions by the president in a crisis.

Even more striking by way of comparison are the African data. Of the five African countries which Bratton and Mattes report on in their *Journal of Democracy* article, four of them show levels of support for democracy (as “preferable to any other form of government”) higher than the Latin American average, and at 57% Namibia is only slightly lower. In the context of its long history of stable democratic functioning without interruption, the 82% support level in Botswana is evidence of democratic consolidation. The same level (81%) in Nigeria more likely reflects the broad revulsion with predatory military rule and the euphoria of the transition back to civilian, democratic government that had been completed only about six months after the survey was conducted. The 71% figure in Zimbabwe may also be a statement of opposition to Robert Mugabe’s repressive and corrupt regime, but it helps to explain the strength of the democratic opposition. The even higher figure in Ghana (76%) can now be read as a harbinger of the extraordinary opposition victory in the December 2000 presidential election. Even among those

²⁰ However, it was not until more than a decade after its transition that Portugal exhibited a level of support for democracy comparable to the other established democracies of Europe. See Chu, Diamond, and Shin, “Growth and Equivocation.” For additional comparative data and discussion, see Diamond, *Developing Democracy*, pp. 174-182.

who say that democracy is “not working,” “democracy is supported by large majorities in Zimbabwe (74%) and Botswana (65%) as well as by substantial majorities in Malawi (59%) and Zambia (54%).”²¹

The high levels of support for democracy in these African countries cannot be dismissed as deriving from a vacuous or specious understanding of democracy. As Bratton and Mattes show, large majorities in each country (overall, three-quarters) are able to attach a meaning to democracy, and most of these (about seven in ten) define democracy in terms of political procedures, not substantive outcomes.²² Indeed, “popular African conceptions of democracy are, perhaps unexpectedly, quite *liberal*,” with the open-ended responses citing “civil liberties and personal freedoms more frequently than any other meanings (34 percent).”²³ Where democracy has been in place by far the longest, in Botswana, the identification of democracy with civil and political rights is most frequent (55%).

The Afrobarometer is the first regional survey to employ both the standard support for democracy measure and the innovative item—support for specific authoritarian alternatives—developed by Richard Rose for the study of postcommunist states. On this measure as well, large majorities in five of the six countries reject authoritarian alternatives such as military and one-party rule, but such opposition is somewhat weaker in Namibia. Interestingly, except in Zimbabwe—where there has been no democracy for some time—satisfaction with the way democracy works is much higher (from 54 to 84%) than in Latin America. And this may be one

²¹ Robert Mattes, Michael Bratton, Yul Derek Davids, and Cherrel Africa, “Public Opinion and the Consolidation of Democracy in Southern Africa: An Initial Review of Key Findings of the Southern African Democracy Barometer,” *The Afrobarometer Series*, no. 1, July 2000, p. 12. The overall level of support for democracy in Zambia (which is not covered in the *Journal of Democracy* article) is 74%.

²² Bratton and Mattes, “Africa’s Surprising Universalism,” p. 109.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 110.

reason one why support for democracy is so high. Bratton and Mattes find that in Africa (as elsewhere) “popular support for democracy has a strong instrumental component. Citizens extend support to a democratic regime in good part because they are satisfied with its performance in delivering desired goods and services.”²⁴ Yet most Zimbabweans support democracy (59%) even though they are dissatisfied with the way it works—in fact, because they perceive it to be largely lacking, and appreciate its importance. And overall, one in five Africans surveyed support democracy despite dissatisfaction with its performance. Moreover, asked if they would prefer democracy or a “strong leader who does not have to bother with elections” when “democracy does not work,” substantial majorities in several countries still choose democracy as “always best.”²⁵

Comparative Trends in Institutional Trust

Everywhere, democratic publics are less satisfied with the performance of democracy than they are committed to it as the best (or lesser evil) form of government. And some democracies, notably Italy, have mass publics that are chronically cynical and dissatisfied. However, cynicism is one thing in a consolidated democracy; it may affect the character and quality of democracy, but not necessarily its viability. Where democracy is still a young and somewhat fragile plant, lacking other attributes of consolidation, chronic dissatisfaction and alienation can be an obstacle to consolidation. Indeed, it may well be the case that different dimensions of cynicism--namely, dissatisfaction, alienation (low system efficacy), and institutional distrust--inhibit the growth of democratic legitimacy.

²⁴ Ibid, p. 119.

²⁵ “Public Opinion and the Consolidation of Democracy in Southern Africa,” p. 13. The support level under that condition is 65% in Botswana and 74% in Zimbabwe, but 43% in Namibia.

One of the most widely tested and theoretically important dimensions of system evaluation is public trust or confidence in political institutions. The data presented here are not entirely standardized, in that the Taiwan survey used an 11-point scale while the Korea survey used a four-point Likert scale (the most common response structure for this item across countries). In his surveys of the new democracies of postcommunist Europe, Richard Rose used a 7-point scale. The Taiwan and postcommunist data are thus the most comparable, since both have odd-numbered scales with a neutral mid-point. For the most part, citizens in Korea and Taiwan appear to have middling levels of trust in democratic institutions. Levels of trust in Taiwan vary only modestly across institutions, ranging from about 40 to 55%. In Korea, they range much more widely: while almost three-quarters of Koreans trust the military (on which they rely heavily for defense against an ever-threatening North Korean regime), only one in five trust their respective legislative bodies (Table 8). The overall result is similar, however.

While levels of trust in public institutions appear quite modest in Korea and Taiwan, they are better, or at least no worse, than in the post-Communist states. Trust in their legislative body is just as low in the post-Communist world as in Korea, but Koreans generally have more trust in other public institutions. One may argue, however, that the post-Communist states represent a low standard of comparison, given the cynicism about the state and the party left from the Communist era. Yet trust in the national legislature is also very low in Chile, Brazil, and Argentina, as well as Japan (Table 8). And overall levels of trust in political institutions are not very high in West European democracies, either. In fact, on several dimensions, the public in Taiwan is at least as trusting, if not more so.

Some Concluding Thoughts

What do we learn from this growing accumulation of data? I will not attempt here to provide any kind of comprehensive or definitive conclusions, but will offer just a few reflections.

First, despite the extraordinary outpouring of data over the past decade, the comparative study of how mass publics in emerging democracies view and value their institutions is only now emerging into a more mature phase. There has been a good deal of innovation—but still not enough—in the design of questions to capture complex and subtle distinctions in public attitudes and values. The need for experimentation with new questions in order to probe deeper, or at least differently, is unfortunately in tension with the need for standardization longitudinally as well as cross-nationally, in order to facilitate comparison. Standardization presses us to go with what we have, at the risk of some ossification of our understanding. Experimentation and innovation promise either to generate new important new insights into how the public views democracy, or at least to enhance the reliability of the understanding we derive from our existing measures. The latter would not be a trivial achievement. Both goals—standardization and innovation—are in fact vital if we are going to take the comparative study of democracy to a new level of sophistication and value added. In principle, within the space of a questionnaire that can probably only accommodate about 100 questions overall before the typical respondent loses focus or breaks away, it should be possible to include both old questions and new ones about legitimacy, satisfaction, trust, and so on. The problem is a practical one. Funding a survey often means satisfying diverse constituencies, not just in the research community but among government agencies and commercial enterprises that may be funding all or part of the survey. If a survey is to become a true barometer, it must be repeated often, and that will require raising

funds from sponsors who have other interests—for example in topical issues and pressing policy questions such as drug trafficking and poverty. These may sometimes generate valuable independent variables whose association with the democracy measures is well worth exploring, but inevitably, it reduces space available for democracy questions. Probably the only alternative is to rotate some questions in and out over time. The collaborative team that is now designing the East Asia Barometer has faced many painful trade-offs as a result of the diversity of intellectual items on the research agenda and the need to encompass a sufficiently wide range of issues to appeal to potential funding sources in some countries. No doubt, the questionnaire that has been agreed upon for the first survey will be revised in the future if indeed a true periodic “barometer” can be funded.

A related point has been made at some length in my book and I will not belabor it here. But it is worth reiterating that we cannot generate reliable cross-national comparisons unless the same questionnaire wording and format is used. We now have two different strategies, for example, for measuring legitimacy. One is to ask directly whether democracy is the best form of government. Another is to inquire indirectly by assessing support for nondemocratic alternatives. Our understanding would advance much more if each regional comparative survey employed both strategies, as the Korea Barometer began to do some years ago and the Afrobarometer now does. Legitimacy is the irreducible phenomenon that must be measured in any attempt to understand democratic progress, and the cost of two or three additional questions on the subject is well worth bearing. Experimentation on this dimension is particularly necessary and welcome.

Both the Korea Barometer and the Afrobarometer have devised new questions to get at one of the most subtle and elusive issues in the study of democratic regime legitimacy. When can

support for democracy be assumed to be intrinsic rather than instrumental or simply the response that seems to be appropriate and expected by society, and by the interviewer? How can we press respondents to reveal their true feelings, fears, anxieties, and inhibitions about regime alternatives? One way is to pose for them plausible hypotheticals, and then, by carefully finding neutral language, to give them normative space to give a nondemocratic response if that is what they feel. This is what the New Democracies Barometer does in posing the regime alternatives. But we can and should press further by pitting competing values against one another, as the World Values Survey has done for many years. Thus Doh Chull Shin has asked, in various ways, respondents to indicate which value is more important, economic development or democracy. The tension between freedom and order also needs more exploration.

The Afrobarometer employs a question that Robert Mattes and his team first developed for their surveys of South Africa.

Sometimes democracy does not work. When this happens, some people say that we need a strong leader who does not have to bother with elections. Others say that even when things don't work, democracy is always best. What do you think? Which statement do you agree with most: Need strong leader, or Democracy is always best?

The new information this question generates is quite significant. While 83% of the public in Botswana say democracy is preferable to any other kind of government, in response to the standard question, support for democracy when it "does not work" declines to 65%. Support for democracy under this scenario also declines in most other African countries surveyed. Yet this question may give us a better, more revealing indication of the rock-bottom support for democracy than does the more abstract item that has been used for some time. And it may also

bring some surprises. By the standard measure, 71% of Zimbabweans support democracy, but the figure actually rises slightly (to 74%) when the question invokes the prospect of a strong leader who does not bother with elections (Table 9).²⁶ This may be because Zimbabweans by now have had their fill of a strong, abusive leader such as Robert Mugabe.

Substantively, two conclusions merit mention. One is that the road to democratic consolidation is longer and more complicated than was often blithely assumed a decade ago when many of these new democracies were taking shape. There is no imminent threat to democracy in Korea and Taiwan, and no democracy has ever broke down in a society even approaching their level of per capita income. However, the survey data demonstrate that at the level of mass public beliefs, values, and evaluations, democracy has yet to be consolidated in either country, and indeed has probably moved in the reverse direction in Korea. One need only look to the political crises and stalemates in each country, the inability to find a sustainable working relationship between executive and legislature, government and opposition, to find confirmation of the cautionary tone of our survey findings. Elsewhere, most of Latin America is stuck somewhere between democratic stability and crisis. In Central and Eastern Europe it is mainly an external factor—the enormous gravitational pull of the EU, with its clear political conditionality—that is propelling these systems toward consolidation, though not without some signs of regression, anxiety, and institutional deformity. In a number of countries, public opinion is much more supportive of democracy than are the elites or the institutional actors. This is particularly so in Africa, where, with the exception of Botswana, the high levels of public support for democracy do not indicate consolidation. Yet these levels do constitute a positive sign, and in Ghana they may well herald a new era of sustainable democracy.

²⁶ Mattes et al., “Public Opinion and the Consolidation of Democracy in Southern Africa,” pp. 12-13.

Second, and finally, the more recent evidence from the studies and data analyzed here continues to point toward the crucial importance of regime performance in fostering or stunting the growth of democratic legitimacy. We are still a very long ways from being able to determine very clearly and satisfactorily what generates sustainable support for democracy. But the recent data add to our sense that both economic and political performance matter. A sharp economic downturn can diminish support for democracy when misrule appears to be the cause, at least in part. And people will blame the government for bad economic times, whether it deserves that blame or not. The key is whether they will go on to blame *the system of government*. The capacity for throwing the incumbents out has eclipsed that judgement for some time in many countries. However, the declines in democratic support in Colombia, Venezuela, and elsewhere Latin America suggest that if economic difficulties go on for long enough—and especially if they are deemed to derive from broader problems of governance, such as corruption and abuse of power—the system of government will begin to be blamed.

This raises again the relationship between political performance and democratic legitimation.²⁷ Causal analysis of the Korea and Taiwan data suggests that political factors are more important than economic ones in shaping support for democracy. The more satisfied people are with the way democracy works, the more they trust key political institutions, and in particular the more they perceive the system to be democratic, the more likely they are to support democracy. The African survey data as well contains some indications that perceptions of the degree to which the system is functioning democratically may be important in affecting support for the political system. And Rose and his colleagues have shown the perception of greater freedom to be a

²⁷ For an earlier summary discussion of the evidence, see Diamond, *Developing Democracy*, pp. 192-205.

significant determinant of support for postcommunist democracies, while political factors in general outweigh economic ones.²⁸

Freedom is important but it is not sufficient. If democracies are to be seen to deliver on the political promise of democracy, they must deliver a rule of law in a second sense as well, not just *permitting* citizens to express themselves and live their lives, but also *restraining* government officials from abusing power. We do not have nearly enough data specifically measuring how citizens perceive corruption and what factors shape their perceptions. The data we have demonstrate widespread and growing cynicism about corruption in public life, even though actual levels of corruption in some countries may well be lower than when the press was less free to report it and the institutions of investigation and horizontal accountability less active. If democracy is going to be consolidated at the level of mass public beliefs and values, there will need to be much more dramatic progress in controlling corruption in politics and government and improving responsiveness and accountability more generally. The growing accumulation of public opinion data only reinforces this fundamental point: the challenge of democratic consolidation remains substantially one of providing effective democratic governance.

²⁸ Richard Rose, William Mishler, and Christian Haerpfer, *Democracy and Its Alternatives: Understanding Postcommunist Societies* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999).

Table 1
Support for the Current Regime in Postcommunist States

Percentage of the public expressing approval

Country	1991	1992	1993	1995	1996	1998
Czech Republic	71	71	78	77		56
Slovakia	50	58	62	61		50
Hungary	57	43	51	50		53
Poland	52	56	69	76		66
Slovenia	49	68	55	66		51
Bulgaria	64	55	58	66		58
Romania	69	68	60	61		55
CEE average	59	60	61	65		57
Russia		14	36	26	28 38	36
Belarus		35	29	35		48
Ukraine		25	24	33		22
RBC average		25	30	31		35

Sources: William Mishler and Richard Rose, "Five Years after the Fall: Trajectories of Support for Democracy in Post-Communist Europe, *Studies in Public Policy* 298, Center for the Study of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde, 1998, Table2; Richard Rose and Christian Haerpfer, "New Democracies Barometer V: A 12-Nation Survey" *Studies in Public Policy* 306, pp. 49-50; and Richard Rose, "New Russia Barometer Trends Since 1992," *Studies IN Public Policy* 320, Table 4.1.

Note: CEE indicates the above seven countries of Central and Eastern Europe. RBC indicates Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine.

Table 2
Support for the Previous Communist Regime

Percentage of the public expressing approval

Country	1991	1992	1993	1995	1996	1998
Czech Republic	23	29	23	24		31
Slovakia	44	48	50	52		46
Hungary	51	67	58	66		58
Poland	34	42	38	25		30
Slovenia	41	40	32	36		42
Bulgaria	30	41	51	58		43
Romania	26	35	33	28		33
CEE average	35	43	41	40		41
Russia		50	62	67	59 60	72
Belarus		60	64	77		60
Ukraine		55	55	75		82
RBC average		55	60	73		71

Sources: See Table 1.

Table 3
Reject all Authoritarian Alternatives

Country	1991	1992	1993	1995	1996	1998
Czech Republic			79	82		75
Slovakia			67	70		57
Hungary			72	69		68
Poland			57	63		67
Slovenia			58	68		78
Bulgaria			44	55		56
Romania			60	61		60
CEE average			62	67		66
Russia				39	58 46	39
Belarus			35	30		46
Ukraine			37	23		24
RBC average						36

Sources: see Table 1.

Table 4
Reject Suspension of Parliament

Percentage of public disapproving suspension

Country	1991	1992	1993	1995	1996	1998
Czech Republic	88	78	82	75		79
Slovakia	85	81	76	78		77
Hungary	75	75	70	74		83
Poland	67	57	71	68		81
Slovenia	85	89	n.a.	81		74
Bulgaria	79	75	72	78		77
Romania	90	81	76	88		73
CEE average	81	77	75	79		78
Russia			n.a.	61	66 65	63
Belarus			57	60		72
Ukraine			44	39		55
RBC average			51	53		63

Sources: See Table 1

Table 5
Democratic Legitimacy
Responses in Percentages

COUNTRY, YEAR	DEMOCRACY IS ALWAYS PREFERABLE	SOMETIMES AUTHORITARIANISM IS PREFERABLE	IT DOESN'T MATTER TO PEOPLE LIKE ME
Taiwan 1998	54	12	17
Korea, 1999	55	30	15
1998	54	31	15
1997	69	20	11
1996	65	17	10
Spain 1995	79	9	8
1992	78	9	7
1985	70	10	9
Portugal 1992	83	9	4
1985	61	9	7
Greece 1992	91	4	3
1985	87	5	6
Latin America average			
2000	60	17	17
1996	61	17	17
Costa Rica 2000	83	7	
1996	80	6	
Uruguay 2000	84	9	6
1996	80	9	8
Argentina 2000	71	16	11
1996	71	15	11
Chile 2000	57	19	22
1996	54	19	23
Brazil 2000	39	24	28
1996	50	24	21
Paraguay 2000	48	39	13
1996	59	26	13
Venezuela 2000	61	24	10
1996	62	19	13
Colombia 2000	50	23	20
1996	60	20	18

Sources for comparative data: Marta Lagos, "The Latinobarometro: Media and Political Attitudes in South America." Paper presented to the 1996 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 29-September 1, San Francisco; Informe de Prensa: Latinobarometro 1999/2000, Santiago, Mayo 2000; José Ramón Montero, Richard Gunther, and Mariano Torcal, "Democracy in Spain: Legitimacy, Discontent, and Disaffection." Estudio/Working Paper 1997/100, June 1997, Center for Advanced Study in the Social Sciences, Juan March Institute, Madrid, Spain. Additional data on Latin America were provided directly by Marta Lagos.

Table 6
Democratic Support and Satisfaction in Latin America

	No Democracy without a National Congress (percent agreeing)		Satisfaction with Democracy (percentages)		
	1997	2000	1996	1998	2000
<i>South America and Mexico</i>					
Argentina	74	70	34	49	46
Bolivia	62	54	25	34	22
Brazil	50	47	20	27	18
Columbia	46	39	16	24	27
Chile	73	68	27	32	35
Ecuador	45	29	34	33	23
Mexico	65	64	11	21	36
Paraguay	58	61	22	24	12
Peru	64	64	28	17	24
Uruguay	74	79	52	68	69
Venezuela	51	29	30	35	55
Average	60	54	27	34	35
<i>Central America</i>					
Costa Rica	81	72	51	54	61
El Salvador	73	72	26	48	27
Guatamala	57	54	16	57	36
Honduras	73	67	20	37	43
Nicaragua	75	68	23	27	17
Panama	52	42	28	34	47
Average	68	63	57	43	39
LA Average	63	57	27	37	37

Source: Latinobarometer.

Table 7
Satisfaction with the Way Democracy Works

Percent satisfied with the Way Democracy Works*

Country	1985-91	1993	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999-2000
Korea					49	46	45
Taiwan				60			59
EC avg., 1976-1991	57						
EU avg., 1997-1999						53	
Spain	58	39	41	57			
Portugal	63	54	40				
Greece	56	45	28				
Latin America Avg.				27	41	37	37
Uruguay				52	54	68	69
Argentina				34	42	49	46
Chile				27	37	32	35
Brazil				20	23	27	18
Venezuela				30	35	35	55
Colombia				16	40	24	27
Peru				28	21	17	24
Costa Rica				51	68	54	61
Eastern Europe avg.				36			
Czech Republic 1991	35	53		41			
Hungary 1991	34	29		22			
Poland 1991	35	26		48			
Romania				52			
Bulgaria				6			
Slovakia				21			
Russia				8			

Sources: see Table 1. Also, Dieter Fuchs, Giovanna Guidorossi, and Palle Svensson, "Support for the Democratic System," in Hans-Dieter Klingemann and Dieter Fuchs, eds., *Citizens and the State* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 341, table 11.4; Larry Diamond, *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), Table 5.4, pp. 180-181, and Richard Rose and Christian Haerpfer, "New Democracies Barometer V: A 12-Nation Survey," Centre for the Study of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde, Studies in Public Policy, no. 306, pp. 50-51; Gabor Toka, "Political Support in East-Central Europe," in Klingemann and Fuchs, *Citizens and the State*, pp. 364-365, Table 12.3; Hans-Dieter Klingemann, "Mapping Support in the 1990s: A Global Analysis," in Pippa Norris, ed., *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), Table 2.10, p. 50.

* Surveys in Korea (1997 and 1999) used a ten-point scale (1-10) of democratic satisfaction. The 1999 Taiwan survey used an 11-point scale (0-10) of democratic satisfaction. Responses of 6 or higher (with 10 or 11 being highest) indicate satisfaction. All other surveys (including Taiwan, 1996) used a four-point Likert scale, and the percentages indicated those who are "somewhat" (or "fairly") or "very" satisfied.

Table 8
Trust or Confidence in Institutions

Percent Expressing Trust or Confidence in Specific Institutions

Country	Courts	Police	Military	Legisla- ture	Civil Service	Parties	Press	Presi- dent
Korea 1997	57	42	72	22	45	20		
Taiwan 1998	43	49	53	42	48		45	54
EC 14-state avg. 1981 1990	64 57	75 74	58 50	50 48	45 44	n.a. n.a.	33 35	
Post- Communist States (11) avg*, 1997-98	29	30	49	22	26	13	35	44
Czech Repub	25	29	31	15	27	15	48	60
Hungary	39	35	40	25	32	11	42	53
Poland	30	32	53	25	28	9	42	40
Slovenia	29	34	34	20	34	11	42	45
Romania	40	41	76	31	50	19	46	53
Bulgaria	19	27	54	21	18	13	27	70
Russia	24	18	34	13	n.a.	7	22	14
South Africa				60				
Chile				38				
Brazil				34				
Japan				27				
Argentina				15				

Sources: for Korea, 1997 Korea Democracy Barometer Survey; for Taiwan, 1998 National Chengchi University Survey; for the post-Communist states, Richard Rose and Christian Haerpfer, "New Democracies Barometer V: A 12-Nation Survey," Studies in Public Policy No. 206, Centre for the Study of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde, 1999, pp 59-62; for Europe, Ola Listhaug and Matti Wiberg, "Confidence in Political and Private Institutions," in *Citizens and the State*, pp. 304-305, Table 10.1; Klingemann, "Mapping Political Support in the 1990s," Table 2.11, 51.

Table 9
Support for Democracy in Africa, Two Measures

Question	Botswana	Zimbabwe	Zambia	Malawi	Lesotho	Namibia
Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government	82	71	74	66	39	58
Democracy is always best, even when things don't work	65	74	54	59	34	43

Source: Robert Mattes, Michael Bratton, Yul Derek Davids, and Cherrel Africa, "Public Opinion and the Consolidation of Democracy in Southern Africa: An Initial Review of Key Findings of the Southern African Democracy Barometer," *The Afrobarometer Series*, no. 1, July 2000, pp. 12-13.