Strategies of Combating Insurgency in North-Eastern Nigeria:
A Non-Traditional Approach

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Abstract

Insurgency in Northeastern Nigeria has been one of the major national security issues and resulting an international concern for the global agenda of war against terrorism and international security. The insurgency has been consuming thousands of lives and billions of properties in the geo-political region breaching the national security of Nigeria. The problem identified by this paper is the method adopted in fighting against the insurgents especially the traditional security approach has failed to achieve peace, stability, and security in the region for many years since the inception of the insurgency. Thus, the paper has investigated the causes and effects of insurgency in Northeastern Nigeria and also why the current method of addressing the menace of insurgency in the region not yielding the required result. The paper is a conceptual theoretical paper which used qualitative method of data collection and analysis. The data were obtained from primary and secondary sources. Content analysis was used for data analysis and interpretation. The paper has discovered that insurgency in Northeastern Nigeria was caused by long standing socio-economic and political issues such as poverty, ideology, unemployment, ignorance, social exclusion, inequality, and external factors. Thus, for insurgency of this nature to be addressed, need for exploration and utilisation of non-traditional or non-military approach such as negotiation, ideological perception, social justice, and equitable distribution of national wealth among all classes in the country are needed.

INTRODUCTION

National security is a great administrative concern for policy makers, analysts, scholars, international organisations and agencies, international communities, individuals, and all stakeholders involve in the process locally, regionally, and globally. Nigeria is a country with a fragile national security as a result of many components that can trigger tension and insecurity in many ramifications most especially political, economic, social, and environmental. The current insurgency in Northeastern Nigeria indicates that Nigeria is now one of the terror-affected states in the world and all efforts must be put in place to address the menace.

Boko Haram has affected national security of Nigeria negatively (Nkechi, 2013). It is a group that has been observed to have been in existence for many years but manifested violently for more than a decade now (Aro, 2013). The Boko Haram insurgency in Northeastern Nigeria

has been unique in its nature because of the damages, the geographical spread and religious affiliation attached to it (Ahokegh, 2013). In its response, the government adopted the traditional or military approach to resolving the conflict which is not responsive, inadequate, temporary, and prolonging.

This study presents an entirely different approach from the previous works in this field. While there are many works in this subject matter by many scholars, one aspect that is neglected or that has not been given adequate attention by the scholars is the use of non-traditional approach in the combat against insurgency in Northeastern Nigeria. The non-traditional approach in its classical term denotes a preventive, protective, deterrence and responsive approach towards national security instead of the traditional or military method which is not responsive accordingly and inadequate as the situation on ground indicates the lingering crisis of insurgency continuing despite the combat for many years. This is the research gap and contribution to knowledge that this paper seeks to provide.

LITERATURE REVIEW

In this section, attempt was made in making a critical review of various existing literature in this subject matter of study using thematic approach. In the discussion of insurgency in Northeastern Nigeria using the means of non-traditional approach, it is pertinent to examine the recurring debates on traditional versus non-traditional approach towards national security in developing countries including Nigeria. Specifically, the study has reviewed the nature of insurgency in Northeastern Nigeria, causes, manifestations, and its effects on the security of lives and properties.

Security Debates: Traditional versus Non-Traditional

National security is a policy concern for governments globally especially in the post-Cold War era. The need for territorial defense by nation-states across the globe led to international politics of alliance and re-alliances in addition to re-examination of the security threats faced by world countries (Wolfers, 1964). There emerged an intellectual debate on the nature and concept of national and international security. The Idealist thinkers believed that harmony, cooperation, and formation of an international regulatory agency might curb the outbreak of international wars and led to a secure international environment (Johari, 1997). However, the other side of the coin, the Realist, believed that wars at international stage are inevitable as a result of conflicting national interest and dimension of international politics which is obtainable only through the ability of a state to force its way into her demands at global level. Thus, they emphasised on the need for balance of power and balance of terror to secure national territory and international environment (Wolfers, 1964, p. 6).

However, with the emergence of Cold War between the US and USSR, a new dimension of national and international security emerged academically. Many scholars (Buzan, 1983; Leffler, 1990) identified that military threat might demise as a concern for national and

international security because the Cold War was an intelligent war of espionage and counter-espionage, economic sabotage, political alliance, cultural imperialism, and deterrence. Therefore, military threat to war should not be over-emphasised. Other aspects of international security should be considered too. There are more pronounced security threats in the post-Cold War including economy, national politics, and national cohesion, environment, terrorism, marine protection, hunger and food security, refugees, poverty, and cyber security threats. All these should occupy the main concern of nation-states in terms of national security and not the traditional security threat of military. The same should also be said of international security (Buzan & Hansen, 2009, p.23).

The traditional versus non-traditional debates occupied a larger part of the 1990s in terms of national security and international security. The traditionalist failed to rule out the possibility of outbreak of war at national and international level and therefore perceives military threat as the dominant security threat that must occupy the strategic studies discourse in the 21st century. The non-traditionalist on the other hand believed that there is need for a shift from the perception of military as a threat to non-military such as the environment, food, terrorism, economy and politics while there are those who pursue the benefit of integrating the two for a viable alternative.

The developing countries are even more vulnerable in terms of national security as a result of the intricacies and complexities of international system. The internal security of most developing states is fragile as a result of the social settings, nature of political environment and instability in most of the neighborhoods. Therefore, the national security of developing states too needs to reconsider its policy, perception and settings from the usual traditional military threats to non- military threats especially the threats of religious extremism and terrorism which is currently trending and which has been a serious national and international security concern even for developed and secured countries in the world.

Insurgency in Northeastern Nigeria: Nature and Genesis

Contemporary militant Islamist movements in Northern Nigeria can be identified by the manner in which they pursue the principles of Islam. They seek to achieve their goal through violent confrontation with institutions and authorities in power. They seek strict implementation of Islamic laws and principles towards total abandoning of Western influence in their society. The early militant Islamic movement in Nigeria can be traced to 18th century during the Usman Dan Fodio Sokoto Jihad. However, the Sokoto Jihad cannot be categorised in the same status with the likes of Maitatsine and Boko Haram because it was an organised intellectual and revolutionary movement against tyranny and injustice of the Hausa rulers. It was an intellectual engagement and a knowledgeable revolution which liberalised and liberated the Hausa/Fulani land into an organised administrative system based on Islamic teaching and practice. It was later followed by Maitatsine in 1980s and Shiite movement in the 1990s and later joined by the Boko Haram sects in the 20th century which escalated into terrorism different from the first movement (Isah, 2010; Sule, Sambo, & Tal, 2018).

Boko Haram is an extremist movement shaped by its Nigerian context reflecting history of poor governance and extreme poverty in the North (Campbell, 2014). Boko Haram is an Islamic militant movement based primarily in the Northeastern region of Nigeria in the states of Borno, Yobe, Adamawa, Taraba, Gombe, and Bauchi and some Northwestern states of Kaduna, Kano and Plateau in the North central and Federal Capital Territory Abuja. The self-given name is "*Jama'atu Ahlil Sunnah Lil Da'awati Wal Jihad*", meaning "People committed to the propagation of the Prophet's teachings and Jihad. It was tagged *"Boko Haram"* in the local Hausa Language by the inhabitants in the Northeastern state of Borno where it was started; a phrase loosely translated as "Western education is forbidden" (Bowser & Sanders, 2012).

There is no sacrosanct time frame when the Boko Haram started. One of the accounts stressed that the sect started in 1995 under the leadership of one Malam Abubakar Lawan and then named several times from "*Ahlul Sunnah Wal Jama'ah Hijra*" to "Nigerian Taliban" to "Yusufiyyah sect" to *"Boko Haram"*. It has been observed that, the early attacks by the sect started in 2003 in Kanama and Geidam, Yobe State and in 2007 in Panshekara in Kano State (Onuoha, 2010, p.55). Boko Haram has been considered as a political uprising, a religious organisation, or a social movement or a purely criminal affair. The group graduated from insurgency to terrorism after the so called *"Taliban"* attack in 2003 in which it started striking police stations in remote areas. It was later metamorphosed into full blown terrorist group with deadly attacks after the assault of the army and the extra-judicial killings of the sect leader, Muhammad Yusuf, in Maiduguri, Borno state (De Montclos, 2014, p.137).

Another version suggested that the sect Boko Haram was officially founded by the late Muhammad Yusuf in 2002 in Maiduguri. Since then, it has undergone various changes in organisation and membership as well as operation (Giroux & Gilpin, 2014, p.2). This position has contradicted the above statements of the genesis of Boko Haram although the periodisation is closely linked, the place of birth and leadership differ in this and the above positions. One thing that is indisputable is that it has come into official limelight under the late Muhammad Yusuf even if he is not the actual founder of the group. Sergie and Johnson (2014) also agreed with Giroux and Gilpin (2014) on the genesis of the sect as against the above scholars. Nkechi (2013) identified the various contradictions on the genesis and founder of the sect and concludes that, there is no specific or final position on who is the original founder of the sect or its exact date of operation citing the above two different positions as her justification.

However, one narrative agreed that the sect was established as long as 1995 by the one Abubakar Lawan but when he was leaving for further studies in University of Madina he appointed the Late Muhammad Yusuf to take over the affairs of the group (Olojo, 2013, p.2). Boko Haram was originally a peaceful Islamic movement but later moved progressively towards militant extremism since 2009, regularly attacking Nigerians and foreigners, Muslims and Christians, northerners and even residents of the capital, troops and civilians. For a number of years, the group was treated as an internal Nigerian problem. However, Boko Haram's illicit and armed activities increasingly take place across the country's borders which became clearly a concern for international community (Barna, 2014).

The violent nature of Boko Haram witnessed its inception in 2009 which has changed from using low level guerilla tactics to outright warfare. In spite of a brief flare-up of violence in 2004, until the Nigerian police attack in July 2009, the worst that the sect did was isolation and radical Islamic teachings. From 2009 forward, the sect became violent beyond mere insurgency but full-blown terrorism which led to civil unrest and international concern (Cook, 2014, p.4). Since 2009, Boko Haram has attacked Nigeria's police and military, politicians, schools, religious buildings, public institutions and civilians with increasing regularity (Sergie & Johnson, 2014, p.1).

As the name suggests, the group is adamantly opposed to what it sees as a Western-based incursion that threatens traditional values, beliefs and customs among Muslim communities in Northern Nigeria. In an audiotape posted on the internet in January 2012, a spokesman for the group Abubakar Shekau even accused the US on waging war against Islam. Most of the members are largely drawn from Kanuri tribe, who are concentrated in Northeastern Nigeria and the Hausa/Fulani, who spread across Northeast, Northwest and North central (Forest, 2012, p.3). There is a different opinion on this although not contradictory since the author above said most of the members not all because the Southern ethnic groups such as Igbos and Niger-Deltans as well as Christians too were apprehended among the sect members on many occasion as compiled by Isaiah (2011) in one of his article in Leadership Newspaper titled "Is there more than meet the eyes".

The group was taken to a new stand of violent extremism and terrorism when in July 10, Abu bakar Shekau emerged as the sect's leader following the demised of late Muhammad Yusuf. Abubakar Shekau on his assumption of the mantle of leadership declared that, Jihad has begun and subsequently within few years the group became the Africa's most violent group (Zenn, 2014). The movement was seen as an offshoot of Maitatsine but with different ideology and similar method of operation which is violence and resentment for Western world (Umar, 2013, p.1). The Boko Haram differs with Maitatsine in the sense that it has grown more active and deadly in its attacks against state and civilian targets in recent years (Blanchard, 2014). Rogers (2012) also agreed that radical Islam in Nigeria has not started with Boko Haram uprising. Indeed, he went as far back as colonial era to buttress his arguments where he cited the case of resistance by the Northern Muslim groups against colonialism as the root followed later by Maitatsine's resentment of Western ideas and values in which the Boko Haram built on.

Like many radical organisations, the Boko Haram sect believed that full implementation of Shari'ah requires political change and jettison of Western institutions and structures (De Montclos, 2014, p.8). Despite numerous factors that may have suppressed the movement, Boko Haram has managed not only to continue their operations, but to grow and evolve as an organisation (El Khaim, 2012, p.1).

Succinctly, it can be summed up from the above diverse scholastic views that, Boko Haram movement is not only Islamic but also a political and economic movement against the harsh conditions in the region. It has also been observed that the movement did not started in 1999 or even 2002 as some scholars made us to believe. Some went as far as the Sokoto Jihad to link the cause but the most appropriate position is that of those who identified it as a resurgence

and continuation of Maitatsine movement in Northern Nigeria. But what are the major causes of this uprising? This has been discussed below.

Causes of Boko Haram Insurgency in Northeastern Nigeria

There is no specific or plausible clear-cut explanation or assumption that can adequately explain the reasons or the logic behind such extremism and violent approach towards social bargain. This is most especially that all the verses of the Quran and Prophetic Hadith that they are quoting to justify their devilish act have been debunked by Islamic clerics as misinterpreted and misapplied by the misguided extremist. However, academically, one can trace multiple causes by divergence of scholastic opinions. For instance, Forest (2012) identified the cause of Boko Haram as a product of widespread socioeconomic and religious insecurity. Poverty and ignorance are fertilizers that nourish insurgency globally added Forest (2012) in addition to the above causes. Apart from the above, youth unemployment, social inequality, social and economic exclusion as well as lack of proper censorship of religious activities by the government are the causes according to De Montclos (2014).

Youth bulge in Nigeria where the population of the youth is estimated at nearly 60% of the total population in the country is another attribute factor. Incidences of insurgency and reports from various agencies and stakeholders revealed that youth dominated the insurgents' activities. Indeed, the presence of a large teeming youth without a commensuration jobs opportunities, poor educational services, inequality and a deprived access to economic resources and wealth redistribution where the ruling elites allocate to themselves the largest share of the societal resources all contributed to the phenomenon of insurgency especially in the Northeast where the incidence of corruption, poverty, unemployment, diseases, malnutrition, illiteracy and other dangers of social upheaval are more pronounced than in any other part of the country (Abdullahi, Adekeye, & Balogun, 2014).

Bad governance is what most Nigerians perceived as the remote cause of Boko Haram followed by porous borders for smuggling of weapons and religious misinterpretations (Ahokegh, 2014) while Bamidele (2012) attributed the causes of Boko Haram insurgency to poor governance, inter-ethnic rivalries, institutional weakness and failure of government in addition to poverty and inequalities as well as the legacy of the external forces of global terrorism. In another version, Cook (2014) identified five major causes as poverty and underdevelopment of Northern youth, Islamic radicalism, peculiarity of Kanuri environment, African guerilla movement and climate change which desecrated the Sahel. The emergence of Boko Haram insurgency signifies grievances over poor governance and sharp inequality in Nigerian society, a symptom of decades of failed government and elite delinquency which finally ripened into social chaos (Sergie & Johnson, 2014). In essence, the above statement identified Boko Haram as the effects and not the cause going by the social problems inherent in Nigerian society before its emergence for many decades.

It is also observed that limited security intelligence and expertise is the cause of Boko Haram tragedy coupled with in-depth corruption of public officials and military personnel, unemployment, religious intolerance, ethnic rivalry, inequality, ignorance and elite rivalry are

regarded as other causes of the insurgency in Northeastern Nigeria (Nkechi, 2013). Yet, the antagonistic relationship between the ruling class and the lumpen class translate into individual and state terrorism in Nigeria according to Ogunrotifa (2013). Oghosa (2018) emphasised that political elites are the body behind the emergence of Boko Haram. It could all be remembered that the national security adviser to the former President Goodluck Jonathan revealed publicly in the South summit in 2013 that the political elites' battles and struggles for power shift between the North and the South Boko Haram. The insurgency could not be dismissing from the attitudes of the elites either in direct or indirect support of the movement. Their inaction, poor policies, non-responsive to the plight of the downtrodden and other factors can be linked in this perspective. Besides, a direct correlation is possible. Several reports and informants in this study narrated that they believed the politicians are sponsoring the insurgency for their own political motives. They questioned for example, the sources of weapons, finance, logistics and intelligence of the Boko Haram. In several cases, they are found to be swift than the security operatives in which without insiders and a genuine intelligence gathering, it could not be possible. The post-September 11 and Al-Qaeda influence is considered as a tantaliser for terrorist movement and attacks in Nigeria (Olojo, 2013). Olojo (2013) also recognised the influence of poverty and underdevelopment in steering the embers of terrorism in Nigeria in addition to what he called transnational drivers which translates into external supports from similar terrorists' groups of Al-Qaeda, ISIS, Al Shabab, and many others.

Poor governance, corruption, and worsening social conditions deepen the security problem in the North (Barna, 2014). Four major causes of Boko Haram were identified in a study which include economic marginalisation, governance failures, extremists' operations and security failures as manifested in poverty, unemployment, extreme inequality, national religious polarisation, political brinkmanship among religious elites and rampant corruption amidst mass poverty (Meagher, 2014, p..1). Ideology and failure of the state to device a common means of dealing with different militant groups that were existing before the Boko Haram were what gave impetus for the escalating activities of the sect in Northern Nigeria (Isah, 2011, p.338). Another scholar added that the disparity in educational level and income between the North and the South followed by sharp poverty, inequality, and social injustice are what led to the root causes of Boko Haram movement in the North (Umar, 2013). Apart from the views presented above, Rogers (2012) also identified the increasing abject penury as the major cause of the insurgent's activities in the North. In another different view, it is seen as the use of force in 2009 against the insurgents that led to full blown terrorism from their own part (De Montclos, 2014, p.8).

Olabanji (2015) made an effort in linking Boko Haram uprising with religious fundamentalism, politics and poverty. Analytically, none of the three points he raised can be disputed as a cause but the presentation can be countered by this work in many fronts. For instance, it is resolute that religious fundamentalism and misperception played a vital role in the movement of Boko Haram, such position has been later relegated by the unfolding of events in the insurgency activities. If Islamic fundamentalism is recognised, Isaiah (2011) argued in an article in a Leadership Newspaper in October 2011 that there is more than meet the eyes. In his presumptions, he presented 12 different cases where Christians were caught involved in the bombing of churches and other places. Based on this, this study assumed that the foundation of Boko Haram has Islamic extremism behind it but its current composition is more of an organised

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syndicated crime beyond religion. In this regard, the second and third points of politics and poverty presented by Olabanji (2015) are valid.

From the diverse consensus views, it can be inferred that, Boko Haram insurgency was caused mainly by failure of government and poor governance, sharp poverty, unemployment, inequality, corruption, ethnic politics and elite political manipulation, external factors and influence followed by misperception of religious teachings and extremism and Nigeria's fragile social cohesion or nearly total absent of it. Summarily, five major causes are identified as political, economic, social, religious and external in this perspective and particularly in this study. It is pertinent to examine how the sect manifested in its activities and the impacts of their attacks on the Nigerian national security internally and externally.

Manifestations of Boko Haram Insurgency in Northeastern Nigeria

Boko Haram insurgency or attacks started slowly as mentioned earlier in 2003 in Yobe State and in 2007 in Kano. But, the full blown violence began in 2009 and reached its highest peak in 2013 with the sect controlling more than 20 local governments in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states constituting nearly 30 percent of the Northeast region attacking with sophisticated guns such as AK 47, improvised device explosives, grenades, and other equipment of battle killing soldiers, police, and other security personnel and also attacking civilians in the mosques, churches, markets, at their residences and everywhere. This study identified some of these attacks from their inceptions (see Table 1).

Table 1: *Manifestations of Boko Haram activities from its inception to date*

Date	Event	Place	Casualties
Sep. 2002	Organisation of the group under Muhammad Yusuf	Maiduguri	None
Dec. 2003	Attacks on multiple police stations in Yobe State	Yobe	Unknown
July 2007	Panshekara attacks in Kano	Kano	16 killed many injured
July 2009	Uprising in Bauchi, Borno Kano and Yobe	Northeast	700 Boko Haram died
July 2010	Abubakar Shekau appointed as the new leader	Northeast	None
Sept. 2010	Attack on prison in Bauchi by 50 Boko Haram members	Bauchi	700 inmates released
May 2011	Boko Haram detonates three IEDs near barracks in Bauchi	Bauchi	10 people died
Aug. 2011	Attack on police station in Gombi and two banks	Adamawa	12 people died
Aug. 2011	Attacks on United Nations building in Abuja	Abuja	23 died 75 injured
Nov. 2011	Multiple attacks with IEDs in Yobe and Borno	Northeast	More than 100 died
Jan. 2012	Splinter group known as Ansaru emerged	Northeast	None
Jan. 2012	Coordinated attacks on police stations and barracks	Kano	200 people died
Mar. 2012	Attacks on police station in Gombe	Gombe	23 died
Aug. 2012	Claims on peace talk with government debunked by the sect	Northeast	None
Feb. 2013	A French family of seven kidnapped in Northern Cameroon	Cameroon	Seven
Apr. 2013	Shekau mocked the Government's plan amnesty	Nigeria	None
Apr. 2013	Battle with multinational taskforce in Baga	Borno	More than 200 died
May 2013	Announcement of military offensive in Northeast	Northeast	Uncertain
June 2013	Government proscribed Boko Haram as a terrorist group	Abuja	None
June 2013	Multiple attacks in churches on Sunday in Northeast	Northeast	More than 50 died
Aug. 2013	Ministry of Defense announced the dead of top member	Maiduguri	1
Aug. 2013	Nigeria's Army claimed Shekau died but he debunked it	Nigeria	None
Sept. 2013	Attack in checkpoint in Benisheik	Borno	More than 143 died
Sept. 2013	Shekau appeared in a video claiming he is healthy and alive	Northeast	None
Nov. 2013	United States declared Boko Haram and Ansaru as terrorist	U S A	None
Jan. 2014	Shootings in market in Kawuri	Borno	45 died
Feb. 2014	Militants attacked village in Konduga	Borno	23 died
Apr. 2014	Boko Haram abducted 276 teenage girls in Chibok	Borno	More than 200 gone
May 2014	Shekau claimed the abduction of Chibok girls	Borno	None
May 2014	Attacks on three villages in Borno but the villagers resisted	Borno	200 Boko Haram died
May 2014	Twin bomb blast in a market in the city of Jos	Plateau	118 died

May 2014	United States sent 80 troops to Chad	Chad	None
May 2014	The US Security Council added Boko Haram as terrorist	UN	None
June 2014	Raids by Boko Haram in Borno	Borno	About 500 died
June 2014	More young women were kidnapped by Boko Haram	Borno	20
June 2014	Boko Haram abducted 60 women and killed many in Kumaza	Borno	30 men killed
July 2014	Abducted girls from Kumaza escaped	Borno	None
July 2014	Damboa was raided by Boko Haram	Borno	66 died 15000 fled
Oct. 2014	Announcement of ceasefire by Nigerian Government	Abuja	None
Nov. 2014	Shekau in a video denied the announced ceasefire	Borno	None
Jan. 2015	Baga town taken over by Boko Haram	Borno	More than 2000 died
Jan. 2015	Multiple explosion in Borno	Borno	20 killed 18 injured
Mar. 2015	Two people were beheaded by Boko Haram suspected as spies	Borno	2 died
Mar. 2015	Boko Haram pledged allegiance to ISIS	Borno	None
Mar. 2015	ISIS announced the acceptance of the pledge by Boko Haram	Iraq	None
Apr. 2015	Massive killings in Damasak	Borno	More than 400 killed
Apr. 2015	Nigerian troops rescued many civilians from Boko Haram	Borno	450 rescued
July 2015	Boko Haram militants raid three villages in Borno	Borno	145 killed
Sept. 2015	Nigerian military rescued many civilians from Boko Haram	Borno	241
Sept. 2015	Attacks in a market in Kerewa	Cameroon	30 died 145 injured
Sept. 2015	241 women rescued by Nigerian military from Boko Haram	Borno	241 rescued
Feb. 2016	Attacks on two villages in Northeast by the militants	Northeast	30 killed
Feb. 2016	Suicide bombing in Northeast	Northeast	58 died
Apr. 2016	CNN posted a live video of the kidnapped Chibok girls	Northeast	None
May 2016	One of the Chibok girls rescued by Nigerian military	Borno	1 rescued
Aug. 2016	ISIS announced Musab Al Barnawi as the new sect leader	Borno	None
Aug. 2016	Chibok girls video released by Boko Haram	Borno	None
Oct. 2016	A negotiation led to the release of 21 Chibok girls	Borno	21 released
Nov. 2016	Chibok school girl found by Nigerian Army	Borno	I discovered
Jan. 2017	Another Chibok girl found	Borno	I found
Jan. 2017	Nigerian fighter jet mistakenly hit civilians	Borno	About 100 died
May 2017	82 Chibok school girls released	Borno	82 released

Source: CNN Library 2017 (compilation in tabular form made by the authors).

The above compilation is just major events and attacks by the militants there were hundreds or even thousands that were not reported by this report and some of them are famous like the Abuja Nyanya twin bomb blast which killed more than 100 people, the Kano mosque attack which killed more than 200 people, uncountable bomb attacks in Borno, Yobe, Gombe, Adamawa, Bauchi, Kano, Plateau and Abuja in addition to many local governments that were captured and controlled by Boko Haram such as Gwoza, Bama, Baga, Madagali, Mubi, Damboa and many other bigger towns in the Northeast. If all these are taken into account, there are ten times more than what the CNN Library reported. The report is incomplete because it omitted many interesting areas like numerous attacks in mosques and churches, capture of many local governments in Northeast and many other incidences. However, still the report is useful in giving a sample of what transpired.

Besides the above detailed account of the activities of Boko Haram, the manifestations of their activities earned Nigeria a notorious position and a worst ranking in Global Terrorism Index emerging as the third country affected most by terrorism in the globe according to the ranking (see Table 2).

Table 2: Nigeria's Profile Ranking in Global Terrorism Index in 2017

Rank	Country	Score
1	Iraq	10
2	Afghanistan	9.441
3	Nigeria	9.009

4	Syria	8.621
5	Pakistan	8.4
6	Yemen	7.877
7	Somalia	7.654
8	India	7.534
9	Turkey	7.519
10	Libya	7.256

Source: Global Terrorism Index 2017

Thus, it is indicated that the activities of Boko Haram have smeared the name of Nigeria among the comity of nations globally and it has reached a peak where it is only comparable with countries that are in full blown wars. Therefore, what are the impacts of the insurgency on Northeastern Nigeria? The next section discussed the impacts succinctly.

Impacts of Boko Haram Insurgency on Northeastern Nigeria

There are many divergent views of scholars on the impacts of Boko Haram insurgency in Northeastern Nigeria. For instance, Ahokegh (2013) identified the impacts as devastation in terms of destruction of thousands of lives and properties worth billions of Naira such as buildings, markets, stores, arsenals, offices, and their equipment and other structures. Bamidele (2012) on the other hand perceives the impacts of Boko Haram insurgency as erosion of national security and confidence of the general public on the ability of the security personnel to protect their lives and properties. It is also noted that, one of the impacts of terrorism in Northeastern Nigeria is perception of the image of the country across the globe as the country is turned into one of the terror haven zone and also the image of public perception of Islamic religion being smeared by the action of the few where sometimes some commentators and individuals linked Islam with terrorism directly (Aro, 2013). The Boko Haram insurgency led to the vulnerability of regional security in the Sahel and Sub-Region of West Africa and Cameroon which drew international community into the scene in terms of intervention to curtail the spread of the terror acts into other parts of Africa (Forest, 2012).

The Boko Haram insurgency created food insecurity not only in the Northeast but the entire Nigeria and indeed, West Africa because millions of farmers were displaced with many agrarian societies displaced into Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps leaving the land uncultivated for many years which caused hunger and food scarcity (Olojo, 2013). In addition, the insurgency in Northeastern Nigeria created further a sharp division among religious and ethnic groups in Nigeria with blames and suspicions among them while the Christian community suspects the group as a Jihad movement to Islamise Nigeria. The Muslims on the other hand accused the Christian community of blackmail citing the cases that Muslims are the most affected by the killings of Boko Haram and their insurgency (Blanchard, 2014). Also, Boko Haram insurgency created a response from the Nigerian military which led to collateral damage with thousands of civilians hit by the Nigerian Army in the process of operation and this scenario portrays Nigerian military as unprofessional and unethical and it also escalates corrupt practices among the military and policy makers (Omotosho, 2015).Finally, the emergence of Boko Haram insurgency displayed the visible failure of Nigerian government, sharp inequality, extreme

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poverty, corruption and poor governance as well as division among Nigerian component groups (El Kaim, 2014).

National and International Response

In any case of humanitarian crises and violent conflicts, it is expected that both the domestic government and international community will respond in many ways such as rescue mission, prevention, protection, negotiation, identifying the root causes and addressing them and most importantly in the case of insurgency, using several strategies. One of the strategies adopted by the Nigerian government is the use of coercion and traditional/military response. Security personnel were deployed in the Northeast to counter insurgency. Unfortunately, that aim has been defeated because in most cases, the insurgents tend to be holding superior firepower and are more combatant ready than the Nigerian security agencies. This has been one of the motivations behind this work. This work felt that the measures put in place are inadequate in fighting an insurgency of this nature in Northeastern Nigeria. the work opined that other viable options should be utilised among which it identified one which is; a non-traditional or non-military approach. Nevertheless, the responses are briefly analysed below to justify why they are inadequate and why the suggested approach in this study is necessary.

There are many responses locally and internationally but, the responses are inadequate and this is the major arguments of this work that the strategies adopted by both the Nigerian government and international community are not the best means of resolving the conflicts, the Nigerian government adopted responsive method which is to respond militarily towards the crisis as observed by many scholars (Onuoha 2010; Campbell, 2014; Sulaiman, 2014; Umar, 2013; Meagher, 2014) while the international community responded by helping also militarily and with intelligence information and equipment (Serrano & Pieri, 2013; Giroux & Gilpin, 2014; Barna, 2014; Meagher, 2014; Blanchard, 2014; Montclos, 2014). The current security situation and laws in the country in addition to weak political institutions all made the responses inadequate. The challenges faced by security personnel include among many lack of synergy and cooperation among the various security operatives, obsolete weapons and equipment, lack of proper intelligence gathering, hostile community relationship and low level of motivation (Adeoye, 2013; Sule, Ahmed, Alhaji, Yahaya, & Gambarawa, 2019). All the approaches above are only responsive but Nigerian government should apply preventive, protective, deterrence and responsive as counter-terror measures. This suggested approach could serve as long term solution to the problem in the study area. Indeed, the approach is a pre-insurgency, insurgency and as well as post- insurgency measure.

Framework of Analysis

This work adopted a framework design by Muthiah Alagappa (1987) in his explanation and illustration of the national security of developing countries. The framework or model identified that, basically, there are two major security threats that the developing countries are facing which are traditional and non-traditional threats and the model suggested that until and unless both of the security threats are identified and taken care of by developing countries, the countries may be vulnerable to internal and external threats both traditional and non-traditional. Nigeria is a developing country and it is affected practically by military and non-military threats and this is what prompted this work to adopt the model and apply it within the context of the chosen topic of research. Military threats consist of conventional warfare and potential risks and threats that involve warfare and military actions. The non-military threats are socioeconomic and political threats that lead to insecurity such as poverty, unemployment, disease, hunger, malnutrition, inequality, political marginalisation, lack of political, and social cohesion.

A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS

INTERNAL THREAT TO NATIONAL SECURITY
- Conflicts over the physical definition of the state
- Conflict over the organising ideology of the state
- Problem of legitimacy

EXTERNAL THREAT TO NATIONAL SECURITY
- Conflicting national interest of global and other extra-regional powers
- Other States in the region

NATURE OF THREATS
- Political
- Military
- Economic
- Social
- Terrorism
- Cyber attacks
- Food security

OBJECT TO NATIONAL SECURITY
- Idea of state
- Physical base
- Information infrastructure
- Territory
- Population
- Sovereignty
- Regime security
- Maintenance of favourable regional environment

EXTERNAL
- Geostrategy
- Historical experiences
- Relative power capabilities
- Credibility

PERCEPTION OF THREATS

INTERNAL
- Domestic Vulnerabilities
- Doctrinal
- Structural
- Psychological
- Religious

APPROACHES TO NATIONAL SECURITY
- Security through strengthening the state
  a) Security through political development
  b) Security through economic development
  c) Security through social development
  d) Security through national integration and development of national identity
- Security through food sufficiency
- Counter-terrorism
- cyber security
- Security through suppression
- Security through power and international alignment
- Security through non-alignment, neutrality and equidistance etc.
- Security through regional cooperation

INSTRUMENTS OF POLICY
- Diplomacy
- Military Power
- Political development
- Economic development
- Social development
- Legal measures
- Psychological measures
- Counter-terrorism
- Regional approach
- Intelligence
- Communication

Figure 2: *Framework Analysis (Source: Alagappa, 1987)*

The model indicates that basically, there are two major threats to national security; internal and external threats and both the two threats can be either traditional or non-traditional. In the internal case, there may be social incoherence and other vulnerabilitites that might lead to arm groups which is a traditional threats while at the external level there might be territorial and national interest issue which might set one country at conventional military conflict with the other. In the non-traditional perspective, issues such as the economy, geography, social settings, right of sea and land territory can be potential conflicts that might lead to insecurity internally and externally for developing states like Nigeria, for example. Terrorism or the case of Boko Haram here falls within both the traditional and non-traditional threats as well as internal and external security threats that Nigeria is facing.

The nature of threats can be economic, military, political and as identified by this research; terrorism, food insecurity and cyber attacks which is the recent security concern globally. Terrorism can take the military or traditional approach as in the case of shootings, bombings and slaughtering of people in which the Boko Haram is perpetrating in Nigeria. It can also be non-traditional as in the case of economic blockage where they denied thousands or even millions of targets from farming, business and social security such as schooling and attending hospitals for medical care. Thus, as identified by Alagappa (1987), any serious developing country that requires absolute national secuirty must pay attention to both internal and external security and also must give consideration utmostly to the traditional and non-traditional military threats.

Thus, threats of terrorism can lead to domestic vulnerabilitites and external threats which can compromise the credibility of national security strategy. As such, it should be a major issue of concern for policy makers not only of developing states but also of the entire globe. Therefore, the national security of developing states should pay much attention to the issue of counter-terrorism and device strategies of protecting their critical political, economic and social sectors in the discourse of their national security. All the areas marked red in the model were not hitherto identified previously in the original model by the author but, this work found it imperative to integrate them as part of its theoretical contribution.

In this perspective, the research made a significant contribution in filling the gap of knowledge and consolidating the model towards providing a more comprehensive and all-round framework of analysis that can provide theoretical explanations and analytical interpretations of national security of developing states which can give a well-articulated and illustrative support for the study of such nature in the future. It is also an expansionary model that has been taken a step further by the researchers in their efforts to shed more light in the area of study. Some studies (Hakeem, 2013; Suranjan, 2015) also concluded in their discourse that but for neglect of

the basic rights of the youth and inhabitants of the Northeast economically, socially, politically and in other ramifications (which this study interpreted as non-traditional security concerned), the Boko Haram insurgency will not have escalated into its current level even though, it has currently subsided in 2018 and 2019 and it is still low as it approaches its 11th year by 2020. However, the two studies above while recognising the non-military factors as the threats that escalated the insurgency, they still identified the conventional method as the best approach. This study differs in its approach since it emphasises more on the non-conventional or non-traditional application of conflict resolution in addressing the crisis of Boko Haram.

Conceptual Clarification.

From the framework of analysis, the work found it expedient to make some conceptual clarifications based on the assumptions of the study. Some of the concepts identified within the context of this study are Boko Haram, Insurgency, and Strategies. They are discussed below.

Boko Haram

The term 'Boko Haram' is a Hausa word. Hausa language is the lingua franca in the entire Northern Nigeria. it comprises of two words 'Boko' and 'Haram'. Initially, the founders of the insurgency movement called themselves 'Jama'atu Ahlul Sunnah Lil Da'awati Wal Jihad' translated in English as 'Movement for the Propagation of Islam and Jihad or Holy War'. In their frequent teachings, they used to mention 'Boko' which in Hausa language means 'Western Education' and 'Haram' is an Arabic word borrowed and used in Huasa to refer to 'Forbidden'. In their daily engagements and preaching, members of the movement used to refer Western education (Boko) Haram because according to them, it is through the Western knowledge that oppression, injustice and moral decadence were introduced in our societies. They perceived the poor leadership and mismanagement of societal resources as well as corruption all as the products of Western education or 'Boko'. They further argued in their preaching that 'Boko' is contradicting Quran especially the Darwinist Evolution and Marxist secular atheism. Even though, they were countered by renowned and respected well-vast religious clerics in constructive debates such as late Sheikh Ja'afar Mahmud Adam, late Muhamad Auwal Adam Albani and Sheikh Dr. Isa Ali Ibrahim Pantami, they still persisted ignorantly in their misinterpretation of the usage of Boko and Jihad terms. This is how and why they earned the name 'Boko Haram' to the extent that even the members of the sect sometimes used to refer themselves as such. These views are also narrated by many informants that were interviewed as they were also reported by many works (Blanchard 2014, De Montclos, CNN Library 2018 and Harvard Divinity School

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2018). Within the theoretical perspective of this work, the emergence of Boko Haram is both an internal and external security threats emanating from the non-traditional security aspect. This is because the movement is perceived as a response to the hopelessness and deprivation that the youth in the Northeast which is poorest in the country is suffering from. Poverty, unemployment, corruption, inequality, injustice and other social issues such as depletion of Lake Chad and encroachment of herders into farms all led to additional poverty, food insecurity and joblessness. This is why this study feels that the problem could be theoretically resolved through the non-traditional method.

Insurgency

Insurgency is the violent attacks on perceived targets especially by rebel movements on state and state apparatus such as security personnel and others. This study from the theoretical points of view recognised that the existence of both internal and external threats in non-traditional security discourse such as political, economic, social and environmental issues compelled some misguided and restive deprived youth to engage in radical movements that escalated into full-blown arms conflict in Northeastern Nigeria. Weak political settings enable for such uncensored radical preaching which metamorphosed into insurgency. A strong political commitment will not tolerate such activities under its watch with all the intelligence and coercive apparatus at its disposal. The economy in Nigeria is vulnerable leading to poor micro and macro economics indicators and settings which derived many youth into poverty and joblessness. The issue of poverty, corruption, inequality, domination, hunger, malnutrition, diseases and illiteracy all tantamount to social crises in Nigeria that led to violence in several occasions. In the environmental aspects, the desertification, food insecurity, decline of Lake Chad and fishing in the Northeast pushed many into poverty. Thus, as rightly observed by Alagappa (1987) in his theoretical disposition that non-traditional security threats can threaten the national security of any country, such fate befall Nigeria in the Northeast. Thus, it can be countered using non-traditional approach as well as suggested in later part of this work.

Strategies

In any situation of security threats, some poor strategies led to the situation and it takes a good strategy to counter them in the short run and permanently. Buzan & Hansen (2009) stressed that modern strategy is beyond mere military approach. This is because many non-military threats can emerge especially after the Cold War. Issues such as terrorism, cybercrime, insurgency, economic sabotage and others were not considered hitherto, before and during the Cold War nuclear race as serious threats.

Thus, after the Cold War, the security strategies resharpened and took a new dimension. Alagappa (1987) in his postulations above recognised the essence of integrating non-military strategies in addressing security threats especially the non-traditional ones that are related to social, political, economic, environment and others. Using a strategy that is unsuitable in addressing an issue of violent conflict will not lead to a lasting solution to the phenomenon even if it is curbed within a short period of a time. In the case of Nigeria, lack of suitable strategy led to the failure of the country to address the issue of insurgency in the Northeast. This study readily identified this loophole and suggested that the best strategies should be recognised and applied as suggested in the discussion section.

METHODOLOGY

This work used qualitative method of data collection and analysis. The paper is a conceptual paper which used both primary and secondary sources. Qualitative method is a paradigm not only for data collection but entire research in terms of generation of ideas and data for a research (Creswell, 2014). It is an extensive scientific research paradigm where specific philosophy is used in generation of ideas and data from varieties of sources for interpretation and analysis (Lune & Berg, 2017).

Thus, the primary data used for this research include government's documented sources gathered on the menace of Boko Haram insurgency in Northeast and its devastating effects on political and socioeconomic aspects of life of the inhabitants of Northeast. The secondary source is the use of books, articles in journals, maps, and internet sources.

The data collected would be analysed using a thematic interpretive analysis where sub-themes are identified which are the major issues discovered in the work and discussed using simple tables and possibly charts where applicable in addition to the discussion of the findings in relation to the existing knowledge in the area and the adopted theory was applied in the discussion of the findings in the work to enable for a contribution and suggestion for further research in this field of knowledge and social issue.

DISCUSSIONS AND FINDINGS

The work discovered that the insurgency in Northeastern Nigeria cannot be combated effectively according to the strategy currently put in place by the government. This is because the nature of the war, guerilla warfare, is the most difficult type of battles since the target or enemy cannot be recognised and can sometimes adopt defensive tactics that will deter military from responding such as kidnapping of children and foreigners.

One of the findings of this research is, Boko Haram insurgency continues to escalate from 2009 to date despite the military operation in the area which means the strategy adopted has not paid up the required result otherwise it would have subsided. This has been indicated in the summary report by the CNN Library (2017) which manifested how the attacks and suicide bombings keep on going higher yearly. This is amidst the military response to the extent that Sambisa forest was sacked yet, as at today; the insurgents are still displaying resilience with attacks and suicide bombings. This is supported by the assumption made by Alagappa (1987) that national security of developing states should give emphasis on both the traditional and non-traditional approach by taking care of the political, economic, social, cultural, and environmental factors towards national security and not only military aspect. However, from 2017 to 2019 and towards 2020, the level of insurgents' activities declined steadily. This has relevance with the offer of amnesty and negotiation that the current government employed when it assumed power in 2015. This has further supports the view of this work that better strategies than conventional warfare are the alternative of combating insurgency in Northeastern Nigeria.

Also, the research discovered that even with the increase assault and military operation by Nigerian forces, regional alliance and international support for many years, the insurgency persisted earning Nigeria a detested rank of third most terror affected state in the world in 2017 according to Global Terrorism Index (2017). It displayed how national security of Nigeria have been compromised internally and externally as observed by Alagappa (1987) in the model adopted that developing countries faced internal and external threats from both traditional and non-traditional security system. It also depicts the inadequacy of the strategy adopted and the responses as hypothesised by this paper from the beginning which means an alternative framework or strategy of combating terrorism must be initiated and adopted.

The paper also identified that, the Boko Haram insurgency has many devastating effects such as economic stagnation, social problems including refugees, dislocation of individuals, corruption, unemployment, poverty, killings and separation of families,

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political problem which further create chasm in the national political equation leading to blame games and politicisation of the security religious issues which is extremely difficult to handle due to its sensitivity. The above position has been supported by many scholars (Aro, 2013; Onuoha, 2010; De Montclos, 2014; Forest, 2012; Umar, 2013; Isah, 2010; Blanchard, 2014; Sule, Sambo & Tal, 2018). Thus, it is discovered that, military strategy alone cannot ameliorate the problems created by the insurgency in addition to the insurgency itself. There is need for more strategies in non-military aspects to curb the problems but, the Nigerian government seems to concentrate only on military offensive in the process making the insurgents more reactive and responsive thereby leading to more problems that the government is not paying attention to presently.

This is one of the arguments presented by Alagappa (1987) in his analysis of the national security of developing states that if one aspect of security either internal or external from traditional or non-traditional security threats is not considered, it will lead or affect national security of developing countries as observed above.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

The paper concludes that the strategy adopted by the Nigerian government towards addressing the issue of insurgency in Northeastern Nigeria is inadequate and cannot solve the problem. It will only prolong the insurgency and make it more devastating making the national security of Nigeria weak, fragile, vulnerable, and turning the Nigerian state ungovernable which will drive away foreign investors making the economy to decline and also diverting a huge sum of money into security sector which should have been used to provide critical national infrastructure for national development. As such the paper recommends that economic integrity should be pursued through intensive policies that will foster economic growth and development, negotiation and persuasion should be adopted in dealing with the insurgents to denounce their heinous activities and embrace peace, deradicalisation and rehabilitation of the insurgents as well as post-conflict peace building should be intensified, social cohesion should be targeted through equality and equity among various groups in the country, political stability needs to be achieved through the promotion of democratic principles and values, religious aspect should be considered; for instance, censorship should be considered by policy makers of suspicious ideology and preaching that are considered a threat to national security, intelligence gathering and community involvement in information, and data collection and proper communication among all stakeholders in the security sector and the entire community are necessary.

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