THE POLITICAL COMMUNICATION OF ISLAMIST PARTIES IN DEALING WITH THE 2024 INDONESIAN ELECTION: A COMPARATIVE STUDY BETWEEN THE PROSPEROUS JUSTICE PARTY (PKS) AND THE UNITED DEVELOPMENT PARTY (PPP)

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Abstract

From the point of view of similarity, conversion insurance and takaful are transactional products or services for its customers. However, Islam prohibits all transactions containing gharar (uncertainty) elements and maysir (gambling). The need to buy property, health or education makes the Muslim community in Malaysia, whether government or private employees, directly engage in the insurance or takaful industry. Since educators are the largest group of government employees, they are certainly one of the main groups involved in insurance contributions or takaful. Therefore, this study is to look at the factors that encourage educators at Tanah Merah Secondary School,

INTRODUCTION

The 2024 election in Indonesia will be the direct election of the world held in one single day. This election consists of five different ballot papers, namely: House of Representatives, Regional Representative Council, presidential election, provincial parliament members, and municipal/county parliament members. In the same year, Indonesia will also have the regional head election that will be held simultaneously across the country. Regarding the election, Muslims constitute the biggest group of voters. This fact has brought opportunities and challenges for Islamist parties. It is

surprising that although Muslims are majority, voters of Islamist parties have decreased continuously during the Reform Era, from 1999 to 2019. In the 2019 last election, the accumulative votes gained by Islamist parties were not more than 30 percent. Being aware of this situation, many attempts have been taken by Islamist parties to attract more popular votes. The attempts include the party's platform branding, namely bringing Islamic ideology into the political arena. Nevertheless, such an attempt did not affect to any significant rise. Based on this fact, this study aims at investigating three important questions, i.e., a) what is the driving factors affecting to the decrease of Islamist parties' voters in the election during the Reform Era? b) what is political communication strategies employed by Islamic parties in dealing with the upcoming 2024 election? and c) how effective are those strategies in gaining Muslim voters. In answering those questions, this study takes *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera* (Prosperous Justice Party or PKS) and *Partai Persatuan Pembangunan* (the United Development Party or PPP) as comparative cases. The selection of these two Islamist parties is based on the fact that although both are Islamic parties, they operate on different ideological basis.

Keywords: *Political Communication, Election, 2024 Election, Islamist Parties*

Introduction

In the history of Indonesian Islamic politics, Islamic political parties rarely successfully dominated the stage. The only period witnessed the ascendance of Islamic politics was in 1955 election. In 1955, when election was held for the first time in the Republic history, total votes percentage gathered by Islamic parties was at 43,5%. In the subsequent periods, both in Old Order (under Sukarno) and New Order (under Suharto), Islamic parties showed steady decline in gathering popular votes. This significant drop is paradoxical. It is a paradox, since given the fact that Muslims are major religious group in the country, positions of Islamic parties are marginal. Surprisingly, this fact is also true in the post-New Order time. The data of Indonesian Election Commission (*Komisi Pemilihan Umum*, KPU) shows that in recent years, total votes gained by Islamic parties never superseded their counterpart's performance in 1955 election. During the Reform Era, the vote-gain of Islamic parties swing between 16 to 30% (*Kompas*, 04/05/2022). The detail percentage of Islamic parties' vote-gain from year to year are as follows: 1971 election (26 percent), 1999 election (36,8 percent), 2004 election (38,1 percent), 2009 election (29 percent).

The figure quoted above shows that in three consecutive elections (1999, 2004, 2009); Islam-based parties such as *Partai Persatuan Pembangunan* (PPP), *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera* (PKS), *Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa* (PKB), *Partai Amanat Nasional* (PAN), and *Partai Bulan Bintang* (PBB) experienced fluctuate yet insignificant vote-gain. Although some Islamic parties recorded more vote-gain than others, in general, it can be obviously seen that popular support to Islamic parties was marginal. In 2014 election, situation did not change. None of Islamic parties were ranked in top five vote gathers. In addition, the electability of Islamic parties' leaders such as Hatta Rajasa of National Mandate Party (PAN), Lutfi Hasan and Anis Matta (PKS), and Muhaimin Iskandar (PKB) were considerably lower compared to nationalist figures such as

Megawati, Aburizal Bakrie, Prabowo Subianto and Wiranto. It is an apparent indicator of Islamic parties' devastating position in the context of Indonesian politics in general.

Although the decline is a setback in Indonesian Islamic politics, it can basically be seen in a positive way. It should be taken as a moment for evaluations of Islamic parties' performance and real contribution to the people of Indonesia. Basically, there is no single factor able to best explain the marginality of Islamic politics. However, among many interrelated factors, poor performance of Islamic parties is caused by inability of Islamic parties to build effective political communication and play fundamental roles relevant to people's need. Empirically, the presence of Islamic parties in Indonesia has minor contributions for the betterment of people's quality of life as well as the elevation of their prosperity. This article in an investigation and analysis of factors leading to marginal performance of Islamic parties by taking *Partai Persatuan Pembangunan* (PPP) and *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera* (PKS) as case studies. The hypothetical conclusion offered by this paper is that the decline is caused by many factors. However, the most fundamental factor is political communication strategies. Therefore, after revealing and analysing interrelated declining factors, this paper will also investigate and analyse strategies of political communication employed by both Islamic parties under study in order to rebrand their images and regain popular vote in the next election.

Methodologically, this is qualitative research with a constructivist paradigm, namely placing observation and objectivity in order to discover reality, phenomenon or science in constructivist way. The approach used in this research is qualitative with case study method. A case study is an elaboration of a system that has an attachment to one or many cases from time to time through interviews or in-depth data collection and involves various sources of information in a context (Creswell, 1998). This system is bound by time and place. In studying cases, this study will rigorously examine programs, events, or activities. This research attempts to explore the factors causing the decline of popular support to PPP and PKS, and how the political communication strategy is used for the 2024 Simultaneous Elections so that the party's vote acquisition can increase significantly.

Total Perolehan Suara Parpol Berbasis Islam

Pemilu	Perolehan Suara	Persentase
1955	16.433.201	43,5%
1971	14.833.942	27,1%
1977	18.743.491	29,3%
1982	20.871.880	27,8%
1987	13.701.428	16,0%
1992	16.624.647	17,0%
1997	25.340.018	22,4%
1999	38.802.189	36,7%
2004	43.434.666	38,3%
2009	30.338.086	29,2%
2014	39.244.020	31,4%
2019	42.059.378	30,0%

Source: Indonesian Election Commission and *Kompas*

Driving Factors of the Party Decline

Political process is a complicated dynamic. Interrelation between many factors will determine certain condition. Dynamics of Islamic parties are not an exception. The ascendance and descendance of Islamic parties in Indonesian power struggles must not be dependent on one single root-causes. A number of previous studies confirmed this situation. Mulyana (2013) maintains that discovering answer as to what factors leading to the deteriorating position of Islamic parties is not an easy task. In similar tone but with different confidence, Noor (2016) believes that there are multiple factors led to marginal performance of Islamic parties in contemporary Indonesian politics. Among many factors, four are fundamental, namely: (1) Internal friction within the party; (2) Weak leadership and the absence of strong patronage, which in turned loosened the solidity among parties' members; (3) Weak parties' ideology which resulted in the increase of exclusivism and pragmatism; and (4) External factor, namely various government's policies and interest which sometimes created limitation for Islamic parties, especially parties in conflict (Noor, 2016).

Referring back to 1955 election, the outstanding performance of Islamic political parties at that time was due to fundamental beliefs of Islamic parties' leaders that as a state, Indonesia should be run in Islamic ways. This belief was parallelly implemented in the form of support to Islamic parties in election. However, the situation dramatically changed when Suharto's took over the power from Sukarno and established his own political system. Although aspiration to run Indonesia in Islamic ways, still strongly circulated among Muslim political leaders, Suharto's new political policies had prevented them from realising this idealism. Suharto's early step to power was featured by his cautious stances to Islam. The trilogy of *deidologisasi* (de-idelogization), *depolitisasi* (depolitization), and *deparpolisasi* (de-party-ization) taken by Suharto to consolidate his-still-fragile power was in expense of Muslim political groups. Deparpolisasi was a policy to fuse many parties with similar ideologies. All Islamic parties exited during Orde Lama was fused into one single new party called *Partai Persatuan Pembangunan*; while all nationalist-inclined parties were united in *Partai Demokrasi Indonesia* (PDI). Other than these two parties, government channelled its own ruling party called *Golongan Karya* which is better known as Golkar. Within this situation, it is understandable that *deparpolisasi* has marginalized and ousted Islamic parties.

From time to time, Islamic parties were struggling to regain their existence. However, the situation was worsened by internal condition of Islamic political parties which faced the problem of solidity. The tensions within many Islamic parties are mostly unresolved and, in many cases, have caused political split. Partai Persatuan Pembangunan is one of Islamic parties suffered from ongoing lack of solidity problems, with some problems originated from parties' elites. During the leadership of Suryadharma Ali-Romahumurziy conflict took place, and similar conflict continued in the period Romahurmuziy-Djan Faridz leadership. Dispute among party's leaders and members in *Partai Amanat Nasional* (a party which mostly associated with modernist Muslim group, Muhammadiyah), for example, has resulted in the establishment of *Partai Ummat*.

Similar situation is the case with *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera* (PKS). Internal conflict within the party is unreconcilable which led to the birth of *Partai Gelora*. This party suffered from individualism and factionalism which brought serious implication for its performance. Conflicts allegedly motivated by factional dissenting opinions within the party's circle are mostly unresolved and untouchable (Akmar, 2019). In PKS case, inter-fraction conflicts have brought effects on representational function in the parliament led by Fahri Hamzah. Consequently, the circulation of elites within the party could not run smoothly. Both executive and legislative positions are circulated among certain faction in expense of others' marginalization. PKS has failed to settle their internal conflicts; and it is clear that this failure is due to dysfunctionality of party's ethics council.

Regarding frequent split within political parties, Marcus Mietzner (2010) offers an analysis. For him, conflicts, tensions, and even the split of a political parties is a result of interconnected factors. There is no single factor in such dynamics. More specifically, the ability of political parties in institutionalizing the party as a system also determinant in guarding the unity of a party (Mietzner & Aspinall , 2010). Other factors include the involvement of legislative members of respective parties involved in corruption, low quality performance of legislative members, high potential of ideological dispute. The combination of some or all of these factors have worsened the image and reputation of Islamic party before the public.

The Failure of Political Communication

From a communication studies perspective, the failure of Islamic parties in gaining significant popular support in election is a form of communication failure (Mulyana, 2013). Why communication fail? As the main goal of communication is deliverance message, the failure of communication lies in the failure of audience to grasp messages. When a communication is not clear and involves complex processes, it is very likely to fail. In social phenomena, it is the complicated process of communication which prevented from clear identification of cause and effect. Complicated and abstract communication phenomena cannot be assumed in simple way. Therefore, complication of communication process cannot be left unresolved, since the ability to resolve problems will determine the success of Islamic parties, in this case PPP and PKS, to convince their voters. To put it in simple way, according to concept of communication as suggested by Harold D. Laswell, communication involves basic elements such as communicator, audience, symbol (message), media or channel through which messages are delivered, feedback, communication obstacles and the context of time and space. Effective communication can only be reached when all its basic elements harmoniously function. The absence or dysfunctionality of one communication element will systemically influence the function of other elements, which culminated in communication failure.

Identifying communicator as source of communication and the communicant as the destination of the message is very crucial (McQuail & Windahl, 1993). In attempts to deliver political messages to public, communicators should formulate and construct it proportionately based on public's psychological condition. Furthermore, in order for communication activities to effective to voters, a political communicator is also required to convey creative and innovative messages through appropriate media and for

appropriate audience. In relation to Islamic parties' political communication, it can be underlined that political communication of Islamic parties is effective if the popular support for them in 2024 election are significant and the members of Islamic parties are elected as members of parliament.

Bagan 1: Proses Komunikasi Lasswell
(Dikutip oleh: McQuail & Windahl, 1993, hal. 12)

Who? **Communicator**	Says what? **Message**	In which channel? **Medium**	To whom? **Receiver**	With what effect? **Effect**

Communicator Analysis. Sociologically, Indonesian society are much influenced by paternalism. Communication pattern in a paternalistic society is greatly dependant on communicators (Mulyana, 2013). Moreover, a paternalistic society are very much bounded by the charisma of a figure. In the context Islamic parties, the charisma of Muslim leaders is profoundly important. Indonesian political history has witnessed the roles of charismatic leaders as played by Abdurrahman Wahid, popularly known as Gus Dur, the fourth president of Republic of Indonesia. In contrast, charismatic leaders from Islamic parties are currently difficult to find. The leaders of Islamic parties such as Suryadharma Ali and Romahurmuzy (PPP) or Hatta Rajasa who succeeded the PAN leadership from Amien Rais, can be seen as ordinary leaders. Compared to other political leaders such as Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Megawati, they can be valued as less charismatic. Danniel Katz maintains that a political leader must be able to utilize his/her influence in two ways. This ability will enable the party to change the social structure and attract voters' interests. Internal conflicts in Islamic parties, which happened to PPP and PKS, show failure of Islamic parties to provide a model on the importance of unity and internal solidity.

This situation leads to paradox and anomaly. While Islamic parties promote implementation of Islamic values in all walks of life, their empirical conditions contradict values they promoted. For example, Islam teaches unity and brotherhood, on the one hand. However, these values are not well-reflected in the context of interpersonal relation among party members, on the other. Reflecting on what took place in PPP dan PKS, it can be underlined that almost all parties' elements (leaders, cadres and members) experience what so-called cognitive dissonance, namely discomfort feelings which worsened relationship among members and affected cohesiveness of party. Unavoidably, this led to negative public opinions and perceptions namely that Islamic values and framework campaigned and advocated by party leaders were only rhetoric. Not only it is a rhetoric, Islam is also falsely used as political commodities.

Reflecting on the case of PKS, in the beginning of its establishment, PKS offered Islamic platform and public was convinced that PKS is an ideal and exceptional Islamic party due to its initial solid consolidation and clear political platform. However, by the passing of the time, PKS's idealism and exceptionalism faded, and it turned as a

pragmatic political party as any others. Among many other things, decadence of PKS started when its president, Lutfi Hasan Ishaq, was involved in corruption case of beef import which resulted in his capture and imprisonment. In anticipating the party turbulence, PKS leaders were unsettled, and they seek to restore party's reputation through many policies and actions. Nevertheless, the attempts proven ineffective as within this attempts, violations of Islamic values were obviously perpetrated by party leaders whom public perceived as pious models. Based on this situation, public's mistrust to PKS, specifically, or any Islamic parties, generally, mostly originated from disappointment of party leaders' false piety, that they sell religion for political ends (Affandi, 2013). In PKS case, political turbulence was tackled gradually. During 2019 election, PKS image and reputation was restored due to solid performance of its members and cadres.

Analysis on Political Messages of Islamic Parties. In a communication perspective, political message is fundamental element in communication, both verbal and non-verbal. Referring to Laswell's theory, political communication necessitates the presence of messages and political actors. In order political communication to be effective, political actors are obliged to convey substantial messages. In the context of Islamic parties, however, they fail to deliver substantive message, and in contrasting mode, they even continuously produce artificial, symbolic and general messages. Islamic parties lack uniqueness in terms of political platform which made them indifferent with other parties, especially those are with nationalist orientation. In this case, PPP showed inability to adapt with changes and unable to identify which social groups are their potential voters. In current situation, 60 percent of voters are youth. This means that ability to formulate political messages in accordance with youth's need and vocabularies is fundamental and unavoidable. Nationalist parties, on the other, have been genuinely able to grasp this phenomenon, so their messages are more acceptable by youth.

Referring back to *deideologisasi*, *depolitisasi* and *deparpolisasi* afore-mentioned, they also bring consequence for Islamic parties in terms of their ability to adapt themselves with modernization wave. Consequently, public believe that Islamic parties are not appropriate political channels. In fact, Muslims have chosen various political parties to channel their aspiration and do not necessarily affiliate themselves to Islamic parties."[1] Public's reluctance to elect Islamic parties also corresponds with the way Islamic parties formulate Islam and modernity. Rather than seeking congruence of Islamic values with modernity, Islamic parties tend to show versions of contradict to modernity. In fact, as far as values are concern, modernity is compatible with Islam. Deddy Mulyana, professor of Communication Studies at Padjajaran University, Bandung; confirm this analysis. Mulayana contends Islamic group or institutions do not need to explicitly exploit the symbols of Islam. Rather, Islam should be taken as spirit and Islamic values should be empirically implemented in practices. The use of Islamic symbolism which is not accompanied by implementation will only create impression management. The way Islamic parties bring Islam into politics does not correspond Muslims' aspiration and idealism on the place of religion in politics. However, in the

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[1] Interview with Senior Researcher, Indonesian Council of Research, Firman Noor, 25 January 2023.

midst of this situation, PKS can be seen as relative exception. Generally, when as long as Islamic parties are concerned, there is a tendency to parallelize Islamic parties with PKS, although in order to build a solid public parallelism between PKS and Islam as values, many more things to do by PKS.

Audience Analysis. Although Muslim is major religious group in Indonesia, the meaning of Islam is much more symbolic and superficial rather than substantial. In other words, the high quantity of Muslim in Indonesia does not reflect the Islamicity level of its people. A survey conducted by Pew Research Center (PRC) expose paradoxical face of Indonesia. Although superficially religious, moral violations such as insultation, corruption, discrimination and persecution are common. In such situation, Islamic parties should basically play transformational roles to substantially islamize society. Theoretically speaking, exposure of transformational roles will send Islamic parties to certain proximities with people. Islamic parties' policies should be set more populist and avoid elitism by reproducing phrases and narratives which are easily digest by public. Ideally, choosing Islamic parties is a rational choice for Muslims, as ideological proximity between Muslim voters and Islamic parties is too obvious. Islamic parties should accurately take this opportunity by setting breakthrough, innovation and creativity which are more compatible with popular need and aspiration to face 2024 election.

Media Analysis. Media convergence tremendously influences and impacts audiences, and more specifically voters, in elections. However, the fundamental question is whether political campaigns carried out in the form of political advertisements in the mass media, placing banners, pamphlets have significantly influenced voters to elect Islamic parties? From election to election, the fact is that political campaigns are less effective in obtaining significant votes (Setiyono, 2008). This condition is exacerbated by the fact that Islamic parties such as PPP and PKS do not have the support of the mass media, because the existing media provide more support by spreading issues that are more in favor of the nationalist party as the party winning the election.

Islamic parties need to have a strategy and a special team to be able to design political communications that not only attract Muslim voters but also non-Muslim voters. People who are increasingly critical, especially young people, use conventional media that are considered less effective. So far, Islamic parties have flocked and gathered masses to highlight political candidates who are strong, cool and Islamic. It is as if everything seems trite and contrived with slogans that people can't understand. Political parties are only known by the public but do not come to the decision to vote for an Islamic party at the polling place (TPS).

**The Strategy of Political Communication towards the 2024 Election**

General and simultaneous election in 2024 is a great challenge for Islamic parties, as election in all levels are held simultaneously, its management, administration and realization will be complicated and costly, at the same time. In terms of popular support and ability to gather votes, this will also be difficult time for Islamic parties, considering the fact that the number of participants of 2024 election increase compared to last election. This will inevitably require Islamic parties, in this case PPP and PKS, to work

more substantially in order to gain popular support. One possible strategy both PPP and PKS can adopt is restoration and reformulation of their political communication.

Political communication is an important part of political organization. This condition can be seen from the pattern of communication carried out by the organization, such as internal and external communication, vertical, horizontal communication, one-way and two-way communication as well as verbal and nonverbal communication. In the context of Islamic parties' political communication ahead of the 2024 simultaneous elections, it is a tough challenge for PPP and PKS with complex conditions. There are more competitors, both Islamic parties and nationalist parties, compared to the 2019 simultaneous elections. Islamic parties are required to have creative and innovative strategies with breakthroughs that are different from nationalist parties. The political communication strategy carried out by PPP and PKS can be described as follows:
Source: elaborated from research findings.

Islamic Party Rebranding. The Islamic parties rebranding y is an effort that can be made by the party to adapt to changing times and the challenges it faces. One of the Islamic parties that is rebranding ahead of the 2024 simultaneous elections is PKS. The decision to rebrand is caused by structural changes that have a very fundamental effect on organizational identity and become the main strategy (Muzellec & Lambkin, 2006). The characteristics of rebranding are the tagline and new name, symbol, design, change of logo to change the brand image in voters. After the V PKS National Conference in Bandung on Sunday, November 29 2020, PKS launched the symbol, march and hymn as the party's new spirit in the journey of nation and state. This is a symbol that PKS has a commitment to always want to be close and warm with all people without exception (PKS, 2020). According to Berger and Luckman (1966) in his book "The Social Construction of Reality: A treatise in the sociology of knowledge" that the sociology of knowledge is described in social processes through their actions and interactions when individuals intensely create a reality that is subjectively owned and experienced together. The round shape contained in the PKS symbol depicts harmony, equality, order, unity and unity of direction in order to fight for justice and people's welfare in Indonesia based on Pancasila.

While the crescent moon symbolizes the dimension of time, beauty, harmony, enlightenment, the nobility of Islam to be able to maintain the glory, balance, continuity of history, and continuity of the life order of the nation and state. The symbol of a string of 17 grains of rice on an upright stalk has the meaning of fairness, ukhuwah, istqomah, brave, disciplined in carrying out tasks, and firm in realizing justice and prosperity. Orange is the new color. The color reflects warmth, hope, the spirit of life that is always optimistic and always feels young at heart. While the white color symbolizes purity, cleanliness, sincerity, sincerity and nobleness in doing anything. The black color symbolizes discipline, willingness to work hard, firmness, strength, authority, certainty, aspiration and protection.

In view of the constructivist paradigm, the change in the PKS logo is a transformation that sees the social reality faced in the current era as a social construction created by individuals who are free human beings. Individuals become determinants in the social world according to their will (Berger & Luckman, 1966). This is also reinforced by Edward Bernays's thought that in Public Relations, PR always follows civilization. PKS changed the hymn, march and logo in order to keep up with the times by taking into account demographic bonuses and the high number of millennial voters in the 2024 election.

"PKS is committed to presenting new ideas and ideas to keep up with the times. Because conditions and situations are always changing, PKS sees the need to refresh and investigate future developments. It is hoped that the new PKS logo, march and hymn can embrace all segments and be even more communicative."[2]

Apart from PKS, PPP is also making transformation efforts to face the challenges of the 2024 election so that votes do not continue to decrease by adjusting to ongoing political developments. PPP is moving towards the center of becoming a religious nationalist party. The narrative developed is to maintain unity with development and strengthen the narrative to prevent polarization and political division in society. To maintain the traditional voter base, PPP strengthened its historical network with NU through activities and meetings with residents and officials, both at the central and branch levels.

"The segmentation of nationalist and religious voters is actually not beneficial for the development of Indonesia's political future. PPP wants this division to be a thing of the past. In the future, we must strengthen the history that Muslims are true nationalists."[3]

Strong Media Support. Islamic parties such as PKS and PPP need to have successful teams capable of designing strategies for dealing with the media, managing the image of both candidates and political parties for audiences, internal and external party communications, managing information including through networks and social media. This is of course done so that the power of the media is not solely played by the big nationalist parties. Apart from that, it is important to pay attention to the packaging and

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[2] Interview with PKS Central Board's Public Relations, 10 June 2022
[3] Interview with PPP Vice-Chairman PPP Arsul Sani.

management of issues that are of interest to the public. Because so far crucial issues are often not considered by Islamic parties. Entering the 2024 election campaign stage, Islamic parties no longer need to create political advertising campaigns such as advertisements for cooking spices which are trite and not substantive. This will not attract sympathy for voters. In terms of media support, PKS is trying to innovate by producing quality PKS TV and podcast content as a form of political education for voters, bearing in mind that the public is increasingly critical, especially young voters who already have strong choices of their own.

Strengthening Leadership. In the post-New Order era, leadership in Islamic parties shows strengthening tendency. It is unavoidable that in 1999 and 2004 elections, there were slight vote increase for Islamic parties. This was due to charisma and influence of two prominent figures, Abdurrahman Wahid and Amien Rais. Although seems irrational, figures and charisma they brought have played instrumental consideration for public to vote Islamic parties. In many cases, charisma of leaders plays stronger role than ideology. For this reason, strengthening Islamic parties' leadership can be taken as an alternative strategy to attract more votes in 2024 election. In order to support this strategy, regeneration is also important to avoid generational gaps within the parties.

Adequate Funding. One important factor in decline of Islamic parties' vote-gain is the unavailability of adequate funding. It is fully understandable that without proportional funding, many parties' activities will go impossible. Those include socialization of parties' platform, mission, and also figures and leaders. Socialization through media is expensive which rationally require adequate fundings. In an agenda setting theory, the more parties are present on media, the more popular they will be, both the parties and figures or leaders. PKS and PPP need to seriously seek for solution related to election fundings in order to make them easier to persuade public through media socialization.

Utilisation of Coattail Effect. Islamic parties must also accurately utilise coattail effect of election, namely overflows of political parties votes, as effect of presidential candidature a party proposed. Islamic parties must seriously pay attention to this aspect, especially voters from youth who are usually swing-voters due to lack of experience they exposed. Based on this rationale, support to presidential candidates in 2024 election, must be adjusted to aspiration and choice of grass-root voters. Failure to perform this aspect will only result in failure to gain significant votes.

CONCLUSION

The decline of Islamic parties' vote-gain in the post-1955 election is a form political communication failure. This claim can be identified from the dysfunctionality of communication elements such as communicator analysis, political message analysis, audience analysis and media analysis. Regarding political communication employed by PKS and PPP towards 2024 election are by party rebranding, seeking strong media supports, strengthening charisma and leaderships of figures, funding for election and utilizing coattail effect.

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